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Abstract 
 One of the main themes of this project is identity and it is examined in relation 
to how some Americans perceive other people in countries of interest. The main 
concerns of this project stem from the American led war in Iraq and Edward Said’s 
Orientalism. Through literary analysis Said presents a picture of the West as having a 
negative discourse about people from the Orient. 
 Based on these interests, I discuss some of the influences that might have 
affected the American mind-set. Additionally, I examine if it is possible to draw out a 
particular discourse that might serve as a representation of an American mind-set. 
 To examine and illustrate these aspects I have created a frame of analysis 
which acts as a guideline for analyzing the case material. This frame consists of a 
discussion of Michel Foucault’s theories on discourse, knowledge, and power. 
Foucault examines discourse by looking at its origin and how it has come to 
look the way it has. By doing so, one is able to isolate a particular discourse. Further, 
Foucault’s theory on discipline illustrates how it has been possible for some people to 
manage and control others by way of analysis and study. This is important to the 
project in that it explains how some people from the West have learned to deal with 
certain studies of other peoples and cultures. 
Moreover, Said’s Orientalism is included because he examines the effects of 
the Western discourse and discipline. Said claims that there has been a clear division 
between East and West and people in the West have come to accept this as part of life. 
Moreover, the discussion of Said is used in the analyses of the case study in order to 
examine if this belief is existent in the American mind-set and if the behaviors of 
Americans, who stay abroad, are affected by this. 
Furthermore, Stuart Hall is discussed in relation to identity and representation. 
People attribute identity to other people based on representations thus it is interesting 
to discuss this and relate it to the analyses of the case study. Representations are 
important to examine since these might not be true and thus provide a biased picture 
of reality. 
Stereotypes are discussed as a fourth component of the theory. These are 
common to all people but the degree to which they are believed and lived by varies. 
Examining stereotypes illustrates the identity some people attribute others but also 
how these people see themselves in relation to the other. 
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A discussion of Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations provides 
a picture of the role America plays in the world. This chapter describes aspects of the 
American worldview which might explain how some Americans think of others and 
themselves. 
 In order to examine the development and the perception of an American mind-
set I have chosen to include both fiction and reportage in the case study material. This 
choice is based on the fact that I wish to examine how Americans are perceived, from 
the point of view of authors, but also through reportage which is supposed to hold an 
objective stance. Both genres provide a description of American attitude and actions 
in foreign countries. The case includes content analysis of Graham Greene’s The 
Quiet American and The Ugly American by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick. 
These novels deal with the American interest in Asia in the 1950s. Second half of the 
case deals with the American involvement in the current war in Iraq based on 
Generation Kill by Evan Wright and newspaper articles from The New York Times. 
The analyses draw out behaviors and ways of thinking that Americans are described 
to have while staying in a foreign country.  
 There are many different American characteristics which describe different 
ways of thinking about themselves and other people. It is clear that even though there 
appear to be an overall discourse which influences many Americans, there are 
Americans who still choose not to live by this and thus act and think differently. Thus 
it is difficult to establish one particular discourse. According to Said, people from the 
West have a negative attitude toward people from the East, which developed hundreds 
of years ago and still exists. However, as seen in the analysis, this attitude can be both 
positive and negative and is moreover subject to change. 
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Abstrakt 
Et af hovedtemaerne i dette projekt er identitet og dette undersøges i 
forbindelse med hvordan nogle amerikanere har tendens til at opfatte andre 
mennesker i de lande de har interesser.  
Problemstillingen for projektet er udformet således, at jeg til at begynde med 
vil kigge på hvilke faktorer der har haft indflydelse på amerikansk opfattelse. 
Endvidere vil jeg på baggrund af min empiri undersøge, om det er muligt at fremhæve 
een specifik diskurs der kunne repræsentere amerikansk tankegang.  
For at kunne besvare disse områder  bruger jeg teorier til at udforme en 
analyseramme som senere bruges til at analysere det empiriske materiale. Teorien 
består af en diskussion af Michel Foucault’s teorier om diskurs og disciplin. I den 
forbindelse inddrages synspunkter fra Edward Said’s ”Orientalism”. Endvidere 
omfatter teorien Stuart Hall som beskæftiger sig med identitet. Der er somme tider 
tendens til katogisere andre mennesker og derfor bliver dette diskuteret i relation til 
hvilke indflydelser dette kan have på menneskers tankegang. Til slut i teoriafsnittet 
diskuteres Amerikas rolle som supermagt og hvilken indflydelse dette har haft. Dette 
er på baggrund af Samuel Huntington’s bog ”The Clash of Civilizations”.                        
For at kunne undersøge en udvikling og en opfattelse af den amerikanske 
tankegang inddrages både fiktiv og faktuel litteratur. Denne omfatter den amerikanske 
oplevelse og tilstedeværelse i asien i 1950’erne og den nuværende krig i Irak. Den 
fiktive del af litteraturen består af Graham Greene’s ”The Quiet American” og ”The 
Ugly American” skrevet af William Lederer og Eugene Burdick. De beskriver of 
kritiserer begge den amerikanske tilstedeværelse i asien. Den faktuelle litteratur består 
af Evan Wrights ”Generation Kill” og artikler fra ”The New York Times” der alle 
handler om krigen i irak. Værkerne bliver analyseret på baggrund af indholdsanalyse.  
Her er det blandt andet muligt at undersøge og analysere beskrivelser af amerikanere 
og forholde disse beskrivelser til hinanden.  
Resultatet af undersøgelsen er, at det til dels ikke har været muligt, at fastsætte 
en specifik diskurse som kan bruges som en repræsentation af den amerikanske 
tankegang som blandt andet Said har tendens til at gøre det i ”Orientalism”. Det er 
muligt at fastslå en overordnet negativ diskurs som blandt andet bliver dannet af de 
amerikanske ledere, men der er også amerikanere der afviger fra denne hvilket 
afspejler sig i deres tankegang og væremåde. 
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  Introduction 
The main concern of this project is the question of how some people think of 
other people and thereby how they create their own identity and the identity of others. 
I believe creating awareness of this issue is important as it might help people to 
understand why they have come to think of others in a certain way and moreover, help 
them to understanding their own identity and that of others. This project lies within 
the field of intercultural communication because it examines Western discourse or 
more specifically American discourse, and whether or not it has changed or remained 
more or less the same for the past fifty years. Moreover, the project deals with the 
types of communication and the behaviors that occur when a person encounters 
people of different origin and values than him- or herself. 
The interest behind this theme derives from the American led war in Iraq and 
various literary readings such as Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). In order to 
combine these interests the project seeks to examine how Americans perceive other 
people and what developments and factors might have influenced this perception.   
To reach a conclusion on this subject and to include the literary interest the 
project will not merely examine the American experience in Iraq but also the 
American experience in Asia in the 1950s prior to the Vietnam War. The reason for 
including both events is that they deal with Americans and their experiences with 
staying abroad. The focus will be on how Americans are described to engage and 
communicate with other peoples and, as a result of this, how some Americans identify 
themselves and others. The aim of this examination is to present certain tendencies in 
American discourse.  
The current situation in Iraq is surrounded by much controversy and the events 
have taken a different path than first believed and expressed by both the public and 
the Bush administration. The rationale for the war was, to begin with, the fight against 
terror and the belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. It later turned 
out that these allegations were based on false grounds. Thus, the aim became to free 
the Iraqi people and to establish democracy in a post-Saddam Iraq. As reported by the 
media, the American invasion proved much more difficult than first anticipated and 
more than two years after the first attacks, the Americans and their allies still have 
great difficulties in establishing peace. The coverage of the war provides the public 
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with mixed messages. The media reports on casualties almost every day while the 
Bush administration continuously takes a more positive stance. 
The American experience in Asia in the 1950s is interesting with regards to 
this project in that it, like the war in Iraq, involved an American interest and 
intervention in a foreign country. In the mid 1950s Vietnam was divided into North 
Vietnam, ruled by the Communist Viet Mihn, and South Vietnam, controlled by the 
non-communist allies of the French. America’s main concern was the spread of 
communism and it was believed that if Vietnam fell, communism would overcome all 
of Southeast Asia. Thus, another similarity between the two events seems to be the 
American objective to help a foreign nation in an act of liberation. Some might say 
this has proved to cause more damage than good with regards to casualties on both 
sides. However, it depends on who you ask. 
I will look at these two American experiences from a literary and journalistic 
point of view. The experience in Asia is taken from fictional writing while the 
American experience in Iraq is based on reportage. 
In 1955 Graham Greene published The Quiet American which is based on his 
experiences from traveling in Asia. The novel is fictional, however, it does hold some 
truth to it as some of the characters are based on actual people. It explores the 
struggles between the old French colonial rule, the Viet-Minh, and the newly arisen 
American interest in Vietnam. The characters in the book are presented more as 
representatives of their nations than as individuals. When the novel first appeared it 
attracted attention based on its anti-American sentiment. It was praised in Europe, 
however in America, because of the various political stances and implications, it was 
initially excoriated.  
Another critical novel The Ugly American was written by William Lederer and 
Eugene Burdick in 1958. The Ugly American is also fictional, however, this too is 
based on factual events. The book describes a string of different short stories on ‘how 
to’ and ‘how not to’ fight the spread of communism in Asia as seen from an American 
point of view. Though this book also presents a critical view of American policy in 
Asia it was very well received by the public and became a best-seller. Moreover, the 
novel was highly influential as it spoke both to the public and the leaders of America 
and to some extent it played a part in shaping contemporary political discourse. 
It is claimed that The Ugly American was a response to Greene's The Quiet 
American and the novels share certain similarities in their choice of characters. 
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Moreover, they were both significant literature that helped influence the Western 
discourse and outlook on Asia. This kind of literature was a way for a domestic 
audience to obtain information about the evolvements of the American experience in 
Asia. 
In order to examine if the criticism of Americans and their attitude toward 
other people in these novels is contemporary, it will be compared and contrasted with 
a study of the situation in Iraq, based on journalistic writing. The first source of 
analysis is Generation Kill written by Evan Wright in 2004. Wright is a journalist 
who followed a group of American marines on their journey from southern Iraq to 
Baghdad. The book is based on articles written for Rolling Stone magazine. The book 
offers a very different and intimate view of the experiences of a group of marines and 
their actions in the war.  
The last source in the case study is articles from The New York Times. Having 
read all the articles on Iraq from May to December 2004 these have been divided into 
three themes that explain different situations. The first deals with the issues that 
appear when rebuilding Iraq, the following deals with the coverage of American 
soldiers taking over the town of Najaf, and finally the last story deals with the 
discourse and the appearance of the Americans.  
In Orientalism Edward Said provided a new critique of the negative 
perceptions the West has of the East before, during, and after the colonial times. 
Though the book is still frequently used and is still regarded as a very important work, 
it has received a great deal of criticism and Said has been accused of holding an anti-
Western attitude. Although, the colonial times are long gone, is the act of the West, or 
America, in the 21st century that of liberation or imperialism?  
The concepts of ‘mind-set’ and ‘identity’ are central issues in this project. The 
comprehension of the American mind-set is understood by a way of thinking. This 
should not be seen as an established belief but more as a representation of an attitude 
which might appear more common than others in the public discourse, or rather the 
material of the case study. Moreover, this particular way of thinking ought not to be 
accepted at face value as it is not possible or valid to merely conclude or establish a 
certain mind-set on the case study in this project. Thus, the term ‘mind-set’ is 
understood by a mental attitude and it is used as a generalization or tendency of the 
American way of thinking. 
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Additionally, the concept of ‘identity’ is important in the discussion of 
discourse and the perception of other peoples. Identity is often the marking of 
difference and it is applied on the basis of how people believe they are different from 
one another. One way of looking at this more specifically is through stereotypes. 
Everyone holds stereotypes but their influence vary in regards to how strongly people 
believe in them and whether or not they actually live by them.   
Based on theses reflections and by using theory that might help explain 
various influences and developments of the Western mind-set and by looking at the 
American involvement in Asia and Iraq respectively the project seeks to examine and 
answer the following questions.  
What are some of the influences that might have affected the Western and 
in particular the American mind-set? Moreover, based on the analyses of the 
case study is it possible to draw out one particular discourse that might serve as 
a representation of the American mind-set?  
Prior to analyzing the case study the project seeks to establish a frame of 
analysis which acts as a guideline for the case study. This framework is based on 
theory by Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Stuart Hall each of whom contribute to 
the discussion of discourse, perception, identity, and mind-set. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to look at how stereotypes are created and how these are able to control the 
way some people think about others. The theory is concluded by a chapter on the 
relations between America and other parts of the world which will show the issues 
that play an important part in the American mind-set and some of the events that 
might have influenced the American way of thinking about themselves and others.    
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Methodology 
 To carry out this project and reach an answer to the problem posed in the 
introduction the project is divided into two main parts, namely theory and case study. 
By using theory to create a framework of analysis it ensures that the case study is 
analyzed according to the problem definition and that the focus of the analyses is 
maintained. 
 The theory behind this project is created on the basis of four theorists who 
each, through discussion of their theories, pinpoint the first half of the problem posed 
in the introduction. In carrying out his research Edward Said was inspired by two 
works of Michel Foucault, namely The Archeology of Knowledge (1969) and 
Discipline and Punish (1975). Thus, I believe it was necessary to study these as they 
created the basis for explaining some of the influences of the Western mind-set. 
Knowing and understanding the origin of a particular discourse is helpful to the 
process of understanding or possibly changing the attitude of people. Thus, Foucault 
contributes with a means of understanding what might underlie some of the influences 
that control the way people think about others. 
 Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) explains the characteristics and the origin 
of a particular Western discourse that both the West and the East have come to live by 
throughout the years. In relation to this project Said is used as an outline for how 
people from the West have come to think about other peoples. His main points are 
discussed and thus used as a guideline in the case study to examine whether his theory 
is contemporary today and whether it is possible at all to state that the West hold one 
particular discourse about other peoples.  
 Stuart Hall provides a third contribution to the theory. He too is influenced by 
the work of Foucault. However, he deals with the concepts of identity and 
representation, which become key aspects of this project. Moreover, he examines the 
question of representation and reality which additionally might clarify some of the 
influences that drive a certain way of thinking about other people. 
 Stereotypes are important to this discussion as they influence the human mind-
set. It is possible to examine the identity one person has provided another by looking 
at stereotypes. Moreover, they may clarify what feelings people have toward one 
another and thus what issues affect the mind-set. 
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 The last theorist used in this project is Samuel Huntington who wrote The 
Clash of Civilizations (1996). The discussion of this work adds to the understanding 
of how some Americans might have come to think about other people. However, this 
work takes the theory from a focus on the individual mind-set to a higher level as it 
explains the circumstances behind the relations between countries focusing on 
America as a superpower and its influence on other countries. This might also affect 
some people’s preconceptions and viewpoints. It also explains the historical 
conditions which become important in explaining a discourse.  
 Based on this outline which forms the analytical framework it is also 
important to mention that the case study will be analyzed on the basis of content 
analyses. The reason for doing so is that content analysis allows for a more 
generalized comparison of the characteristics of an American mind-set. The aim of 
this project is to try to reach an objective representation of an American mind-set and 
using content analysis provides a means of a useful overview of the various 
characteristics of an American mind-set presented in the four texts in the case study. 
Moreover, as the case study consists of a large amount of material content analysis 
provides the method of most accuracy (Fiske, 1990: 136). 
 The case study consists of four ‘works’. The first part of the case study deals 
with the American experience in Asia in the 1950s and the analyses are based upon 
Graham Greene’s The Quiet American (1955) and William Lederer and Eugene 
Burdick’s The Ugly American (1958). Both books are fictional but they are based on 
factual events and hold as their central tone the view of the authors at the time of 
publication. 
 The second part of the case study is based on the American experience in Iraq 
as written by journalists. The first work is written by Evan Wright and is called 
Generation Kill (2004). The remaining analyses are of articles written for The New 
York Times from May through December 2004 on the war in Iraq. 
  The reason for choosing both fictional and factual writing is the interest in 
examining whether or not the authors’ perspectives are actually valid today or if their 
accusations of Americans can merely be dismissed. Moreover, since the analyses of 
the case study are carried out on the basis of content analysis and since the fictional 
writing is based on factual events it should be possible to make a comparison of the 
characters in both cases, while keeping in mind that the results are representations and 
thus should not be regarded as being completely authentic.    
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 In using these two different genres, problems and challenges arise that need to 
be considered and borne in mind throughout the project. One can not rely on the 
fictional writing being completely truthful. An obvious challenge that comes to mind 
when examining, and anticipating finding a representation of an American mind-set, 
is that half of the analysis is based on fiction. The stories are made up to fit the given 
situations and the critique they pose of the American policies abroad. The problem 
that occurs in this situation is the validity of the results that can be drawn from the 
analyses. However, this might be justified by the fact that the analyses are compared 
to one another and thus the conclusion can either be that there are no resemblances or 
that there are many similarities and thus the authors were valid in their criticism. If the 
latter is the case then the question that comes to mind is whether or not it is possible, 
from the comparison, to provide a discourse that could serve as a representation of the 
American mind-set. 
 Finally, it is essential to offer an explanation of how the project understands 
and uses ‘the West’, Europe, and America. The focus of the project is the American 
mind-set, however, the theory that makes up the analytical framework is partly written 
in Europe and for Europe. The concept of the West is used about those countries in 
Western Europe and North America who are believed to hold more or less the same 
values, norms, and knowledge. This is not to say that these countries necessarily 
merge into homogeneity but they do have certain characteristics in common.  
 Furthermore, the works by Foucault and Hall are written partly about 
situations in Europe. However, since they share the same institutions and systems of 
democracy it should be possible to draw parallels to America. Said mainly deals with 
French and British colonial history in Orientalism, however, he claims that these ideas 
about other countries have been adopted by America. Thus, I should be able to apply 
certain characteristics to America and thus, on the basis of these reflections, examine 
the American mind-set.  
 13
Introduction to Theory 
 In order to present a framework for the analysis of the case study I have 
chosen to include five aspects of what I believe can help explain some of the 
influences and characteristics of the American mind-set. In the case study these will 
then either be validated or dismissed according to the findings in the analyses. 
 I believe that using Michel Foucault proves an essential tool in this process. 
The main reason for using Foucault is that his theory on discourse is helpful in that it 
suggests how to go about examining a discourse. This approach is useful when aiming 
to understand and explain the influences and traits of a particular way of thinking. In 
addition, Foucault is added to the discussion with his theories of power and 
knowledge and his ideas about how the objectification of some people might lead to 
suppression.  
 Edward Said’s Orientalism is used to point out the results of a particular 
discourse that developed and can be explained on the basis of Foucault’s theories. The 
purpose of Said is to present his ideas of how people from the West think negatively 
about people from the East and that this discourse has come to establish itself in the 
Western attitude. Moreover, with regards to the case study it becomes interesting to 
find out if some of Said’s assertions in Orientalism are present in the American 
discourse today. At the end of this chapter I have included some reflections on 
Orientalism that point out what I believe are some of the weaker aspects in Said’s 
critique in relation to this project. 
 The way of thinking about other people not only explains something about the 
identity of these people but also explains how this person sees him- or herself. Thus, 
identity becomes very important in this discussion and Stuart Hall is included to 
provide this concept with more insight and substance. Hall deals with representation 
which will draw attention to how the process of identifying others and oneself 
operates. Moreover, the way some people often tend to think about others is expressed 
through stereotypes. These can both be positive and negative; regardless, they say 
something about the identity people attribute to others and themselves. 
 Finally, the last chapter in the theory deals with the relations between America 
and other countries. It mainly examines how America or some Americans might see 
themselves on the basis of their role in the world.       
 14
Discourse, Knowledge, Discipline 
 The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has been one of the 
most influential theorists in modern time. His theories on discourse, power-
knowledge, and social relations presented a new way of looking at social theory and 
structures in society. His focus is on “how human beings understand themselves in 
our culture” (Dreyfus, 1983: 17). 
Michel Foucault has been labeled as a constructionist although he has had a 
great impact on various fields such as philosophy, psychology, human sciences, and 
critical theory. Foucault presents discourses as creating and defining objects of 
knowledge, which means that discourses govern the way people are able to 
communicate ideas and beliefs. Furthermore, Foucault argues that knowledge is a 
form of power and that in a society there are a variety of powers. However, these can 
only be exercised and are only created through discourse. 
Power is not to be looked upon as a static control but as circulating in all 
aspects of the human social life from the family to the school system and to the 
hospital. Foucault argues that many people in the West have been overly concerned 
about the will of knowledge in that they continuously have created representations of 
political order to reach the state of an ideal society. Furthermore, this will of 
knowledge that people have tried to obtain is, in the Western part of the world, used 
as a means of domination. Foucault thus concentrates on how Western culture has 
been able to make humans into subjects (Rabinow, 1984: 5-6). In other words, 
possessing information and knowledge about other human beings are, in Western 
culture, seen as a means of power and superiority. 
The importance and relevance of Foucault in this project is to be found in how 
he suggests one should examine a discourse and moreover how he has been used in, 
among others, explaining postcolonial experiences. As Elleke Boehmer claims, 
Foucault is used in the understanding of the effect of imperial discourses (Boehmer, 
1995: 50-1). Moreover, Brian Turner writes that Foucault plays an important part in 
the criticism of orientalism as he believes that systematic knowledge leads to 
systematic power which acts as societal control of the body (Turner, 1994: 43). 
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Examination of Discourse 
In order to examine certain representations of the Western mind-set and look 
at some of the developments that have influenced some people’s way of thinking it is 
necessary to open the discussion with an examination of discourse and the discursive 
formation which Foucault studies in Archeology of Knowledge.  
 The central theme in Archeology of Knowledge is statements as they make up 
a discourse. Foucault seeks to understand the thought behind the discourse, which is 
the statement and when it occurs, why it exists, its limits, and its relations to other 
statements. 
 In other words,  
To situate the statement the archeologist need only to accept it at face value, 
and place it in its actual context of other surface statements (Dreyfus, 1983: 
46). 
  
 Moreover, Foucault describes the statement as an event because it is connected 
to the act of writing or speech, it is subject to repetition and change, and it occurs in 
cohesion with other statements (Foucault, 1972: 28).   
To examine and understand discourse Foucault suggests that one look at the 
origin of a discourse and of the objects of knowledge. Foucault’s account of objects, 
at times, seems to be laid out as ideas and concepts and at other times as tangible or 
material things that humans have come to learn about through discourse. When used 
here an ‘object’ is referred to as an idea or knowledge. This can be understood as 
something which has not been publicly known or spoken about but develops and 
receives attention and thus is discovered and possibly researched. Knowledge is thus 
given speech through study. It takes shape and becomes more tangible.  
 Examining the origin of a particular discourse is to locate its first appearance 
and thus source of appearance. Foucault calls this the historical conditions. 
Additionally, it is important to determine the authority that was able to establish the 
‘object’ as an object. Meaning, who was the authority that was able to define, label, 
and establish the topic or theme as an object? This aspect involves the institutional 
sites in society and society as a whole.  
As presented by Foucault this process appears to be straightforward, however, 
there are many factors that need to be considered in order to find the exact origin of 
an idea or knowledge. The idea might have developed from another idea and taken a 
different shape. Consider the circumstances under which the authority established the 
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idea? Who was the person influenced by and where did his or her interest lie? This is 
just to mention a few aspects that need to be reflected upon when dealing with 
theories where the lack of reflections and a critical stance seems omitted.    
 Finally, Foucault writes of the discursive relations that these are the discourse 
as ‘practice’.  
Discursive relations…are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it 
objects of which it can speak, or rather…they determine the group of relations 
that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to 
deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them etc. 
(Ibid: 46). 
  
 In relation to identity and holding a certain view about another people this 
approach enables one to go back and examine why and how this view appeared and 
additionally determine why it has come to be what it is. As an example, why has one 
population or country come to look at another in a negative way? The historical 
conditions are helpful to look at to determine the relations between the countries. 
Have they been at war, have they had disagreements, or do they hold different views 
on lifestyle and values? The authority that might have defined and established this 
other country as an enemy has done so on the basis of these historical conditions. 
Moreover, the authority has the power to reinforce ‘enemy’, or the object, as 
knowledge in the minds of people by analyzing and labeling. In other words, the 
authority can give the object speech. 
Moreover, as suggested by Foucault it is necessary to examine the means of 
how the objects can be spoken of and who has the right to say what is being said. An 
example could be that of a scholar; his or her status, function in society, and of what 
knowledge s/he speaks? Moreover, one needs to establish the institutional sites from 
where s/he obtains their discourse as it plays a difference whether it is from the 
university as an instructor or from studying texts at the library. Lastly, one must bear 
in mind what position the scholar is in. Does s/he function as an observer, doing a 
field study, or instructing? This applies to all institutional sites in which discourses 
appear and thus the example could be that of a doctor as well.  
It is necessary to bear in mind the importance of the institutional site and the 
authority that speaks of the object. Many people have a certain relation to an 
institutional site and often what is being said is not questioned. A doctor is rarely 
questioned in his diagnosis. The leader of a country is believed to know best and 
because of his or her power it might be difficult to object to his or her actions. These 
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are factors that Foucault does not seem to consider in his account. However, this is 
important in that the new knowledge might be affected by only one authority who has 
his or her own way of thinking and which might not be in accordance to the general 
public discourse.  
 One of the last aspects that make up the structure of a discourse is the search 
for underlying themes and theories that are commonly used and by which other 
theories and themes are defined. However, as Foucault is aware of himself, there is a 
problem with finding common themes as these might change. In the 18th century the 
idea of the Orient might be different from what it became in the 19th century and thus 
a single theme of the Orient has two different discourses. In relation to this Foucault 
claims that discursive formation 
opens a field of possible options [and] the different possibilities that it opens 
of reanimating already existing themes, of arousing opposed strategies, of 
giving way to irreconcilable interests, of making it possible, with a particular 
set of concepts, to play different games (Foucault, 1972: 66, 36-7) (Dreyfus, 
1983: 72). 
 
 As discussed in this chapter Foucault’s theory of discourse should not be 
accepted at its face value or read without taking a critical stance. As presented by 
Foucault, it does not seem that there would be any problems in the process of locating 
the origin of a discourse, however, this is not an easy task and there are many 
uncertain paths that need to be taken. How can one be certain that the authority that is 
said to have labeled the object really is that person and not a replica?  
Finally, Foucault is often used in explaining and understanding the 
postcolonial experience and he is used in this project in the understanding of 
discourse and influences on the Western mind-set. Foucault mainly speaks of the 
French society and thus his area of research seems very narrow for him to be used in 
postcolonial experiences. Foucault is used as an inspiration for the discussion of 
identity and in this case the American mind-set. Foucault has attracted attention to a 
possible way of examining how a particular discourse has arisen and using that 
approach might provide a means for explaining various aspects of how a certain 
identity has come into being.    
 
The Power of Knowledge 
The previous chapter outlined Foucault’s theory on discourse. In this chapter 
Foucault’s work Discipline and Punish functions as a means to elucidate changes in 
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society which might have affected the fact that people from the West were able to 
dominate other peoples, not merely with the power of an army but also with the force 
of knowledge. 
 Foucault’s main interest in his study of power in Discipline and Punish is that 
in Western societies knowledge of the body is used as a technique of power. Foucault 
presents the methods by which the body has been formed as a subject and an object in 
modern society as well as the internal links between power and knowledge. 
We should admit…that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations (Foucault, 1977: 27). 
 
 In this work Foucault talks more generally of Western societies. However, he 
does not clarify what countries this covers. On the other hand, at times he speaks 
more specifically of French. Thus, it is difficult to know whether it is acceptable to 
merely refer to all countries in the West or if one needs a better distinction. As 
interpreted from Foucault and as used in this project Western countries that are 
spoken of are those that share similar institutional sites and structures of society. 
In order to explain the relations between power and knowledge Foucault 
examines three kinds of punishments; the monarchial, the classical, and the 
disciplinary. The latter is of interest in this project as it explains how ‘professionals’ 
obtained power over bodies, or other people, and how, through observation, the 
modern world exercises its controlling systems of power and knowledge.  
 After the 18th century a new knowledge emerged that turned the body into an 
object of ‘investments’. This appeared when researchers became aware that the body 
could be taught, shaped, and trained. The advance of bureaucracy over the population 
required systematic forms of knowledge (Turner, 1994: 21). Foucault uses the 
example of a soldier as he is trained and his movements are controlled. These 
methods which control the operations over the body are what Foucault calls 
discipline. Discipline is a rule of method that acts upon the body and by examination 
the body can be managed and controlled. These processes, as Foucault presents, 
appeared in schools, hospitals, and the military which are all part of the disciplinary 
institutions (Foucault, 1977: 136-8).  
 The interesting aspect is some of the techniques by which discipline was 
capable of being exercised. Among others, Foucault mentions the placing of 
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individuals in classifications or ranks. Discipline, as he states, is an art of rank, 
meaning that individuals were identified by what they were or were not as opposed to 
the ‘other’. The example Foucault uses is that of schools in which students were 
divided into groups, or grades, according to their level of proficiency. This 
classification of individuals in disciplinary institutions spurred comparison, rivalry, 
and hierarchy. It became a fact that some people were viewed or thought of as 
superior to others. Additionally, people came to consider themselves of higher or 
lower rank than others. As a result of this some people were applied and came to 
know themselves by an identity originating from the marking of difference (Ibid: 145-
8).  
It is even possible to claim that somehow people are in a state of becoming 
rather than being since this identity is subject to change as what people measure one 
another against also changes throughout discourse and time. Foucault does not 
mention this anywhere in his text and thus it is not clear where he stands on this issue. 
It is interesting to consider whether this classification that he speaks of is meant as a 
timeless process or if it is occurring within certain limits. People change, they grow 
up, they obtain new experiences through life, and since people see themselves as 
opposed to the ‘other’, identity appears to be a never-ending process that can easily 
change over time.  
Furthermore, Foucault argues that this technique of order made it possible to 
characterize, manage, and observe other people and it was, moreover, a technique of 
power and procedure to gain knowledge. Foucault puts forth some of the techniques 
of, as he calls it, successful disciplinary power.  
the disciplinary power [is] absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and 
always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and 
constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of 
supervising; and absolutely ‘discreet’, for it functions permanently and largely 
in silence (Ibid: 177).  
 
Additionally, this observation led to what Foucault identifies as the 
examination which, by means of supervision, provides knowledge to a particular 
discourse (Ibid: 186). Moreover, the field of examination brought with it the art of 
writing as the knowledge which was gained was written down in order to keep a 
record of everything. Thus, the examination became a mechanism of objectification of 
human beings, meaning that real people became degraded to the status of objects. 
Furthermore, writing put people, or the objects of a study, in mass documentation and 
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thereby they were captured and ‘fixed’. As a result of this, it became possible to 
manage, describe, create, and analyze these objects and also produce a ‘comparative 
system’ in order to be able to tell people apart based on their characteristics (Ibid: 
189-190). As Foucault states, 
This turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of heroization; 
it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjectification (Ibid: 192). 
 
 Foucault does not offer any specific criticism or any reflections on this system. 
The same procedures are present today in many societies. If a company or a school 
performs a survey the participants are probably not viewed as individuals but rather, 
on the basis of analysis, as a general opinion or tendency in society. However, some 
reflection should be given to the fact that deviating from this system must have caused 
problems. How did authorities deal with this? As mentioned earlier, many of 
Foucault’s theories are laid out as simple, however, little reflection is provided and 
thus many aspects are not considered. 
An important issue to consider as well is that the authority who writes down 
his knowledge, for example, about other people might not be questioned. Additionally 
his object of study is not likely to be revised as he is believed to hold the most 
accurate and truthful knowledge about this other person. Based on that, a certain 
identity or attribute, which might not have been questioned or been subject to a 
secondhand opinion, has been applied to the object of study and thus deviance from 
this identity should be considered.  
Further, the study of others led to a discourse or act of repression as also 
claimed by Foucault. 
The fact that power is so deeply rooted and the difficulty of eluding its 
embrace are effects of all these connections. That is why the notion of 
repression which mechanisms of power are generally reduced to strikes me as 
very inadequate and possibly dangerous (Foucault, 1980: 59).  
 
The object then is produced through and within discursive formation and this 
alludes to the fact that to some extent there exists an unequal relationship between the 
person representing and the person who is being represented.  
Knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and 
speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse (Ibid: 182).  
 
Finally, people make order by categorizing from representations. Therefore, 
the characteristics that the object of study have been given or categorized by are used 
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in discourse and thus will become manifested in people’s minds. Further, the 
information that has been processed will become reality both for the subject and the 
object.  
The concepts of discourse, power and knowledge, and identity that have been 
laid out in the chapters on Foucault will be further explained and illustrated in the 
following chapters. As these are seen in relation to events that might help explain why 
some people have come to think about others in a certain way and attributed certain 
characteristics to other people. In the light of this some people have been able to stand 
as superiors toward other people which the following chapter deals with.  
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Orientalism 
Edward Said (1935-2003) was born in Palestine, which at that time was a 
British colony. He is one of the most acclaimed critics of how the West has perceived 
the Orient. The following chapter offers a discussion of Said’s views presented in one 
of his most well known books Orientalism (1978). Other well-known works by Said 
that are used as inspiration for this project are Culture and Imperialism (1993) and 
Covering Islam (1997) which both deal with the relations between West and East. In 
Culture and Imperialism, like Orientalism, Said examines how Western literature has 
portrayed the East. Covering Islam is focused on the Middle East and how media 
discourse in the West deal with Islam. 
 Orientalism is an account of the development and history of the study of the 
Orient as seen through the eyes of the British, French, and American experience and 
as dealt with and written about in literature. Edward Said was a professor in 
Comparative Literature and by examining various texts he provides a very thorough 
study of the literary history of what he calls traditional and modern orientalism. The 
main focus in Orientalism is the Middle East since Said grew up in Palestine and 
Egypt before moving to America. It is interesting to note that in all countries he was 
subject to a Western education (Said, 1978: 25).  
Overall Orientalism illustrates how a dominant culture was able to impose 
itself on another and how the inferior was deprived of its culture and identity (Macfie, 
2000: 195). Thus, according to Said the study of the Orient gave rise to racist, 
imperialistic, and stereotypical ideas about other peoples and cultures. 
The definition that Said ascribes to orientalism is essentially the Western 
attitude towards Islam, Arabs, and the Orient. However, it does not prove as simple as 
that as Said on the very first pages of Orientalism provides the reader with three 
definitions of what orientalism means to him. His definitions cover three aspects of 
orientalism; the academic, the imaginative, and the historical. According to Said, any 
person who studies, researches, teaches, or writes about the Orient can call him- or 
herself an orientalist. Moreover, orientalism covers the very notion of a distinction 
between the East and the West. People have been taught and are thus aware that there 
is a difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and this belief is then used in theories and 
literature. Finally, orientalism is a discourse which is a way for people to deal with the 
Orient and to describe it from a historical and material aspect (Said 1978: 2-3).  
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Moreover, Said sees orientalism as a study that has more to do with the West 
and explains more about the West than it does about the Orient.  
as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political 
concerns shaped by the three great empires – British, French, American – in 
whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced (Ibid: 
14-15).  
 
 The basis for Said’s claim is that the Orient was looked upon within a network 
of categories and concepts by which it had been defined and controlled. Thus, the 
discourse used for the Orient became a framework and a means of analysis of the 
Orient in order to diminish its complexity and thereby to explain the Orient by types 
and characters that were found in the West. It is thus through these representations 
that the West has experienced the Orient. By doing so, a Western audience was able 
to relate to what was written or discussed about the Orient (Turner, 1994: 4, 22). 
 The chapters in this section have been named and divided according to the 
themes and concepts in the chapters on Michel Foucault. This approach has been 
taken mainly because Said is inspired by Foucault’s theories and because this 
provides a better idea of the main issues in the project. 
 
Orientalism as Discourse 
By using the frame of analysis of discursive formation that Michel Foucault 
presents in Archeology of Knowledge, Edward Said is able to explain the Orient in 
terms of being a discourse. As mentioned earlier, Foucault argues that the ordering of 
objects by which discourses are treated function “as practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). Thus, Said sees the necessity to 
deal with orientalism as a   
systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and 
even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively (Said, 1979: 3). 
 
However, in order for Europe to control and manage the Orient this discourse 
creates the Orient as an idea or ‘new’ knowledge, which is why and how the very idea 
of ‘orientalism’ was able to establish itself. In accordance with Foucault, Said claims 
that an author is able to create new objects of knowledge and write a text which does 
not consider ‘reality’ as it is but merely reflects the points of view of the author.   
In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel 
Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the 
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originality of a given author is really responsible for the texts produced out of 
it (Said, 1979: 94).  
 
 It is probably true that a text reflects the point of view of its author, however, 
it is problematic to claim that it did not reflect reality as it is. Who can actually 
describe reality as it is? Are all people not influenced by their own frame of 
reference? Said does not give this any thought and surely he too is influenced by the 
situation that he is in and the thoughts that he gives to this research. Said claims, the 
scholars who wrote and studied the Orient made up their own texts from fragmented 
parts of other scholars’ work. Therefore, the account of the Orient is merely a 
revision, editing, and repetition of previous work. Thus, Said’s point is that the Orient 
simply became a representation of something imaginary, as the Orient, to begin with, 
was invented by the West. (Ibid: 176-7).  
 Additionally, Said’s anger in Orientalism is targeted toward the fact that the 
Orient was merely studied from texts and usually not through actual experience. The 
result was that, as a knowledge or system of thought, the Orient was reduced to an 
object of study and the “knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, 
in a sense creates the Orient” (Ibid: 40). Thus, Said believes that since some people in 
the West saw themselves as culturally stronger by being able to write, study, and 
analyze the Orient they also felt that by way of studying they would be able to shape 
the Orient. The Orient was only seen from a Western point of view and as Said states 
“totally ethnocentric” (Ibid: 204). It furthermore came to “identify a specific body of 
information” (Ibid: 205). The discourse of the Orient originated from and manifested 
itself in the “institutions” which are those “of an advanced society dealing with a less 
advanced society, a strong culture encountering a weak one” (Ibid: 321). In this case 
the institutions that Said speaks of are within the academic field. 
 An important point to be aware of is that Said claims the discourse of 
orientalism changed after World War I. At this point in time the Orient came to play a 
different role in the West as it “transformed itself from being textual and 
contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military” (Ibid: 210). 
This change came as a result of colonization. The Orient went from being merely a 
study and exploration to be an area of management, source of cheap labor, and 
symbol of power. In short, the Orient turned “from alien into colonial space” (Ibid: 
211). Altogether, Said experiences the way the Orient has been dealt with and thought 
about in Europe and later America as,  
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[t]he Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations 
framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, 
Western consciousness, and later, Western empire (Ibid: 202). 
 
Why is discourse so important to the study of other peoples and cultures? The 
knowledge and thereby discourses that people learn from society shape their 
worldview and as people live by them they also believe them to be true. Thus, it might 
be difficult for some people to move beyond a particular discourse and be objective 
about what is being said, as Foucault claims there is nothing outside discourse as it is 
through discourse that objects become meaningful. The question then is whether it is 
possible to be completely objective and whether it is impractical to observe something 
which one has no words for? According to Foucault, this is not possible.  
 
Orientalism as Discipline 
Foucault suggests that by examining people in terms of observation and 
supervision the examination becomes a means of objectification. Bearing this in mind, 
Said claims that Orientalism became a branch of knowledge and thereby it was able to 
turn some people, by observation and writing, into objects of study. This way of 
studying others creates a gap between the observed and the observer as well as a clear 
distinction between the two. The people who are being observed are powerless 
compared to the observer, who has collected knowledge and thereby gained the power 
of characterizing and managing the other. As claimed by Said, the Orientalist became 
a “central authority for the Orient” (Said, 1979: 106).  
 The way that these power relations have become manifested is by means of 
techniques in which the new knowledge becomes a reality. By attributing certain 
characteristics to an individual or a group these might become what they are 
attributed. This means that they are merely known by what they have become through 
observation and writing. This ‘reality’ does not consider their true identity as people 
apply the characteristic on the basis of their point of view and the results of their study 
and thus believe this data to be authentic and applicable. As a result of this, Said 
attacks the fact that the West attributed certain identities to the Orient, which became 
fixed, and did not distinguish between the different cultures and peoples. A 
comparison was made between the West and the East and since ‘they’ did not look 
like ‘us’ they were attributed characteristics like backward and alien, everything that 
the West was not (Ibid: 104, 207).    
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 Did Orientalists actually exercise power over the Orient in order to acquire 
knowledge? Their interest, according to Said, was in managing and changing the 
Orient and only through knowledge were they able to do so. However, it is clearly not 
the only power that the West possessed that enabled them to rule large parts of the 
world. Their superiority in wealth and military also had a great impact, however, 
knowledge of the ‘other’ is the basis for the exercise of power and vice versa. 
 
Orientalism and Identity  
 The identity Orientals were attributed by scholars, authors, and travelers is one 
of Said’s main concerns. In relation to Foucault’s objectification of the body, Said 
finds the discourse of orientalism is based on categories people have made from mere 
representations. One of the arguments he puts forth is that the Western part of the 
world attributed an inaccurate identity to the Orient, its peoples, and cultures. When 
Said speaks of the West he deals with Europe. However, several places later in 
Orientalism, in what he calls The Latest Phase he argues that America has inherited 
this particular way of thinking and that there are obvious similarities between 
European and American imperial designs (Said, 1979: 295).  
A vast web of interests now links all parts of the former colonial world to the 
United States…all the former philological and European-based disciplines like 
Orientalism (Ibid: 285).  
 
The basis for Said’s critique is the fact that he and others have been labeled 
‘Orientals’, an identity provided by people from the West. This identity has for many 
years been part of the Western myth about the Orient and Westerners have treated 
Orientals as passive and unchanging objects. Moreover, these beliefs prevented the 
Orient and Orientals from developing and changing because they were ‘invented’ by 
the West. Its peoples are locked in the same position and not before the West changes 
its discourse and way of thinking can the Orient change. One main concern with this 
is that it poses a problem when Said speaks of this and then labels many different 
countries ‘the West’. He is very general in his assumptions of the Western attitude 
toward the Orient. He does not discriminate between the many different peoples and 
cultures in the West or between people in general.  
[T]he male conception of the world…tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. 
The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement – in 
the deepest sense of the word – is denied the Orient and the Oriental (Ibid: 
208).   
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The study of Orientalism was mainly carried out by men and the descriptions 
of the Orient and its people often involved men. Women were often only mentioned 
in relation to the male fantasy and as Said writes “women are usually the creatures of 
the male power-fantasy” (Ibid: 208). This completely ignores women and their role in 
both the study and the perceptions. Said does not offer any explanations or reflections 
on the role of women in the whole exchange of writing about and traveling to the 
Orient. 
One reason why identities did not change was that classical Orientalism was 
mainly studied through texts. Thus, when an Orientalist traveled to the country of his 
studies he would hold presumptions and expectations of its people based on his 
studies. It therefore became his objective to prove the truth of these texts as he 
believed that his knowledge about the study was sufficient and that it reflected a true 
situation. This led to the fact that the Orientalist was not able to understand the natives 
and thus his encounter provided him with a very biased view of the experienced 
reality (Ibid: 55).  
For it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever 
ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his own 
circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American 
studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his 
actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, 
as an individual second (Ibid: 11). 
 
In this example it is again only the male who is included and women are not 
considered. When mentioning this, it is not to prove Said wrong as it is probably true 
that most scholars and travelers at that time were men. The problem in dealing with 
this is, however, that Said generalizes to the extent that he includes and speaks of one 
Western attitude and one West and neglects to mention that this does not include 
women, who constitute at least one half of the population. Thus, it is problematic to 
speak of one public discourse.  
Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, 
uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework 
constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. 
The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the 
insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as 
lamentably alien (Ibid: 207). 
 
Over the years the Orient became a natural part of European culture and more 
importantly people’s identity. This is manifested in the fact that the Orient was made 
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into a contrasting image of the Western world. It represented a mirror image of what 
was inferior in values and alien to the West.  
Finally, the way the notion about the ‘other’ came about and how it developed 
a clear sense of a difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is explained by Said by way of 
stressing that people create certain objects in their mind that are only representations 
of a fictional reality. In other words, to feel secure and to feel that you belong people 
appoint a familiar place in their mind which they label as ‘ours’ or as where ‘we’ 
belong. Outside this fictional space is where ‘they’ live and what belongs to ‘them’. 
This is how these other people are assigned a certain difference from the ‘us’ because 
‘they’ obviously do not have the same qualities and characteristics as ‘us’, and 
therefore ‘they’ become the ‘other’ in the mind of ‘us’ (Said, 1979: 54). Said calls this 
imaginary geography and history and as he argues, this picture of other people does 
not reflect reality, it does not speak the truth, and most importantly it is not authentic 
(Ibid: 20-21).  
 When dealing with other people this difference has in some instances a 
profound connotation in how identity is created.  
[I]n the hierarchical language of the West, what is alien represents otherness, 
the site of difference and the repository of our fears and anxieties (Rutherford: 
1990: 10).   
 
 
Reflections on Orientalism  
Though Edward Said’s Orientalism is a significant work it should not be 
looked upon uncritically. Many theorists have criticized the work of Said as either 
lacking certain aspects or presenting an anti-Western view. As summed up by Bill 
Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia in their book Edward Said.  
To historians he is unhistorical; to social scientists he conflates theories; to 
scholars he is unscholarly; to literary theorists he is unreflective and 
indiscriminate; to Foucauldians he misuses Foucault; to professional Marxists 
he is anti-revolutionary; to professional conservatives he is a terrorist 
(Ashcroft, 1999: 74).   
  
The reason to include reflections in this part is that it is necessary to point out 
some contradictions in Said’s claims which are important in relation to this project. 
Said examines many different types of literature. However, he does not stress 
and distinguish between fictional and non-fictional writing. He merely looks at the 
authors’ views and thus does not consider the basis of the literature (Turner, 1994: 7). 
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This approach can be used when merely striving to describe an overall attitude of a 
given period of time. However, it becomes problematic when the results are used to 
explain reality as Said believes it to be. The product of Orientalism should thus be 
seen as a representation of a Western attitude and not as a fact of life. 
Moreover, Orientalism merely presents a criticism of a Western attitude 
toward the ‘other’ but the text does not provide any aspects of where and how the 
West has failed to offer an accurate picture of the Orient. In the afterword of 
Orientalism, Said points out that the study presents an anti-Western view which he 
regrets to have given it. However, underneath his, at times, harsh criticism Said does 
not ask the question why and how to go about ‘otherness’ differently. He does not 
provide the reader with means of how he would like the West to approach the Orient 
differently. Apart from his mere criticism it seems that Said fails to explain the 
reasons why the Orient has not been able to oppose the discourse and attitude that 
have oppressed Orientals the way Said claims they have. His answer to this problem 
is explained by the difficulty to reject a text which contains knowledge about 
something actual which naturally is believed to be true by most people. As he states, 
expertise is ascribed to the text and thus its validity increases. “Most important, such 
texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe” 
(Said, 1979: 94). 
Even though this explanation seems legitimate it is nevertheless difficult to 
understand why opposition from the Orient seems to be non-existing as claimed by 
Said. The problem is that he does not explain this with a more thorough examination 
other than saying that it is caused by the fact that the Orient was oppressed and 
inferior. Relying on Foucault’s theory of discourse and knowledge Said does not 
clarify the possibility of how this discourse can be changed. Foucault argues that  
power produces knowledge…[and] that power and knowledge directly imply 
one another; that there is no power relations without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault, 1977: 
27).  
 
Based on this Said ought to believe that if there was to be an alternative to this 
discourse a new one would consist of power relations as well. It is thus not possible to 
completely discard a certain discourse as a new one would surface and take its place 
with another expression of power. In other words, there is no alternative which is free 
of discourse. As Foucault states, knowledge and power coincide (Turner, 1994: 31). 
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An alternative analysis would be to change the discourse of orientalism. However, 
Said merely recommends that the West improves its account on Islam and thereby 
does not present any answers to the problems (Ibid: 101).   
Finally, Said takes a very critical stance toward French Orientalism which is 
described in great detail. However, he seems to neglect a coverage of British and 
German Orientalism (Ibid: 5). He frequently mentions the West as having one 
negative discourse about the ‘other’. However, since the West consists of many 
different and diverse cultures, like the Orient, he falls short in making this distinction. 
As he is very concerned about viewing parts of the world as one, why does he allow 
himself to talk about the ‘whole’ West with merely one representative? Said criticizes 
the fact that the West perceived the Orient as one, one people and one culture; 
however, he, too, fails to discriminate between the different imperialisms. 
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Creation of Identity 
 The previous chapters dealt with discourse, discipline, and the perception of 
other people. An area that needs more emphasis is that of identity and representation. 
As Edward Said deals with the perception of Orientals and the identity they have been 
attributed by others Stuart Hall provides a better understanding of how identities and 
representations transpire. 
Stuart Hall (1932) is a social constructionist, who works within cultural 
studies. He sees language use within a framework of politics, power, and institutions. 
By looking at the ways that social reality and social phenomena are constructed, he 
examines in how people in general make meaning of the world as they see it. Hall 
takes an institutional approach like Michel Foucault and is thus inspired by the 
relations between power and knowledge. He shows how representations are used in 
relation to power in the production of knowledge. Furthermore, this field examines a 
socially constructed reality which means that reality is reconstituted by people acting 
on their interpretations and their knowledge of society. Studying representations, one 
is able to examine public opinions and discourses. Thereby the words and ideas 
people use to express ‘the real world’. Hall argues that in order to study these 
identities one must look at the courses of history, culture, and language.  
 
Identity and Representation 
 Stuart Hall’s approach corresponds with that of a later Michel Foucault, as 
seen in Discipline and Punish, and that of Edward Said’s Orientalism in how 
institutions are able to shape people’s identity and thus how they would perceive 
reality as a construction through these. Hall argues that identity can be found in the 
existing relations between the subject and discursive practices (Hall, 1996: 2). 
 Hall also argues that although identities appear to have an origin they are a 
dynamic process of ‘becoming’ rather than of being. Therefore, what people might 
become and how they have been represented lead to how people might represent 
themselves. This is an important issue to bear in mind when dealing with the concept 
of identity. It is an endless process and identity continuously changes as people grow 
older and encounter different institutions and other people. Therefore, when applying 
a certain identity to another person one has to remember that the given surroundings 
change and thus the identity changes.  
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It seems that Hall offers more reflection on this theme than both Foucault and 
Said as he claims that identities change. However, they all appear to agree that it is 
through belongingness that identities arise. It is through discursive formations that 
knowledge is produced and this knowledge takes shape as reality and as something 
that can be experienced and understood. Thus, representations are products of 
opinions created through language (Hall, 1997: 4). It is important to look at 
discourses, the historical and institutional sites, and the particular modalities of power 
that constitute these identities.  
Hall describes representation as meaning created through language. In order 
for people to share ideas and feelings, language functions in a ‘representational 
system’ as it consists of signs and symbols by which people are able to express 
concepts and feelings (Hall, 1997: 1). According to Hall, the system of representation 
is the basis for how people communicate or transmit meaning of their worldview to 
other people. In other words, if one encounters a person from another country, an 
identity is formed in order to make sense of what this person is like and how s/he 
relates to one’s overall worldview (Ibid: 15-7). In forming an identity, people look for 
how this other person is different from them and what characteristics this difference is 
based upon. Hall does not mention the possibility of identity being formed on the 
basis of similarities. Although it is probably true that first impressions are mainly 
based on differences it is impossible to rule out the basis of similarities as these can 
help form an identity as well. 
 Additionally, Hall argues that because identities are created by representations 
they are a product of the marking of differences as seen in Discipline and Punish, 
where classification and comparison became vital tools to create order and 
characterization of individuals.  
The discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or 
hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the 
other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as 
subjects which can be ‘spoken’ (Hall, 1996: 5-6). 
 
 Thus identities, as Hall suggests, can not be accurate as they are merely 
representations. Moreover, since they are created in representation they are 
incomplete constructions which are always in process (Hall, 1998: 222). Said claims 
that the identity the Orient was provided established itself and never changed from a 
Western point of view. Hall, on the other hand, states that identity is a running process 
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which changes and develops. In relation to this, it is unfortunate that Said has not 
given this more reflection in Orientalism. As he states, the identity of people from the 
Orient has changed but the West has not considered this. However, it is difficult to 
comprehend that people from the Orient have not rebelled this process. Even though 
Said is a critic of a fixed Western discourse he does not present a view of the 
changing identity of people from the Orient. In relation to this he has the possibility to 
take a superior stance and educate people from the West about the ‘other’.  
The themes of realities and identities are at times complicated to explain and 
comprehend. Hall speaks of identities being representations and because of this they 
do not reflect reality but who can determine what reality looks like? It is not to 
disregard Hall’s theory but it seems essential to draw attention to this aspect. Who 
knows the real identity of another person him- or herself or is this person also 
influenced by his or her surroundings? Will it ever be possible to experience reality as 
it is without influences? Hall often discusses ‘reality as it is’ but what is reality as it 
is?  
Moreover, Hall argues that one way of examining ‘cultural identity’ is by 
looking at both the future and the past as its belongingness. Thus, one ought to look 
into experiences as well as differences which he calls ruptures and discontinuities. 
Hall claims that identity is a matter of becoming as well as being as histories go 
through transformations. By doing so, Hall suggests that one is able to examine the 
colonial experience in terms of how Western knowledge imposed a dominant regime 
on other parts of the world and how this led to the subjection of another people within 
this regimen. Additionally, Hall states that this regime classified others as different 
and as the ‘other’ in the Western categories of knowledge (Hall, 1998: 225). 
Furthermore, Hall states that “the Western world ‘unified’ these peoples across their 
differences” (Ibid: 127).  
 Lastly, the regime of representation that Hall speaks of is created through what 
people in the West have learned about other peoples. These representations, which 
additionally represent a regime of power, are among others  
the colonial discourse, the literatures of adventure and exploration, the 
romance of the exotic, the ethnographic of the traveling eye, the tropical 
languages of tourism, travel brochure, and Hollywood (Ibid: 233).  
 
By representing other people and identifying them through difference the West 
has come to recognize, through comparison, other cultures as different (Ibid: 226). 
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Stereotypes 
 There is yet another attribute to how some people perceive other people. 
Stereotypes are processes of information based on how people experience and 
characterize other people. This chapter may speak in general terms about people 
altogether, which is deliberate, as the stereotype and the act of stereotyping is thought 
to be common to all human beings, though the degree to which the stereotype is 
believed varies. 
 When people engage and communicate with people from other cultures 
attitudes and expectations might, among others, be based upon ethnocentrism and 
stereotypes. These attitudes are inevitable since most people define themselves and 
others based on their own cultural identity and seen from their own frame of 
reference. This process results in the fact that some people tend to hold expectations 
of who other people are and how they might behave. People categorize others from 
their experiences with social identities, and once the categorizations have taken place 
the stereotypes are used to determine the identity of the other. If these expectations 
are not met during an encounter with another person the effect on people could both 
be positive and negative since what they thought was true is proved wrong. Their 
basic beliefs about this other person thus have to change and this process influences 
the discourse in either a positive direction (they find they have more in common) or in 
a negative direction (Ibid: 102).  
Many scholars who study stereotypes do not discuss the outcome of an 
encounter with another person that people might not have formed an opinion about. It 
is possible not to have any knowledge about certain peoples and cultures. If this is the 
case how will the outcome turn out? Will people still have anticipations or will they 
form a judgment based entirely on the encounter?   
Ethnocentrism is the approach by which a person negatively judges other 
peoples by the standards of his or her own culture (Jandt, 2004: 76). A person who is 
ethnocentric believes that s/he possesses the better values and therefore sees 
everything from his or her own point of view. As an example, if a person believes his 
or her culture is better and superior or if s/he thinks another culture is less attractive it 
is thus seen as inferior. This is clearly the case in the discussion of Edward Said’s 
theory in Orientalism. The Orient was seen from a Western point of view and because 
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the Orient was believed not to meet the same societal standards as the West it was 
viewed as backward and in need of Western aid to improve.  
Moreover, almost every person is ethnocentric as it would be difficult not to 
develop a mind-set that is influenced by ones own culture. However, it is possible for 
a person to put aside his or her own frame of reference to try to understand another 
people as seen from their point of view which William Gudykunst identifies as 
‘cultural relativism’ (Gudykunst, 1998: 106).  
Stereotypes are mainly based on inaccurate images of the world that people 
obtain through either their own experiences or from outside sources like the media. 
The images that people construct tend to be based upon generalized attributes of other 
people since it would be too much information for the mind to organize if people were 
to interpret all incoming information. Thus people tend to make generalizations 
(Samovar, 1981: 85). By having to create new categories for the attributes of other 
people, these might become biased as the information that is used to do so might not 
be accurate and might come from subjective sources.  
As a result of this, the way people see other people is selective and based 
entirely on their perceptions and attributions. The latter is mainly used by people who 
encounter others they are not familiar with and if the attributions they believe to be 
true are confirmed they tend to rely on these. Thus, some people choose to see things 
the way they want to see them and therefore, at times, their mind-sets become 
subjective and biased (Gudykunst, 1998: 141). Since people believe reality to be a 
certain way, based on their stereotypes and worldview, this might influence their 
behavior toward someone they have identified stereotypically. It might often be easier 
to develop and hold stereotypes about other people than to lose the ones that have 
already been created. As Stuart Hall argues, the regime of representation, in which 
stereotypes function, “reduces people to a few, simple, essential characteristics” (Hall, 
1997: 257).   
According to Samovar et al., it is possible to look at four aspects in order to 
examine the validity of a stereotype. The first aspect is direction, which determines 
whether the stereotype is positive or negative. The second aspect is the intensity of the 
stereotypes which clarifies to what degree a person believes in them. Are his or her 
behaviors controlled by them or is s/he able to put them aside? The third aspect relies 
on to what extent the stereotypes are accurate. How much truth do they hold or are 
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they based on false grounds? Lastly, stereotypes can be determined by what they say, 
such as the traits they use to describe others (Samovar, 1981: 121-5). 
As a regime of representation it is also a regime of power that is presented 
through stereotypes and ethnocentrism. The result of seeing other people as inferior or 
less fortunate and thus hold knowledge about them leads to power and knowledge 
relations as argued by Foucault. Moreover, the ability to exercise power over other 
people by stereotyping derives from the close relations between power and knowledge 
and how ‘truth’ is able to establish itself on the grounds of knowledge. As argued by 
Foucault, 
Truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power… Truth is to be understood as a 
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, 
circulation and operation of statements (Foucault, 1980: 132, 133). 
  
In relation to Orientalism, the overall idea presented by Said is that the West 
holds a constructed picture of the Orient and that this has been accepted as a 
fundamental truth in the West. Additionally, this is the basis for its thoughts and 
actions involving the Orient. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Said claims that 
orientalism is a developed discourse that offers generalizations and control over the 
Orient. The discourse is fixed and is an essential part of the Western mind-set. Thus, it 
has created many of the stereotypes that some people hold about the Orient because 
they see it as one instead of different countries, cultures, and peoples. As an example, 
many people use guidebooks which describe people and places with a certain 
discourse which might be ethnocentric and thus hold certain stereotypes. As people 
read these they tend to regard what is written as true and they read the text 
uncritically. Yet again if the things that they read are proven not to be true people 
become confused and tend to believe what the more authoritative voice says (Said, 
1979: 93-94). 
 It is impossible not to mention some of the aspects that have already been 
discussed in the case of the colonial discourse as the stereotype is deeply embedded in 
the discursive formation. In accordance, Homi Bhabha, who discusses stereotypes in 
colonial discourse, claims that this discourse is highly dependent on what he argues to 
be a fixed ‘otherness’. This ‘fixity’ “is the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference” 
(Bhabha, 1994: 66) and the stereotype acts as ‘fixity’s’ approach to discourse in 
which the stereotype is a form of knowledge. Additionally, Said believes that because 
the colonial discourse was a means for the Orientalist to speak for the Orient it 
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resulted in the fact that the Orient lost its originality and that it merely became a 
“repetition and reconstruction” (Said, 1979: 3).   
 Moreover, Bhabha believes that the focus of the Oriental discourse ought to 
shift from what is already known (how Orientals are perceived) to how people are 
actually made subject to the colonial discourse. Bhabha offers the following 
explanation of the stereotype.  
[T]he stereotype, then, as the primary point of subjectification in colonial 
discourse, for both colonizer and colonized, is the scene of a similar fantasy 
and defence – the desire for an originality which is again threatened by the 
differences of race, colour and culture (Bhabha, 1994: 75). 
 
Finally, Bhabha argues that in order to understand ‘otherness’ one ought to 
create and understand the regime of truth which makes the basis for the production of 
colonial discourse (Ibid: 66-7).  
 When dealing with stereotypes it is difficult to speak of more specific 
situations since everyone has stereotypes and use them to varying degree. However, it 
is important to stress that stereotypes are not necessarily negative and that positive 
stereotypes have not been dealt with in the project. It is common for stereotypes to 
have taken the connotation of being negative which is possibly caused by the fact that 
some positive attributes often are being recognized as mere compliments and the like. 
Therefore, it is critical to not associate stereotypes with only hatred or disliking other 
peoples.  
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The West and its ‘Other’ 
…’they’ were not like ‘us’, and for that reason deserved to be ruled  
(Said, 1993: xi) 
 
Having examined identities, representations, the influence of discourses, and 
stereotypes this chapter looks at the factors that made some Western countries capable 
of imposing itself on another part of the world. Until now the project has examined 
people’s mind-set on a more individual level. However, it is equally important to look 
into the historical and cultural aspects of how the world has changed and developed in 
order to examine how this might reflect an overall American mind-set. As argued by 
Foucault, the historical conditions are necessary to examine if one seeks to understand 
a certain discourse.  
 In The Clash of Civilizations Samuel Huntington puts forth his thesis that 
Western power and influence is in decline. Overall, Huntington views civilizations as 
defined by religion and he claims that religion will become the defining element of 
people’s collective identity. Moreover, he argues that Islamic and Confucian societies 
will rise against the West because of differences in cultural values and civilization. 
Huntington mainly deals with the time after the Cold War and its consequences in the 
world order. In claiming that the Western influence and power are in decline he 
illustrates Western power during colonial times and how decolonization reduced 
European power, enabling America to emerge as the last superpower. Conclusively, 
during the Cold War America met its match both militarily and economically 
(Huntington, 2003: 83).  
 In accordance with this Said states,  
Much of the rhetoric of the ‘New World Order’ promulgated by the American 
government since the end of the Cold War – with its redolent self-
congratulation, its unconcealed triumphalism, its grave proclamations of 
responsibility…No American has been immune from this structure of feeling 
(Said, 1993: xvii). 
 
The problem with the criticism and The Clash of Civilizations is that it aimed 
at a very general spectrum. When directing criticism or statements it is essential and 
necessary to narrow down and define one’s target audience more accurately. In this 
case a direct criticism ought to include a direct recipient. Moreover, when stating that 
“no American has been immune” Said does not clarifying whether he speaks of 
American authorities or Americans in general. He can not possibly believe that this is 
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applicable to all Americans as opinions and attitudes vary. Moreover, The Clash of 
Civilizations is narrow in some of its claims. It does not reflect on many other aspects 
than religion as being the dominant aspect of a cultural clash which might hold some 
true, however, other factors must play a part as well such as the will to dominate, 
economy, and military power. 
Huntington suggests that there are obvious traits in the American identity 
which reflects the power and influence of an empire. Thereby, culture and history 
have great impact on identity and civilization. However, the question is how this 
division of cultures, as already mentioned in previous chapters, originated and how 
people have come to define themselves in relation to other cultures? 
 By combining various theorists, Huntington presents his definition of a 
civilization as the broadest term for a people. This identification, as well as that of 
culture, describes people’s way of living in terms of values, norms, institutions etc.  
Thus, examining these various aspects is helpful when learning about a culture and its 
people. As Hall claims, in order to learn the discourses in which identity is created 
one must look at the institutional and historical sites. 
  Moreover, the origin of how the Western mind-set came to think of a clear 
division between cultures, like East and West, lies in the fact that some people tend to 
define themselves by what they are not. In other words, as Huntington argues, by the 
18th century French thinkers developed the concept civilization, by which to judge 
other cultures as opposed to the term barbarism (Huntington, 2003: 40-1). This way of 
classifying people is natural according to Foucault but when it involves repressive 
power the outcome is negative. Huntington argues that 
People always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the 
other, our civilization and those barbarians… The most common division, 
which appears under various names, is between rich (modern, developed) 
countries and poor (traditional, undeveloped or developing) countries (Ibid: 
32). 
  
To explain how it is possible for the differences between cultures to cause 
conflicts the answers can be found in some of the same aspects of power relations that 
Foucault lays out in Discipline and Punish. Huntington provides some answers as to 
why it is possible for one culture to oppress another and how the notion of ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ came about. Firstly, culture is very important to people as they define 
themselves by the culture they live in and by its norms and values. Therefore, 
comparison and competition among different identities arise and thus clashes might 
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be generated by the fact that people in each culture sees theirs as the better culture or 
try to impose their values on other cultures. The significance of cultural identity is 
thus at the core of societies. 
 Secondly, Huntington states that identification is solely defined in relation to 
an ‘other’. Thus the concepts of civilized/uncivilized and advanced/backward come 
into play. This way of thinking about differences in cultures brings the need or ability, 
militarily and economically, to embed one’s culture and institutions in the other 
society. The notion of belonging to the better and more authentic culture also drives 
the need to ‘improve’ the other culture in order to make it more ‘functional’. These 
claims need reflection which Huntington seems to leave out. It is not accurate to state 
that identification is only defined in relation to an ‘other since this excludes additional 
possibilities. It might not apply to every person in the West that s/he has a need to 
improve other cultures. 
Finally, people learn about competition and thus the relationship between the 
good and the bad occurs. By feeling superior towards people who are different from 
oneself, the lack of knowledge of the other culture and the difficulty of 
communication among cultures have, as the overall Western attitude, created the 
notion of the advanced ‘us’ and the uncivilized ‘them’ (Ibid: 128-130). In addition to 
this, Huntington argues that the West is the only civilization with a great interest in 
other cultures and that the reason why they have had great influence is because other 
civilizations have needed their help to realize their goals (Ibid: 81).  
Another aspect of Huntington’s text which is worth considering is the fact that 
he provides a definition of how he uses the term civilization and what this covers but 
he identifies the West as one civilization and does so throughout his book. This is a 
contradiction since he suggests that civilization implies the norms and values that 
people live by. However, there are many differences between for example France, 
Germany, and America. It is true that different countries in the West share some of 
the same institutional sites and that some countries share more values than others but 
to claim that the West is one civilization is to offer a far too generalized view. 
 Additionally, Huntington argues the division between Western and Eastern 
societies lies in the fact that the former were more homogeneous and thus the first to 
develop and reach modernity. Hence, some people in the West tend to believe that 
they hold the better solutions and values to achieving ideal societies. Moreover, the 
answer to empirical states is to be found in the fact that the West had a more 
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organized and stronger army and thus won its superiority by violence and not in ideas 
and values (Huntington, 2003: 68, 51).  
In relation to this it is interesting to bring up the American involvement in 
Asia and Iraq. What were/are the actual goals for going to war? Was/is it to liberate 
the people from national developments in their respective countries? It is also 
interesting to consider whether the current war in Iraq is carried out on the grounds of 
ideas and values or if it is the result of a military demonstration of power. 
 Huntington suggests that the result of Western superiority and the decline of 
Western values is that America does not seem as attractive as it once did. Other 
countries have developed and become stronger; they are politically independent and 
have developed their own strong cultural identity. Thus, they do not value the fact that 
Western cultures impose their ideals upon them. However, the important issue it 
seems for Western countries today is what differentiates them from the other cultures. 
That is, their attempt to maintain superior, their Western values, and finally the need 
to protect these values (Ibid: 184-5).  
 The ideas of a universal culture and the effort to embed Western values in 
other cultures are very much a valid discussion in the world today. It is not wrong to 
state that Western values are not universal and not the preeminent solution for all 
problems that a country might have. Moreover, the dominance of the West has its 
basis in the belief that other cultures are in the need of Western guidance in order to 
achieve their goals. This is evident in the major Western interest in other civilizations 
throughout time, such as the study of the Orient, Asia, and the Middle East.  
Huntington proves to be right when claiming that the influence of the West is 
declining since the situation in Iraq proves that it is not possible to merely impose 
values upon another culture because as Foucault argues, “there are no relations of 
power without resistance” (Foucault, 1980: 142).  
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Analytical Framework 
 This chapter will briefly draw together the theories presented earlier and set up 
their key concepts and perspectives to pinpoint the problem posed in the introduction. 
However, this will clearly illustrate the analytical framework for the case study.  
The theory attempted to present an outline of how it is possible to examine a 
particular way of thinking and understanding how this particular discourse is 
presented. Additionally, it examined some of the developments and ideas that might 
have influenced some people’s mind-sets. The case study, which follows this chapter, 
examines the representations based on two factual events of American involvement in 
two parts of the world. The listings below are the main issues that will guide the 
discussion and the analyses of the case material.   
• Foucault: Examination of the origin of a discourse. Is it evident that 
knowledge can lead to control?  
• Said: Characteristics of a Western mind-set. Are these contemporary in 
relation to the case study?  
• Hall: Identity and representation. As opposed to Foucault and Said, Hall deals 
with identities as being subject to change. Is it evident that identities are 
constructed within discourse? 
• Stereotypes: These describe the identities people attribute and are attributed. 
To what degree are these present and believed? What are the effects of 
stereotypes? Is ‘cultural relativism’ present? 
• Huntington: America as a superpower. Does the case study material present 
traits of American identity which reflect this power and influence? 
 
 The analyses of the case study focus on characters in the texts and on the 
general attributes, with the aim of identifying and examining an American mind-set. 
Moreover, as mentioned in the methodology the analyses of the case study are 
examined on the basis of content analysis in order to provide a general idea of the 
American mind-set seen from a variety of texts. 
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Introduction to Case Study 
 Based on the theory that makes up the first part of the project the case study is 
an examination of American experiences in Asia and Iraq. America was involved in 
South-East Asia in the 1950-60s and is currently engaged in the Middle East in the 
controversial war in Iraq. The aim of the case study is to examine how Americans, 
who are situated abroad, experience their surroundings and particularly the people 
with who they engage and communicate. Moreover, the aim of the case study is to 
discover if it is possible, through American behavior and attitude, to attribute an 
overall identity and draw out a discourse that describes the American mind-set based 
on the discussion in the theory. 
 The case study includes two sources of each American involvement. The Quiet 
American and The Ugly American are both novels dealing with the American role in 
Asia in the 1950s. The novels contain descriptions of Americans in Asia and analyses 
of these illustrate how some Americans behaved and why they might have been 
perceived with anti-American sentiment.  
The examination of the second American intervention is based on a novel 
written by a journalist who followed a group of marines during their journey from 
southern Iraq to Baghdad. The other analysis is of various newspaper articles from 
The New York Times that have been divided into three themes based on the 
comprehensive information obtained from all articles in The New York Times on Iraq 
May through December 2004.  
The first theme deals with how America goes about rebuilding Iraq and it 
involves the issues and problems that might occur when deciding on how to plan the 
reconstruction of an entire country. The following theme concerns the battle of Najaf 
and the experiences of warfare as covered by the newspaper. The last theme 
completes the discussion of how a particular discourse might influence appearance 
and how this might create a certain behavior. This second part of the case study will 
draw links to the theory and the analyses of The Quiet American and The Ugly 
American in order to be able to lay out a representation of whether the American 
mind-set has changed or, as Edward Said claims, remained fixed. 
 All literature used in this case study have essentially been targeted at an 
American audience. It involves both fiction, the first part, as the stories hold the 
author’s more personal perspective, and journalism which goes beyond this 
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perception and is believed to take a more objective stance since it mainly involves 
reportage. In order to obtain an overall representation of an American mind-set the 
source of the analyses will not merely cover what is thought to be negative aspects of 
the American interventions. This approach has to be taken in order to reflect on 
various problems that might exist and to gain a general idea of the differences 
between positive and negative aspects.  
 Another issue to bear in mind when reading the case study is the fact that The 
Quiet American is written by Graham Greene who is British whereas the rest of the 
sources are written by Americans. The Quiet American is entirely fictional. However, 
it has been based on Greene’s travels to Asia. Moreover, the result of this project is to 
provide a representation of the American mind-set and thus the case study is looked 
upon and used as descriptions of Americans.  
Clive Christie from Hull University, England conducted a study on Western 
literary perspectives on Indo-China in the decade of transition 1950-1960. In the study 
the author compares, among others, The Quiet American and The Ugly American. The 
background for the study is  
on the general significance of The Quiet American and The Ugly American as 
seminal western books that have influenced western outlooks on South-East 
Asia (Christie, 1990: ii). 
 
 As claimed by Christie, Western literature, like these two novels, functioned 
as illustrations and explanations of the situation in Indo-China in the 1950s. Through 
these stories a domestic audience was able to follow “the retreat of France from its 
colonial role, and the intervention…of the United States” (Ibid: 1). 
 According to Christie, The Quiet American acted as a bridge between the 
French and the American experience as it conveyed the French experience in Indo-
China to an American public whose interest and involvement in Asia increased in the 
1950s. Thus, the book became a link between French and American literature on 
Indo-China followed by The Ugly American (Ibid: 23, 35). 
 45
The Quiet American by Graham Greene 
The Quiet American is based upon Graham Greene’s experiences in Indochina 
as he traveled and wrote articles for several papers reporting on the political and 
military situation in north and south Vietnam in 1954-55. It is through these articles 
and The Quiet American that Greene expresses his views on how Vietnam was the 
battlefield of French and American attempts to create an anti-communist state 
(Christie, 1990: 20). 
The story of The Quiet American unfolds in Indochina as the French army 
fights the Vietminh. It is in other words the failing days of the French colonial rule. 
However, the story is as much about the commencement of the American 
involvement in the region and the emergence of a new superpower.  
America began as an empire during the nineteenth century, but it was in the 
second half of the twentieth, after decolonization of the British and French 
empires, that it directly followed its two great predecessors [and] that the idea 
of overseas rule – jumping beyond adjacent territories to very distant lands – 
has a privileged status (Said, 1993: xxiii).  
  
The American involvement is told through the eyes of the British reporter 
Fowler and evolves around the character of Alden Pyle, a young American idealist, 
who has come to Saigon with the objective of promoting democracy. Pyle is thirty-
two years old and works for the Economic Aid Mission. He described as the quiet 
American since he is not like the other Americans who are present in Saigon. He is 
very polite and seems to merely express American kindness and attractiveness. 
Phuong is another character in the novel. She is a Vietnamese woman who is caught 
between Fowler and Pyle in their pursuit to own her. 
 
An American Experience in Vietnam 
When Pyle arrives in Saigon he is illustrated by his native optimism in the 
“fight for liberty” (Greene, 1955: 97). His optimism is based on the fact that he seems 
well prepared for his stay in Saigon as he has studied the country and “had been 
reading in advance on the Far East and the problems of China” (Ibid: 18). Thus, from 
what he has read he believes that he knows what is best for Vietnam in its struggle for 
independence from the French colonial rule. In accordance with Michel Foucault, this 
is how Pyle, among others, is able to obtain his status of superiority in relations to his 
object of study. In addition, Edward Said claims that many people from the West, in 
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their study of the Orient, did it on the basis of texts and not through actual experience. 
Another problem with this is that Pyle only relies on one source of information about 
the East and that he believes in everything this author writes. Pyle appears to be 
interested in the current situation in Vietnam. However, because he only uses one 
source his views become biased as seen here when he says to Fowler that  
I’d take it as a very great privilege if you could find time to brief me on the 
main points. You see, York was here more than two years ago (Ibid: 24). 
  
The developments in Saigon are rapid and clearly York is outdated because of 
the interests, actions, and development of many different countries. This example also 
shows that Pyle is well aware of the fact that his only source is outdated. Moreover, it 
brings to mind whether or not this is a way for Greene to describe the American 
character as naïve and incompetent?  
The author that Pyle gains his knowledge from suggests that in order to 
establish peace Vietnam needs, what he calls, a Third Force. This should be 
established in opposition to the Vietminh and the French army and should be a 
political ‘third force’, which is neither communist nor pro-French. Pyle believes in 
this and he channels economic aid to the Third Force.  
A reason why Pyle in the end fails to succeed with his Third Force might be 
explained by aspects in Orientalism. Edward Said claims that many sources of this 
kind of information are not accurate. They do not provide people with a genuine idea 
of what it means to live in the Orient or for that matter improve the situation in the 
Orient. Pyle is not at all prepared for the job even though he appears to be well 
informed and merely want what is best for everyone. By only knowing about the 
Orient through one person and relying on that account, it makes Pyle out of touch 
with reality. He even admits that the author has made mistakes. This favoring of 
textual attitude is, according to Said, how stereotypes and beliefs about other people 
remain fixed for many years. The views that York holds are merely taken over by 
Pyle without questioning and without exploring the situation himself. Pyle’s source is 
outdated and therefore his views become obsolete as well. 
Another reason for Pyle’s unsuccessful mission is his innocence and naivety. 
He might appear to be fighting for what is best for all parties. However, his idealism 
and faith in goodness eventually becomes his death. This is evident in his assumed 
ideals together with his belief that he serves the Vietnamese people good. 
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Pyle becomes known as the quiet American because, compared to the other 
Americans who are stationed in Vietnam, he is different. He is not loud and 
disrespectful and merely comes across as being innocent. This is depicted by Fowler, 
who states that “innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the 
world, meaning no harm” (Ibid: 37). However, this leprosy, of which the literal 
meaning is ‘harmful influence’, is depicted through Pyle as doing more harm than 
good. As mentioned in the novel “They killed him because he was too innocent to 
live” (Ibid: 31).  
His harmful nature, which is illustrated through his innocence, leads Pyle in a 
direction he can not divert from. Because of his naivety he trusts and relies on the 
wrong people. Moreover, by seeing himself as a liberator, Pyle is driven by 
ideological motives as seen by the fact that he reads books on what to believe. Thus, 
he is theory-driven which leads him to become narrow-minded and appear innocent. 
His book does not teach him about the world. Pyle is therefore not able to see the real 
dangers and thereby deal with the situations that come his way. In the end he is 
carrying out a mission in which the consequences are not considered. In this situation 
the American idealism and innocence prove dangerous. This is illustrated in the sense 
that Pyle has good motives but causes many of the problems that lead to his death.  
Pyle obviously represents America and its involvement in Vietnam with the 
objective to liberate the country. He is a symbol of the younger and richer rival 
America as compared to the older colonial rulers which is depicted through Fowler 
(Christie, 1990: 33). However, things went wrong for Pyle in the same way that it did 
for America and the whole situation eventually ended in what is known as the 
Vietnam War. Said briefly mentions The Quiet American in Culture and Imperialism. 
He says of Pyle that 
American interests have insisted on American innocence, doing good, fighting 
for freedom…Pyle…embodies this cultural formation with merciless accuracy 
(Said, 1993: 9). 
 
The true innocent character of this book is the Vietnamese woman Phuong. 
She represents Vietnam and is only portrayed through the characters of Fowler and 
Pyle. From Pyle and Phuong’s first meeting, he seems to care a great deal for her and 
falls in love with her. Around Phuong he is not like other Americans either. He seems 
to respect her and despise the way other Americans treat women altogether. His 
reaction toward her and how he cares for her appears to be excessive. He is very eager 
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to pursue a future with her and does not let anything or anyone stand in the way. 
Pyle’s respect and care for Phuong amounts to one thing which is the ability to 
possess and own her. His objective with her, like the relations of America and 
Vietnam, is to improve her and who she is. The question that comes to mind is 
whether Pyle has fallen in love with Phuong as a person or for what she stands for. 
Phuong also falls for Pyle but this affection is grounded in what Pyle stands for. He is 
younger and appear richer that Fowler and moreover Phuong believes that he can 
offer her a brighter future. It becomes apparent that Phuong is clearly a symbol of the 
colonial exploitation in the sense that she is an object that can be owned and which is 
in need of Western help in order to improve. 
Pyle’s love for Phuong can thus be seen through the eyes of Orientalism. Pyle 
has invaded her territory and she is merely seen and described from an American 
point of view. She is a passive character as the reader is not let in on her thoughts. Her 
needs are clearly put aside or not considered at all. She is merely a depiction of a 
person, or country, occupied by dominant forces in which her values are not 
considered. She stands for what many Vietnamese girls experienced during the 1950s 
– a promise of marriage by foreigners but left stranded, unable to either regain their 
culture at home or to begin a new life in a foreign country. Pyle is observing and 
learning about her and thus he believes he knows what is best for her. In addition, he 
sees her as an object of study and thus she is capable of being managed and changed 
according to American values. Pyle is very straightforward with what he has to offer 
Phuong.  
I’m not rich. But when my father dies I’ll have about fifty thousand dollars. 
I’m in good health – I’ve got a medical certificate only two months old, and I 
can let her know my blood-group (Greene, 1955: 77). 
 
This represents values are believed to be important to many Americans. 
Money is important to secure one’s life and having children is important to carry on 
the family heritage. Moreover, Pyle’s intentions are not to offer her real love but 
“security and respect” (Ibid: 78). He wants to take Phuong back to America and marry 
her. He does not consider whether she would be happy or not, which is probably a 
way for Greene to describe the American character as shallow and impassionate.  
Even though Phuong talks about all the sights in America she has seen in 
pictures, she is not aware of the kind of life America can to offer her. It would 
probably be very difficult for her to settle down and integrate as an American woman. 
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Vietnam is her home and life and the two countries and their cultures are very 
different from each other. The life that awaits Phuong is described by Pyle as  
My mother is a wonderful woman – she’d take her around, introduce her, you 
know, kind of fit her in. She’d help her get a home ready for me (Ibid: 155). 
 
Pyle makes it sound very easy to integrate Phuong to an American lifestyle. 
Additionally, this shows that he believes that it is easy and straightforward to 
implement American values in Vietnamese culture. Phuong can be changed according 
to Pyle’s needs and she can be owned because of how the American culture and 
imperialism are intertwined. Like the situation in Vietnam, Phuong can be seen as 
having American values enforced upon her without consideration for her cultural 
norms. Moreover, she is attributed an identity by Pyle which is not accurate as it is 
created from his beliefs and his way of thinking based on a textual attitude. This 
corresponds with the studies of Stuart Hall as he claims that the reality people 
experience through representations is not reality as it is. The argument that can be put 
forth is whether or not anyone is able to see the world beyond the influences of one’s 
cultural identity. It is safe to say that the identity that Pyle attributes Phuong is not the 
accurate as he has not made the effort to try to get to know her, he merely comes on to 
her through ethnocentrism. 
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter Pyle is depicted as a quiet 
American because he is not like other Americans. One character that perfectly 
exemplifies this ‘other’ American is the Economic Attaché named Joe (last name is 
not known).  A contrast to Pyle, Joe is noisy and takes up a lot of room with his mere 
style and behavior. He is confident and noisy and he drives a very big car which takes 
up a lot of room on the streets. Fowler remembers him by “his fatness and his 
powdered clean-shaven cheeks and his big laugh” (Ibid: 115). Furthermore, Joe sees 
himself as being a straightforward guy with no bad intentions and liked by every one 
for whom he is. 
 He holds no respect for the natives and he holds stereotypes such as “Joe said 
it was being in bed with a Chink and a negress at the same time” (Ibid: 103). It is 
obvious that, being a visitor in a foreign country, he does not respect the natives. 
However, his attitude is completely different when he is surrounded by people from 
the West. He is very friendly and his goodness and willingness to help others are 
some of the characteristics that apply to him. His goodness is probably real but it 
comes off as very superficial and inappropriate in that he is not portrayed as amiable. 
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 As Pyle and Joe are both Americans they are described as two completely 
different people with very different objectives. Pyle seems to have the best interests at 
heart. However, because of his naivety and innocence he causes more damage than 
good. Joe, on the other hand, appears to cause a big gap between two cultures with the 
way he behaves. A thing that the two characters have in common though is the fact 
that they both represent an American who holds contrasting values of omitted and 
imprudent goodness. Moreover, they share traits of being superficial but this is 
expressed in different ways. One is easily seen through while the other hides behind a 
façade.  
 From Graham Greene’s representation of the American character in The Quiet 
American it is difficult to establish how Pyle has attained his attitude and way of 
thinking. The reader is not told of his influences other than this one book he uses as 
his source of knowledge. It is obviously through this that he obtains his knowledge 
and through which he builds his discourse. Furthermore, Pyle’s power is mainly his 
knowledge and the fact that he believes that he knows the situation in Vietnam. Based 
on this knowledge, he assumes that he is able to take control and lead the events in his 
direction. The problem is that Pyle does not have a comprehensive view of the 
situation and therefore he fails in the end.  
 The relations between America and Vietnam, as told through Pyle and 
Phuong, is that of superior/inferior and advanced/backward. This is illustrated by 
Greene in his descriptions of Pyle in his aim to establish American values of 
democracy through a Third Force. Additionally, Phuong, as a symbol of Vietnam, 
merely lets these actions take over because Pyle believes she is in need of 
improvement. These relations explain how difference causes one part for to be passive 
and another to take over as the acting party. It is obvious that Greene illustrates 
America as a superpower in that the country invades and tries to impose its values on 
another. America is able to do so both by its military power but also through its force 
of knowledge by believing that it posseses the solution to the problems in Vietnam. 
 It is difficult to imagine that Pyle could change his views of himself and the 
perception of his surroundings. He bases his knowledge on one source and it does not 
seem likely that he would change his perception of this author. The reason is that Pyle 
is not able to look outside his personal perspective and thus acquire a more worldly 
view. 
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 Stereotypes are not obvious in The Quiet American but they do exist on a 
higher level. Pyle is obviously stereotyping Phuong through his perception of her as a 
passive object which he shapes according to his interests. Moreover, it is important to 
step outside the novel to recognize that maybe the author of the text stereotypes? 
Greene’s depiction of Pyle does not have any positive aspects. Pyle is merely 
illustrated as “a dumb leper” (Ibid: 37) which conceals his identity along with his 
objectives for Vietnam and his American values. To some extent, Greene uses Fowler 
as his voice in the novel. At first, Fowler likes Pyle’s company but he quickly changes 
his mind about him once he gets to know Pyle. Is this another way for Greene to say 
that Americans appear amicable but after a while one discovers their true nature and 
objectives? This stereotype is also evident in the other American character which is 
described in the novel. Joe is liked by other Americans but Fowler sees him as 
obnoxious.  
Additionally, the analysis has brought to mind that Said is somehow 
contradicting himself. He claims that many authors favored a textual attitude and that 
they experienced the Orient according to this. However, like Pyle, Said also seems, to 
some extent, to favor this in Orientalism as he merely examines an attitude in texts. 
Though his study is vast and includes many texts it appears that he does not use any 
sources that could present a different attitude and thus provide counter writing. Is this 
not to favor one specific textual attitude?   
The Quiet American was a critique of American policy in Asia and the novel 
offers two pictures of Americans. The fat and noisy American who takes up a lot of 
room and the American who is quiet, innocent, and appears to only want what is best 
for others. Both characters have their faults and both cause the American reputation 
and appearance to deteriorate in the eyes of other nations. It appears that Greene 
wants to illustrate that Americans believe themselves to be a generous people but that 
other countries in the world see them differently. 
 With this illustration of Americans as seen by a British author it will be 
interesting to now look at an American depiction of Americans and whether these 
differ or present any similarities in their illustrations.  
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The Ugly American by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick 
The Ugly American explores American foreign policy in the late 1950s. The 
novel consists of various parables and unfolds in the fictional country of Sarkhan in 
Asia. The novel describes different characters that all have one thing in common 
which is the interest of America. However, the interest is expressed in different ways. 
Some of the characters show the best of American values whereas others take a 
completely different stance to the issues at hand, and show the ugly face of arrogance, 
ethnocentricity, and incompetence.  
Through their characters, William Lederer and Eugene Burdick illustrate what 
they believed was wrong with American foreign policy in Asia in the 1950s. The 
different characters illustrate ‘how’ and ‘how not’ to fight communism effectively. 
The novel explains the differences in cultures and shows that American diplomats at 
times find it difficult to step away from their own private extravagance and face the 
real problems of the country they currently live in and are supposed to help.  
America not only has a problem with how diplomats act when they are abroad 
but their foreign aid also proves to be problematic. As one of the richest and most 
powerful countries in the world, it seems that the foremost aim is to showcase their 
wealth and power through aid but the question is how useful this aid is to the 
countries that receive it? Communism has free scope to spread in Asia and America 
seems to have no weapons of any kind to prevent this. 
The analysis of The Ugly American examines four different characters; two of 
whom do not possess positive American values and two characters that set aside their 
own needs to help others. The four are Lois Sears, Joe Bing, Gilbert MacWhite, and 
Homer Atkins. Through the analysis of these four characters it becomes clear that, 
among others, there are three important steps that should be considered in achieving 
efficient cultural relations; information, identification, and integration.  
 
American Experiences in Asia 
Lois Sears 
Sears works as American ambassador to Sarkhan. He was not particularly 
interested in the job but accepted it because of the salary and opportunity to achieve a 
higher standard of living. When told about the job as ambassador, he jumped at the 
chance because a grand salary and cheap liquor are important to his style of living.  
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The main problem with Sears is that he thinks in negative stereotypes. Natives 
and Americans have difficulties in getting along and are not able to do business with 
one another. The natives do not agree with how America supports them. “In particular 
it is reluctant to have us grant air bases in this country in exchange for foreign aid” as 
expressed by a distinguished poet and drama critic of Sarkhan (Lederer, 1958: 29). 
However, the need for foreign aid is necessary to the Sarkhanese people. Hence they 
have to go along with American foreign policies. A problematic issue is that the 
diplomats who are assigned to live in the country are not competent and liked by the 
natives. 
 The stereotypes that Sears holds about the native people are very degrading 
and hinder any contact or possibility of effective communication. Prior to his 
employment Sears states “Now, you know I’m not prejudiced, but I just don’t work 
well with blacks” (Ibid: 14). This statement not only proves that he is prejudiced but 
also that he holds stereotypes about people with a different skin color. Moreover, he is 
very ignorant in calling Asians ‘black’ people. Another example taken from his 
arrival in Sarkhan is when he looks down on people in the streets from his luxurious 
house and thinks  
Strange little monkeys, Ambassador Sears thought…Women do all the work, 
men have all the fun (Ibid: 12). 
 
This shows that Sears does not understand the natives’ way of living and that 
he merely explains other peoples’ behavior with stereotypes. He thinks in terms of 
how they are different from what he is used to thus he compares the natives to 
monkeys as he does not understand their behavior. In accordance with Foucault and 
the discussion of Hall, through this act of observation Sears labels the natives as 
‘monkeys’ as a marking of difference. Thus he is naturally better than they are. This 
provides him with a categorization that enables him to explain the ‘other’ as backward 
rather than advanced. This problem originates from the fact that Sears does not know 
anything about the culture of the country he currently lives in and that he does not 
know the language which is a major hindrance for him. It makes him impatient which 
causes him to become angry at the natives.  
 For example, one newspaper has made a caricature which Sears believes 
resembles him, however, since he does not know Sarkhanese he does not understand 
it.  
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Ambassador Sears wished to hell that some Americans in the Embassy could 
read Sarkhanese. He hated to interrogate the native translators attached to 
USIS about the meaning of cartoons. He suspected that the damned little 
monkeys always lied (Ibid: 13).  
 
Additional stereotypes are created from the fact that Sears does not know the 
language and therefore has come to know the natives as untrustworthy because he 
cannot verify whether or not they speak the truth. This limitation of not being able to 
communicate in the native language is frustrating for Sears. However, the only way 
he feels that he can fight back is by threatening with withdrawing the American 
foreign aid. By doing so he is once again able to feel superior and come out of the 
situation as the stronger part.  
 The incident with the cartoon puts the whole situation in perspective as Sears 
states  
”A few more cartoons like this and I’m going to have to report to Washington 
that your people are not very sympathetic to American representatives,” 
Ambassador Sears was saying. “It doesn’t mean anything to me personally, 
but cartoons like this are damned disrespectful, and hurt relations between 
countries” (Ibid: 29). 
 
It is obvious that the natives are able to feel Sears’ hostility toward them and 
thus they react with the same methods. Moreover, he has brought it upon himself that 
the natives do not respect him. It is him, not the cartoon, which hurts relations 
between countries and cultures. Nevertheless, Sears does not know why he is not 
liked and respected in Sarkhan. He compares the situation with how things were in 
America where he fit in and was thought of as an amiable man. By comparing with 
America standards he degrades Sarkhan, its people, and only thinks proudly of what is 
“made in America” (Ibid: 12).  
 
Joe Bing 
The character named Joe Bing works as the chief of information for the ICA in 
Setkya which is one of the American foreign aid centers in Asia. He is “a government 
public relations man” (Lederer, 1958:79). Being a press attaché, Bing’s job is to make 
Americans look good to the public no matter what the local situation is. 
Joe Bing is sent abroad because everyone loves him. He appears to know a lot 
of people and can socialize with everyone. The account of Joe Bing is told by Ruth 
Jyoti who is an editor and publisher of an independent newspaper in Setkya.  
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The resemblance between the character of Joe Bing and the character of Joe in 
The Quiet American is striking. As well as sharing the same name and having more or 
less the same profession the two characters are ascribed the same characteristics. It 
seems clear that The Ugly American has relations to The Quiet American. “Sitting 
with him behind the table was a very fat, warm, jolly man named Joseph F. Bing” 
(Ibid: 78). In The Quiet American Joe is described by “his fatness and his powdered 
clean-shaven cheeks and his big laugh” (Greene, 1955: 115).  
Like Sears, Joe Bing is very well liked in America. As claimed by an 
employee of the State Department, “After all, everybody loves Joe Bing. The 
department loves him. The newspaper people love him” (Lederer, 1958: 70). 
Nevertheless, Bing gives Americans a very bad reputation with the way he behaves. 
In Setkya he is not known for his charm but for the fact that  
He drives a big red convertible which he slews around the corners and over 
sidewalks. And he’s got exactly the kind of loud and silly laugh that every 
Asian is embarrassed to hear (Ibid: 69). 
 
Furthermore, he hosts large parties every month for which he gets his supplies 
from “good ole U.S.A.” (Ibid: 69). These parties are held according to Western 
standards in that there is plenty of food and liquor. However, the parties are only for 
people from the West since the parties are not held according to Asian values. It is not 
considered that in some religions people are not allowed to drink alcohol. Hence the 
natives are not invited because they are not respected. Even though Bing is said to 
know a lot of people and socialize with everyone he only does so with people from 
the West.  
There is an obvious difference in how Americans act at home and abroad. One 
of the reasons they only socialize with one another is that it is much more comfortable 
and much safer than being around strangers and a strange language. They have not 
made the effort to learn about the culture, the people they are supposed to live among 
and thus they do not understand the locals. Ruth, who is a publisher of a local 
newspaper, dislikes people like Bing. She claims  
They [Americans] fawn all over us – if we speak English – and start making 
big plans for the country – without knowing anything about it (Ibid: 71). 
 
Another aspect that could explain this arrogant behavior is the fact that 
because everything is cheaper it is possible to lead an extravagant lifestyle. Thus, it is 
easier for Bing to feel that he is above everyone else by having a bigger house, car, 
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and hosting big parties every month. All of this is evidence that Joe Bing and some of 
the other characters are not qualified for the job. They are not willing to sacrifice their 
time to learn the native language, culture, and socialize with the people among them.  
 Joe Bing, and the way he behaves, is recognized and appreciated by authorities 
in America. Everyone loves him because the only feedback the authorities receive is 
from other Americans who enjoy Bing’s big parties and his American charm. In 
addition, his charm is used to recruit other Americans for overseas professions. He is 
also said to be an expert in Asian affairs and known as “a person who is an expert at 
meeting natives face to face as equals” (Ibid: 79). Thus, he speaks on behalf of 
Americans who are stationed abroad and have to adjust to life in a foreign culture. 
 In the end, Bing only knows about the informal side of living abroad which 
seems to be all he cares about. Bing explains what life is like working as an American 
official abroad. He states that “…when you’re doing big work and important work 
you still have to relax…” (Ibid: 79). He does not put any emphasis on the actual work 
that you are supposed to do; rather he explains the kind of life he is having and all the 
benefits that come along with it. In describing the American situation in Asia, Joe 
Bing actually tells the truth. Unfortunately, the simple truth sells the job. Among 
others, he states “We look out for our people. When you live overseas it’s still on high 
American standards” (Ibid: 80).  
You’ll have to work among foreigners, but we don’t expect you to love ‘em 
just because you work among ‘em…you’ll be living with a gang of clean-cut 
Americans (Ibid: 79-80).   
 
Fact is, we don’t expect you to know the native language. Translators are a 
dime a dozen overseas. And besides, it’s better to make the Asians learn 
English. Helps them too (Ibid: 81).  
 
Using this discourse there is an obvious difference between two peoples. One 
is superior to the other and as in Orientalism it is the dominant and occupying force. 
Even though Bing speaks the truth, no one recognizes the problem in what he is 
saying or questions the situation. The statements explain what foreign work is based 
upon and no one makes an effort to understand the foreign culture.  
The fact that Bing lectures the way he does gives people the wrong attitude 
and expectations about going abroad. The enthusiasm and reason that people might 
have for going abroad is being twisted and turned into something it should not be. In 
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other words, he establishes a certain discourse that others come to live by and believe 
in. 
Sears and Bing share similar behavior and both represent America. 
Fortunately, The Ugly American also deals with characters that do well in terms of 
spreading American goodness. 
 
Gilbert MacWhite 
 Gilbert MacWhite, as a contrast to Sears and Bing, is a professional Foreign 
Service officer succeeding Sears as ambassador of Sarkhan. By the time he takes 
office, communism has grown more popular but MacWhite is prepared to take up the 
fight.  
He learned the Sarkhanese language in fifteen weeks…He read every 
book…on Sarkhanese history and political life. He talked to anthropologists, 
sociologists, political scientists, diplomats, and businessmen who had visited 
Sarkhan in the last several years (Lederer, 1958: 94). 
 
His main objective in Sarkhan is to help fight communism. However, in his 
point of view the only way to do so is first of all to learn about the country, culture, 
and the enemy. In other words, he sees the need to fight on the natives’ terms by 
trying to see the situation from their frame of reference. 
This American character goes through a lot of trouble to fit in and learn about 
the culture of where he is living. MacWhite consults with the natives to learn about 
communism and the state of the country. Unlike Pyle in The Quiet American, 
MacWhite has more than one source of information on which he builds his 
knowledge. Moreover, one of his strengths is that he is unaffected by the life that the 
two preceding characters described earlier.  
…something happens to most Americans when they go abroad. Many of them 
are not average…Many of them, against their own judgment, feel that they 
must live up to their commissaries and big cars and cocktail parties. But get an 
unaffected American, sir, and you have an asset (Ibid: 108).  
 
MacWhite evaluates and analyzes the situation in Sarkhan. He sets out to 
remedy Ambassador Sears’ careless mistakes and errors. This is what MacWhite 
stands for. He goes out, meets people on their terms, and he goes to great lengths to 
help fight communism. His efforts in learning about the natives prove beneficial as 
during the war he suggests that they need to fight like the natives by using communist 
war tactics. Moreover, he does not undermine the people of Sarkhan. He sees them as 
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people and individuals and not as little monkeys incapable of independence. The only 
way to find out about this is to communicate and work on the ground with the natives. 
Contrary to Sears, MacWhite is not blinded by stereotypes and ethnocentrism which 
enable him to see the Sarkhanese for who they really are. 
As it turns out, MacWhite is not appreciated by America. He does not seem to 
behave as expected which, in the book, appears to be one of the keywords in 
American foreign policy; to do what is expected of you in accordance with American 
authorities. Together with Homer Atkins, MacWhite is one of the few people who are 
able to see that a few small things can make a big difference when it comes to helping 
the natives in Sarkhan. He writes a letter which eventually leads to his reassignment. 
It describes the few and basic things which can be done to help the people and help 
spread the amiability of Americans.  
All he asks for is a group of committed and hard working Americans who are 
prepared to live in another culture. They should learn the language, be willing to stay 
for at least two years, and live like the locals. He is tired of the political game and 
requests measures that may actually cause progress. They are, however, not 
economical and do not provide the public image that America is interested in. 
MacWhite is replaced by Joe Bing who behaves and lives as expected. 
 
Homer Atkins 
 The last character from The Ugly American is Homer Atkins, also known as 
the ugly American. Homer is an engineer who sets out to invent a water pump to 
make life easier for the Sarkhanese people who live in the mountains.  
When first encountering Atkins, he is facing bureaucracy at its worst. Atkins, 
as the ugly American, sits in front of a group of nicely dressed gentlemen. They will 
decide on where and how to build dams and military roads in Vietnam. However, 
Atkins does not agree with these people on what the Vietnamese people need the 
most.  
Because you don’t need dams and roads…Maybe later, but right now you 
need to concentrate on first things – largely things that your own people can 
manufacture and use…I can tell you that your people need other things besides 
military roads. You ever hear of food shortage…? (Lederer, 1958: 207). 
 
Atkins has been among the natives therefore he knows where the true 
problems lie, which are not a priority with the officials in Vietnam. These people are 
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more concerned about something which only they believe is useful for Vietnam and 
its people. It is evident in their discourse that they speak for the country, in terms of 
suggesting what they think it needs, instead of considering its actual needs. Even 
though Atkins is described as being ugly he is not the one who inspires the title of the 
book. It is the fact that he discovers the ugly side of American foreign policy. Only a 
very small number of people are aware of the situation in the country they live. Most 
diplomats do not know anything about what kind of help the country they live in 
needs and most importantly they do not know how communism has come to manifest 
itself. 
They are not able to see this because of their ignorance and unwillingness to 
go out to find the true problems. They are more concerned about money and believe 
that the more money is poured in the better the help. Atkins is only looking to do 
minor things which, on the other hand, will make a bigger difference. However, his 
recommendations for what to do are cast aside by the authorities. 
…I think that’s a political decision which goes beyond your province…Let’s 
just let your report stand and we’ll discuss it on a higher level (Ibid: 208). 
  
This higher level is dangerous as these people are ignorant of what is really going on.  
MacWhite invites Atkins to go to Sarkhan because MacWhite knows that 
Atkins’ approach and motivation will a difference for the locals. Atkins travels the 
country, lives with the natives, and speaks the language. By doing so he is able to 
identify the greatest needs of the Sarkhanese people. He gives them water and he 
teaches them that in working side by side with the natives some Americans are not 
arrogant and disrespectful This, however, also marks Atkins as an ugly American as a 
technical advisor from the American Embassy claims 
…for white men to work with their hands, and especially in the countryside, 
lowered the reputation of all white men (Ibid: 228). 
  
Atkins and his wife live with the locals and like the locals. They live in a small 
cottage, have no servants, and do not lead an extravagant lifestyle. They live as the 
only Caucasians. They become integrated in the village and learn the language 
enough to get around.  
It was not easy, but he could tell that the headman was pleased that Atkins was 
making the effort to talk his language (Ibid: 219).  
 
They show cultural relativism by setting aside their own culture and by only 
bringing in the aspects of American values that will benefit the natives. Moreover, in 
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order for Atkins to implement his water pump he is forced to find ways for it to fit the 
Sarkhanese culture thus he needs to work with the natives. Atkins finds a Sarkhanese 
like himself. Jeepo is ugly on the outside like Atkins but not afraid of working, 
breaking down boundaries, and thereby go against the stereotypical belief of a clear 
separation of different peoples. 
 When working, Atkins does not take over by believing that he is better than 
Jeepo. They share an equal relationship where they both contribute with their talents. 
Furthermore, their relationship proves to break down many stereotypes and categories 
that have been built through the relations between the ‘white’ man and the colored 
‘other’. These stereotypes exist with both parties, however, they all originated from 
the fact that the ‘white’ man acted superior and imposed himself on the ‘other’. 
Atkins’ objective is not to Americanize as it seems to be with Pyle, Sears, and Bing.     
 One might ask the question who is really the ugly American in this story? 
Atkins is one of the ‘heroes’ of the book since he is able to make a difference and 
obtain results immediately. It is not the engineer's skin-deep ugliness that drives this 
story. It is the ugliness of short-sighted, arrogant, and self-important Americans who 
make all the major and important decisions. The physically ugly American in this 
story is the person who is humble and makes the effort to adjust to a foreign culture. 
The reason for making Atkins an ugly American is to create the contrast of how 
important it was for America, through foreign aid and politics, to appear attractive to 
the public. This issue is also evident in The Quiet American. It is obvious that this 
book has somehow inspired the authors of The Ugly American and thereby spurred 
their critique of how Americans chose to behave and carry out their aid in foreign 
countries.  
It is difficult to place Pyle in relation to the characters in The Ugly American. 
He seems to belong to the group of MacWhite and Atkins since he studies the country 
he lives in. Moreover, he is not like the other Americans who behave like Sears and 
Bing. On the other hand, Pyle has his own interests at heart and acts on 
Americanizing the Vietnamese culture. He probably belongs to the same group as 
Sears and Bing even though Pyle is much more dangerous than they are. Pyle is a man 
of action who goes to great lengths to implement American interests and by doing so 
hurts other people. Sears and Bing also act but their actions only result in hurting their 
own reputation and the image of America. MacWhite and Atkins possess ‘cultural 
relativism’ in that they are able to identify and adapt to the culture in which they live. 
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They have been able to cast away all the negative characteristics that Sears and Bing 
possess, only to live by the positive such as generosity, selflessness, and motivation. It 
is therefore possible to extract a certain discourse from these analyses but it reflects 
two types of American characters. One that lives by it and another that goes against it 
to help others. 
It is obvious that some of the reasons why Americans fail to help are their 
superior appearance and know-all attitude. They do not fit into the culture they live in 
and a big gap is created between Americans and locals. By having this fixed thought 
of difference in mind and thereby think in terms of difference, a false identity is 
created for both parties.  
Edward Said points out that America saw the Third World as undeveloped and 
in need of modernization. One of the reasons was that the Third World did not share 
the same standards of living and thus needed to become Americanized. This also 
creates a relationship of a superior powerful force and an inferior culture (Said, 1997: 
29). The interest in another part of the world can moreover be seen as an investment 
which in the end will benefit America in terms of economy, military strategy etc. 
which is evident in the plans to build bridges and military roads (Said, 1979: 6). 
With these descriptions of fictional Americans the case study now takes a 
different approach when describing Americans through reportage. The project now 
takes its point of departure in another American involvement and a recent event 
namely, the war in Iraq.   
 62
Introduction to Second Part of Case Study 
The following chapters deal with the American experience in Iraq. The 
difference between this section and that on Asia is that this is mainly about American 
soldiers and not officials. Moreover, the two previous analyses were based on 
criticism of the American involvement in Asia whereas this account is supposed to be 
objective. It is thus interesting to examine whether or not there is any resemblance 
between the two accounts. 
Though the case study is based on both fiction and reportage, the material 
examines the American experience in a foreign country. The analyses extract 
character traits which are used to discuss and examine a tendency of the American 
mind-set which will be used to illustrate a representation of American discourse. 
It is interesting to contrast The Quiet American and The Ugly American which 
acted as a source of information about American experiences aimed at an American 
audience, to actual reportage. Generation Kill and the articles from The New York 
Times also act as information about Americans in a foreign country and are also 
aimed at an American audience. Based on these similarities the two genres will be 
examined to see whether or not they share any traits and whether or not it is possible 
to see developments or fixity in the descriptions of the American characters. 
As opposed to the first part of the case study, this part is based on journalistic 
writing. Is it possible to examine the tendencies of how Americans think of other 
people and provide a general picture of this based on the writing? It is important to 
bear in mind that the situation of war has serious consequences on communication 
and mind-set, such as fear and stress etc. Moreover, it is very difficult to hold an 
objective stance toward people who are considered the enemy and this consideration 
is equal for both Iraqis and Americans in the war. 
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Generation Kill by Evan Wright 
Generation Kill is written by a reporter who stayed with a team of marines 
during the invasion of Iraq. On a two-month mission the team moved from southern 
Iraq to Baghdad. The book follows the marines closely and describes both their ups 
and downs in the midst of the war. The novel is written as experienced by the author. 
Thus he writes in the first person tense while both observing the marines and being 
part of the team. 
  
American Experiences in Iraq 
As an overall insight into how the American marines experience the foreign 
country and culture, it can be said that they are not prepared for what to expect. They 
do not know anything about Iraq, its culture, and people before arriving. All their 
knowledge seems to be based on an American discourse that carries a clear distinction 
between the two cultures which mainly originates from the media. The Americans’ 
frame of reference and ability to describe what they are experiencing have a Western 
influence as one village is portrayed “like something out of a Sergio Leone Western” 
(Wright, 2004: 127). Moreover, the experience of combat is illustrated by a marine 
through a video game  
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City. I felt like I was living it when I seen the flames 
coming out of windows, the blown-up car in the street, guys crawling around 
shooting at us. It was fucking cool (Ibid: 5). 
  
 The marines’ frames of reference in regards to war and the foreign country can 
merely be explained through terms they know from the West. They have never 
experienced anything like this other than through movies or video games. In other 
words, they do not live through reality but through images created from a Western 
point of view. As the author explains about one of the marines;  
He can’t believe people in the twenty-first century actually live in huts with 
goats and sheep all around (Ibid: 153).  
 
This knowledge is manifested in the way the marines experience the Iraqi 
people. Their view on Iraqis is generally proven wrong. They are continuously 
surprised by the fact that Iraqis share some of the same traits of identity as 
themselves. This is yet another sign that their experiences are not created on the basis 
of the real world but through a medium that clearly provides a biased and unreal 
picture of what the world looks like.    
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 Another sign that the Americans see Iraq from an entirely Western point of 
view is the references to the Bible. After having been in the desert the marines 
“arrived in Mesopotamia’s fertile surroundings on the outskirts of the Garden of 
Eden” (Ibid: 91). The author makes another reference to the Bible when stating that 
“[d]espite the almost biblical look of the place” (Ibid: 202).  
 Through this discourse and after the events of September 11, 2001 many of the 
marines have become prejudiced toward Arab people. They have created an opinion 
about Arabs before ever having met anyone.  
Before we crossed into Iraq, I fucking hated Arabs. I don’t know why. I never 
saw too many in Afghanistan. But as soon as we got here, it’s just gone. I just 
feel sorry for them (Ibid: 111).    
  
 After having been through the events of war and experienced Arabs, the 
American marines change their minds about how they feel about them. Moreover, the 
longer they stay in Iraq and the more Iraqis they meet they become able to experience 
firsthand what the Iraqi people are really like, namely a people who is caught in the 
crossfire between an occupying force and a force determined to fight for the country 
they live in.  
It appears that one of the most important aspects of identity for the marines is 
that they are able to put a face on the enemy. Thereby identify who they are fighting 
against. They discover that some of the enemy combatants are from Syria and become 
excited about the fact that they “just fought actual terrorists” (Ibid: 249). Furthermore, 
they make up stereotypes for the enemy in order to be able to recognize him. They 
create attributes and categories from similar traits that they can relate to.  
Of all the little clues Marines are hunting for to determine whether the people 
and objects in this alien environment are hostile or benign, some facts begin to 
emerge: Fighters tend to be clean-cut or have mustaches, and farmers usually 
have beards (Ibid: 122). 
 
The fact that the marines’ discourse and identity of the ‘other’ develop and 
change are evident several places throughout the book. The marines step outside their 
mental pictures of who the Iraqi people are. They begin to experience a foreign people 
for the first time and most importantly firsthand. Some of the very first indicators the 
marines come across are that the Iraqis appear ‘human’ and not all anti-American. As 
one of them says “”I just waved at an Iraqi and he waved back at me. That was cool”” 
(Ibid: 60). This seems like a simple act. However, for the marines, who have merely 
experienced Arabs through the media and thus at second hand, this kind of 
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communication breaks down some of the barriers that have been built up between the 
two peoples and cultures.  
Additionally, some of the Iraqi men are homosexual which seem to be 
inconsistent with the marines’ stereotypes. This is evident in their reactions as this 
identity seems only to be known and existent in their part of the world.  
…one guy has a picture of himself holding hands with another man. Both men 
wear gaudy, effeminate-looking Western shirts, and one seems to have 
makeup on. The Marines can’t believe they’ve captured a gay Iraqi soldier 
(Ibid: 67). 
 
Moreover, “The…culture shock for the Marines is that several of the men 
seem to be hitting on them” (Ibid: 326). The marines probably did not believe that this 
could happen in a country that is dominated as much by religion and oppression as 
Iraq is. Once the marines are able to come close to some of the Iraqi people, they find 
out that they have attributes just like them and that their identities are not as portrayed 
in the media. This is evident in the situation where the marines have taken a prisoner 
who begins to talk with the author. “”It is your imagination that I am a fighter,” he 
says” (Ibid: 310). Moreover, they are surprised of his reaction when they hear that 
Baghdad has fallen. “He begins to cry again, only now he smiles. “I am so happy!”” 
(Ibid: 311).  
The overall change in the marines’ categorization and stereotyping of the Iraqi 
people is explained by one marine in a letter home “”I’ve learned there are two types 
of people in Iraq…those who are very good and those who are dead” (Ibid: 320). The 
hatred towards the Iraqi people does not exist anymore. The feelings of hate appear to 
have been replaced by those of sadness and sympathy, which clearly is a great change 
in mind and attitude. 
Additionally, Iraq appears much more civilized in their eyes and frame of 
reference than they thought it would. Thus, the marines, who viewed Iraq as backward 
in terms of both culture and society, are surprised. As they enter Baghdad one notices  
…a modern-looking glass structure with bright plastic signs in front. It’s an 
Iraqi version of a 7-Eleven “...it looks almost half-civilized here” (Ibid: 276).  
 
The western influences on the Iraqi way of living surprise the marines as well 
as they search houses and stumble across one that particularly impresses them.  
”It’d be pretty neat to live in one of these,”…A bedroom in one hut stuns the 
Marines. Against the bare walls, there’s a CD player, a TV with DVD, 
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mirrors, a painting of a horse on velvet, electric lamps and what looks to be a 
California King bed (Ibid: 205). 
 
The result of the changes in how the marines see the Iraqi people is expressed 
through comparison with themselves. Once they establish an identity and are able to 
see that Iraqis are people like everyone else the marines find that the gaps between the 
two cultures are not as vast as anticipated at first. Furthermore, this result in the fact 
that the marines are able to put themselves in the position of the Iraqi people and thus 
see what Americans are doing to them from an Iraqi point of view. The first step 
toward empathy and recognition is that the Americans compare the Iraqis to 
themselves.  
You have got to see that these people are just like you. You’ve got to see past 
the huts, the camels, the different clothes they wear. They’re just people (Ibid: 
175-76).  
 
It is obvious that the marines begin to think in different terms. Their earlier 
experiences based upon outside sources, change and become less biased and more 
accurate. Additionally, they begin to justify how Iraqis behave. Before going to Iraq, 
the Americans probably looked upon them as uncivil, barbarian, and anti-American 
but now that they can see the similarities they explain the situation in different terms.  
If you are mad about them mutilating a Marine, it’s not like this is the only 
country on earth with sociopaths. We’ve got people at home in American 
cities who hurt and degrade people all the time (Ibid: 222). 
 
This recognition and comparison is the second step in the process of creating a 
new and more accurate identity for the Iraqi people. The Marines acknowledge the 
similarities to their own culture thus they are able to put themselves in the position of 
the Iraqis. This comparison is mainly expressed by the thought of America being 
occupied by a foreign force “How do you think we would feel if someone came into 
our country and lit us up like this?” (Ibid: 197). Moreover,  
Don’t you think if some foreign army came into a small American town and 
did what we’re doing here, you wouldn’t find some American good old boys 
eager to string one of them up if they fell into their hands? (Ibid: 226) 
 
And finally,  
Just think if someone invaded Los Angeles. Americans would fucking riot if 
their cable went out for three days. These people don’t have water, electricity, 
hospitals, sewers, nothing, and they’re waiving and smiling (Ibid: 330). 
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To find common ground and think from an Iraqi point of view is only possible 
if negative discourses and stereotypes are revised according to a newly experienced 
reality, new categories are created.  
Even though the marines are able to see that the difference between the two 
peoples is not as great as anticipated there are still differences in cultures which the 
marines do not seem to have been taught. One of the bigger problems they seem to 
encounter is the language barrier. No one in the group of marines knows Arabic. 
However, they have been provided with a cheat sheet which proves to be a very 
important article. At one point it enables one of the marines to explain to a couple of 
Iraqi prisoners that they should calm down and that they will not get hurt. Though this 
cheat sheet covers basic greetings and questions it is not sufficient. The marines are 
accompanied by a translator. However, it seems that he is not competent and qualified 
for the profession. He is nineteen years old and not educated in the field of translation. 
He translates by bribes and does not appear trustworthy. 
 One serious incident towards the end of the book proves this. The marines are 
stationed in a small community in which they wish to create a friendly environment. 
The Americans send their translator to speak with an imam to explain how the 
situation is and to say that the marines have come to help the Iraqi people. However, 
without any of the marines knowing what went wrong, the situation completely 
changes from one day to the next.  
Unlike the day before, when crowds had turned out cheering the Marines, this 
morning there’s almost no one on the streets (Ibid: 332).  
 
 In relation to the analytical framework the marines’ discourse is clearly 
affected by events that have happened over the past few years. September 11, 2001 
and the war in Afghanistan are situations that have caused American soldiers to create 
a negative discourse about the war in Iraq and the Iraqi people. This discourse is 
shaped by an overall American attitude to fight terrorism. In both situations America 
stands as the driving force with a determination to do good and obliterate evil. 
Furthermore, it is not evident in this situation that knowledge leads to control. Rather, 
it is the lack of knowledge which proves dangerous in the war in Iraq. The marines do 
not know who the enemy is which causes the killing of innocent people.  
It is difficult to apply Said to Generation Kill because his points in 
Orientalism are mainly of a negative Western discourse like that seen at the beginning 
of Generation Kill. However, the marines change and this is a process that Said does 
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not reflect upon. He merely claims that the discourse of the West has remained the 
same but the marines are evidence that Said’s account does not consider the 
possibilities of changes in American discourse. The marines might not influence the 
dominant American discourse but readers of the book, friends, and family of the 
soldiers will obtain a different account of the war in Iraq. Though small-scale, it is 
still evidence that the American discourse has the ability to change.  
 An interesting comparison of The Ugly American and Generation Kill is that 
the former described Americans with or without stereotypes while Generation Kill 
illustrates the transition from believing stereotypes to realizing that the stereotypes are 
not necessarily true and have to be revised in order to fit a new reality. 
In this analysis of the American mind-set it is possible to establish the origin 
of the marines’ discourse as mainly coming from the media and computer games. The 
young men have been brought up in a post September 11, 2001 America where fear of 
terrorism together with the violence of video games and the media are dominating 
factors. Based on the soldiers’ discourse the identity they attribute Iraqis is that of 
primitive and evil terrorists or nothing at all. As their stay in Iraq proceeds, the 
identity of themselves in connection with Iraqis and the identity of the Iraqi people 
change for the better. The marines are able to attribute identities based on first-hand 
experiences which rely on more accurate characteristics. 
All American soldiers are equipped with the Iraq Culture Smart Cards1. 
These inform the soldiers about the Iraqi culture and language by pictures, glossary, 
and text. However, the information they provide is not very thorough and adequate. 
Culture is too complex to be understood from a couple of pictures. It does not create a 
qualified basis for understanding the Iraqi people. What would the situation look like 
if the marines were familiarized with the Iraqi culture prior to their stay? Among 
others, their stereotypes would probably have had less affect on the marines and their 
first encounter.  
 The role of difference is interesting to look at in Generation Kill. First, the 
marines convey the Iraqi people and culture through differences between America and 
Iraq. However, later in the process difference is turned into similarities as the marines, 
to a greater extent, compare themselves to Iraqis. This is a result to be able to 
                                                 
1 See example of the Iraq Culture Smart Cards on: http://cryptome.org/iraq-culture.htm 
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acknowledge that human beings are not as different from one another as laid out in 
the overall American discourse. 
 Negative stereotypes highly influence the marines’ mind-sets in the beginning 
of their stay in Iraq. However, as with the discourse, these are broken down and 
replaced by new ones that are based on their own experiences. Thus, the marines can 
more easily verify the accuracy of these. With the changing of the stereotypes more 
humanity also seems to come into play. What before were merely labeled as terrorists 
are now real people with feelings and attributes like the marines.  
 Lastly, it is apparent that America is a superpower in that it is an invading 
force and that the marines are there to fight terrorism. However, the transition of the 
marines’ mind-set ameliorates the idea that America is there to change and dominate 
the Iraqi people and culture. 
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Rebuilding Iraq 
The articles analyzed in this part of the project are chosen for their themes 
rather than for how they are written. In other words, the articles are seen as a series of 
themes that have been written because of the war in Iraq. The first story that is 
relevant for this project, for how Americans act and react when in a foreign country is 
the rebuilding of Iraq.  
 
American Experiences in Iraq 
Having read all The New York Times articles about the reconstruction of Iraq 
from May through December 2004 there seems to be two main problems, both of 
which are also described in The Ugly American. One is the fact that a lot of money is 
poured into Iraq but which is not spent where it is needed. The plans for rebuilding 
Iraq do not seem to be taken seriously which causes empty promises and major delays 
in the reconstruction process.  
One of the most important projects is to provide clean water to the Iraqi 
people. One of the canals that is supposed to provide this life source is leaking. 
According to an article  
[t]he leaks kept coming, even though the Americans and their allies had begun 
pouring millions of dollars into repairs on the canal… (June 282).  
 
Moreover, “The project is months behind and may never be completed as 
originally envisioned” (Ibid). A lot of money, apparently $50 million according to the 
article, does not mean that the projects will be carried out as planned. A lot of money 
does not automatically mean success. This is evident, according to the journalist, in 
how some Iraqis feel about the project and the situation.  
Now, even Iraqi engineers who praise the Americans' efforts say that water 
supplies here are at best still no better than they were under Saddam Hussein's 
government (Ibid). 
 
Americans have not succeeded in improving the standard of living of Iraqis, 
which in the end would benefit their cause in Iraq. It is not only the water supply that 
is urgent but also the electrical power supply. This project has been delayed as well 
both because of sabotaging, which the American engineers can not be blamed for, but 
also because of “…reliance on by-the-book engineering…” (June 14).  
                                                 
2 The references to the articles have been listed thematically in the bibliography and appendix 
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This illustrates that Americans are not able to simplify. They are only able to 
work with the latest technology, which is not always available to them. Clearly 
Americans do not go for the easier and simpler solution which might be crucial when 
it comes to saving lives. Moreover, the American extravagance seems to be important 
under these circumstances as simple is not good enough. There are many qualified 
Iraqi workers that can assist American engineers in the rebuilding and from whom 
Americans could actually learn.  
Iraqis engineers are masters at taking from one damaged piece of equipment to 
make another piece work. Instead of employing the careful American method 
of erecting wooden poles to support lines while towers were rebuilt…Iraqis 
had found a way to do it safely with mobile cranes.  
Carrying out a project by the book, with brand-new equipment, “might take 
you six months,” said Saad Shakir Tawfiq, an engineer at the Iraqi Ministry of 
Industry who is involved with several power plants.  
“You need power because it's the people's lives…I don't care about the book; 
you need power. Just do it, the basics, with what you've got” (Ibid). 
 
As evident from this extraction Americans are not willing to learn or cooperate 
with Iraqi workers. They believe their way is the only way instead of realizing that 
Iraqis might be as qualified as they are when it comes to finding a solution. Another 
problem which occurs is the fact that the two parties are not able to work well 
together and to appreciate each other’s work force. As seen from an Iraqi point of 
view  
“The Americans, all of them, move very slowly,” said Raad al-Haris, the 
deputy minister of electricity. “We thought before that the Americans will do 
some excellent job and they can cover the demand…But until now…we have 
only peanut” (Ibid). 
 
America should learn from this situation that letting the Iraqi engineers be in 
charge will benefit the American cause in the eyes of the civilians. Letting Iraqi 
engineers be in control will lessen the appearance of American arrogance and 
superiority. It will make the Iraqis feel they have something to offer and say in the 
matter of rebuilding and controlling their own country. This is similar to the 
relationship between Atkins and Jeepo in which they meet on common ground and 
equally share the interest of Jeepo’s country. 
Instead the American focus is on big projects that will give immediate results 
in order to show immediate changes. This is not what American engineers are 
specialized to do. They are thus not able to see the problems from what they probably 
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believe to be a more primitive stance. In connection with the “by-the-book 
engineering” it is possible to find an explanation for the delays of the projects.   
Some Iraqis also complain that Western engineers have been unable to grasp 
the complexities of a creaky electrical grid that is a patchwork of ancient 
Russian, German, Yugoslavian, Chinese and American equipment. The Iraqis 
say that the engineers, often Americans, reflexively reach for fancy new gear 
costing tens of millions of dollars that can take months or years to order, ship 
and install. 
Iraqis are skilled at balancing the vast swirl of electrical supply and demand 
on their grid with phone calls and intuition, while Americans rely on 
computerized sensors and automatic control circuitry (Ibid). 
 
Another aspect which is also depicted in The Ugly American is American 
priorities when it comes to projects that should benefit the natives.  
 
Slow progress and criticism of the Pentagon's 'big project, big contract' 
approach as being wasteful and ill-conceived have plagued the program. 
Experts on reconstruction say that putting large infrastructure projects first in a 
post-war society is a mistake, and that Iraqis who know their own system 
should perhaps be put in charge of reconstruction (July 27) .
 
Money has been taken from trying to provide water and electricity to trying to 
provide security. The latter is obviously also an important issue but it all comes down 
to what the Iraqis currently need to help them. Regarding this point it is important that 
America does not let the population of Iraq down. The top decision makers in 
America are not entirely aware of what is going on at ground level. Thus, their 
priorities do not correspond with the actual needs of the country. In relation to this, a 
similar problem is illustrated in The Ugly American as Atkins is struggling to 
convince government officials that their  
…people need other things besides military roads. You ever hear of a food 
shortage being solved by someone building a military highway designed to 
carry tanks and trucks? (Lederer, 1958: 207)  
 
The situation in Iraq and that of The Ugly American is similar to the extent 
that America should by now have changed its ways on how to deal with other 
countries. This following extract could easily have been taken from The Ugly 
American. 
“Nobody believes this will benefit Iraq…For a year we have been talking, 
with beautiful PowerPoint documents, but without a drop of water,” Mr. 
Chadirji said, waving a colorful printout that he received from American 
officials (September 21). 
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This example shows the importance of appearance to Americans. Like the 
extract on page 76, of the new gear that takes weeks to order, this shows that the 
packaging needs to be beautiful too even though nothing good or useful comes out of 
it. Why is all this lavishness so important to Americans? It appears that they have a 
difficult time with putting aside their own needs and stepping into the frame of 
reference of Iraqis. They would then see that they do not need to beautify things as 
Iraqis merely need to survive at this point in time. 
An Iraqi engineer working on the project said the Americans had put most of 
their effort into cosmetic work like fixing the ceilings and drywall on the 
ground floor, where visitors could see the renovations. But he said 
maintenance work on seriously damaged water and sewerage systems in the 
building was so inadequate that the hospital could not be used soon (October 
18).  
 
All of this gives Iraqis the impression that America does not care about the 
rebuilding process since they do not focus on the aspects that are most important to 
the Iraqi population. This suggests that America sees Iraq as an investment that will 
benefit America by showing it as a mere ‘project’. This is an observation that is in 
line with Edward Said’s argument that the Orient was seen as a material investment 
which in time would profit its occupiers (Said, 1979: 6). Additionally, the number of 
delays with the projects gives the Iraqis the impression that it is not all too important 
to America when the projects will be carried out and that America has other priorities 
than Iraq. This is clearly the role of a superior power, which in the eyes of the Iraqis 
shows its indifference. This is obviously frustrating and is making many Iraqis grow 
angry with America. 
“They said early March, and then they said early May, and finally they said 
early June the electricity would be perfect,” said Feras al-Rubae, a money 
changer…”But now it is early June, and where is the promise?” (June 14). 
 
Empty promises are also one of many factors that lead to an increasing anti-
Americanism among the population of Iraq. By promising people a better standard of 
living in post-Saddam Iraq and not keeping the promises, the Americans are breaking 
the trust that supposedly ought to exist between America and Iraq. At this point in 
time fewer Iraqis have electricity than during the regime of Saddam which does not 
make America look good as a liberating force. Like in The Quiet American it appears 
they do more harm than good though their objective is the fight for freedom.  
For Iraqis, the delays have bred frustration and anger. Recent interviews in the 
upscale Baghdad neighborhood of Harethiya suggest that the electricity woes 
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have, among other things, created a nation of insomniacs, sweltering in their 
apartments through oppressive nights (June 30). 
 
Iraqis that have supported the American invasion have been deceived. This is 
a consequence of the fact that decision makers are not well aware of what is 
happening on the ground level and that better understanding and communication is 
needed. Does America not see this situation as being important enough to involve and 
interact with Iraq about the rebuilding of their country or do they merely believe that 
they know better because they are superior? This is definitely a case of undermining 
another people by completely overlooking what qualities they possess and by not 
cooperating with what they have to offer, which might be as good, if not better, since 
they know their own country and resources.  
The last aspect of the rebuilding of Iraq deals with the account of how a 
number of small doings brings success which is also depicted in The Ugly American. 
Fortunately there are people who realize that the need of the Iraqis is not grand plans 
to begin with, but minor things that can improve their standard of living from day to 
day. To Americans these things might seem minor but to the Iraqi population they 
may be key factors for surviving. One project which is seen as very small is the 
reconstruction of wells. One well at a time might not seem a lot compared to the 
millions of dollars that are poured into Iraq. However, this is what improves Iraqis 
way of life and their perception of Americans.  
“It makes people think good things are on the way,” Mr. Saleh said…“When 
this well is done, each time somebody takes a drink of water they will say the 
Americans did something good” (July 20).  
  
From building a new soil laboratory to making improvements at a famous 
archaeological site to repairing a single elevator in a hospital, the projects are 
all small, fast and undertaken in response to a highly specific need identified 
by local Iraqis (Ibid). 
 
Still, the myriad smaller local projects run by the military, including repairs of 
pipes and power lines from the household level up, can touch more lives more 
quickly.  
Around much of Iraq now, in thousands of small efforts to repair services, 
build schools and clinics and soccer fields and, above all, give jobs to young 
men, American commanders hope to blunt the popular hostility toward an 
occupation that many Iraqis say has brought more miseries than rewards.  
“We're really good at going out and breaking things,” the general said. “But 
the day I get to spend more time here working on construction rather than 
combat, that will be a very good day” (September 5). 
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It is clearly evident that the number of small projects makes a big difference to 
the population in Iraq then why is more effort not put into these projects instead of 
spending a lot of money and time on much larger projects that eventually are delayed? 
It looks good for America to be able to tell the world about how much money it has 
spent on the rebuilding process. It moreover looks good to be able to show the proof 
in terms of roads and infrastructure which is clearly important to the West. 
This is also illustrated and criticized in The Ugly American. There is a very big 
gap between the people on the ground who actually come close to the natives and the 
top decision makers who are positioned far away with little clue of what is happening 
on the ground. The people, who are situated in America, are far away from everything 
and they only see the war and its consequences from a distant point of view and 
through the media. The other group of people, however, is on the same level as the 
people they are fighting against. This group is able to see the war from an Iraqi frame 
of reference which in many respects is the devastating and psychological costs of a 
war. This became evident from the analysis of Generation Kill as the marines came to 
know more about Iraqis and the horrors they have to live with. 
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In the Midst of a War 
Dealing with stories from a war many things have to be considered before 
judging and examining the situation with regards to the interest of this project. The 
American soldiers are in Iraq to fight terrorism. They moreover have to secure peace 
as their main objective. If shot at they will shoot back in order to defend themselves.  
This leads to unfortunate incidents where innocent people are killed, as 
described in the media and Generation Kill. Media coverage also has consequences 
for how people perceive the war. The media provides the public with certain images 
which might not present a fair description of all parties involved in the war. Without 
going in depth with media discourse one can not deny that the media is one of the 
main contributors to how people perceive the situation and the participants of the war 
in Iraq. Edward Said blames a lot of the stereotypes Americans have of the Islamic 
world on the media. He claims that the media provides Americans with a frightening 
and fearful picture of Muslims (Said, 1979: xx).   
Said argues that most people obtain their perception about others from other 
people, in this case the media, as people are not able to acquire information on a first-
hand basis. The image that is often presented to people is that of anti-Americanism, 
barbarianism, and primitivism (Said, 1997: 47). Thus, Americans only have certain 
negative images in their minds of how Muslims behave. Some people do not see 
beyond this because it would require a more thorough study of the Iraqi people and 
culture. It would also require people to take a more critical stance toward what they 
are exposed to on a daily basis. This might not seem relevant to many people as they 
might not feel the need to find out about how things really are. Thus, the way some 
Americans believe the Iraqi people behave will dominate their relations with them. If 
Iraqis are believed to be primitive in the eyes of the West this will naturally create a 
distance between Americans and Iraqis (Gudykunst, 1998: 4). This too, is what 
concerns Said in Orientalism when he deals with how the East becomes alienated 
from the West because of Western beliefs about a people that are not based on 
accurate information.   
 
Americans in Iraq 
The story of Najaf and the coverage of the battle for the city provide a picture 
with fewer stereotypes than indicated by Said in his critique of the media. The 
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tendency to use stereotypes in the coverage of Najaf in The New York Times is not 
obvious to the extent that Said claims in his book Covering Islam.  
In the articles that mainly deal with the actual battle of Najaf it appears that 
both sides get more or less the same attention and coverage. This, among other things, 
is evident in the fact that both sides are represented equally. However, there are 
examples of stereotyping as seen in Generation Kill as well as described by Said. One 
of the examples is the fact that Iraqis are almost always mentioned in connection with 
war, weapons, and religion. These accounts recur in many of the articles. One of the 
more obvious examples is the fact that the Iraqi resistance has various names 
compared to American soldiers.  
Most of these names have a very negative connotation such as fighters, 
militiamen, rebels. In one article the Iraqi opposition has three different identifications 
“Rebel Militia, rebels, and militiamen” (May 30). Other examples are that of 
“guerrillas, fighters, and insurgents” (August 28). Many of the ways by which 
Americans identify Iraqi soldiers are not just negative; they also associate them with 
something primitive and backwards which is also a tendency that Said argues 
Americans have. 
Other illustrations that indicate the fact that Americans hold negative 
stereotypes about Iraqis occur when The New York Times articles portray them. 
Descriptions like these would probably never be written about American soldiers 
“…the fighters, many of them hollow-eyed and hunted-looking after days under 
fire…” (Ibid). Another description from the same article reads “Some of the young 
men seemed visibly reduced by the siege…” (Ibid)  
This kind of portrayal is not made of the American soldiers. However, since 
both sides are human beings the same signs must be visible on Americans as they, 
too, must be weary from the war. Though not talked about in the media, the account 
of Generation Kill mentions the fact that the soldiers are dirty and clearly exhausted 
from being at war. 
In addition to the way the Iraqi people are described some images support the 
arguments that Said puts forth when saying that Americans look at Muslims as a 
primitive and inferior people. As expressed here by a journalist  
…Sadr City appeared to be under the effective control of militiamen who hide 
down side streets and alleys, promising a potential bloodbath in the event of 
any full-scale challenge from the Americans and Iraq's new security forces 
(August 11). 
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The associations that one obtains from reading this extract are that of primitive 
people who cowardly hide in the streets and promise a bloodbath. The war is 
compared to a bloodbath but this would not be written in the same sentence as 
American soldiers. The problem is that the journalists mainly see the situation from an 
American point of view. In the situation of battle Iraqis are rarely represented in a 
positive light as they are an enemy of America. This could be changed by bringing a 
background story on the Iraqis who fight back when American soldiers attack. There 
is a reason why they resist the occupation of America. Would people from the West 
not do the same if trying to defend themselves and their country?  
The last example that is worth mentioning about how Iraqis are portrayed in 
the coverage of the battle in Najaf is the fact that there is much emphasis on one thing 
that was said by the Shiite cleric “Mr. Sadr, who vowed Monday that he would fight 
“to the last drop of my blood,”” (Ibid).  
This statement is repeated the following two days as well, as if to clarify that 
Mr. Sadr is a man of barbarianism and serious threats. The image that the sentence 
conjures up in the mind of the reader could have been avoided since it is not necessary 
to mention the same sentence three days in a row. 
In one article the relations between America and Iraq are contrasted by 
describing the obvious differences between the superior and inferior. The article 
opens with the dehumanizing and degrading statement “The wild dogs of Najaf ate 
well this week” and continues  
One house at the western edge of the city held four blasted corpses, missing 
arms and legs, their stench heavy in the hot midday sun. Dogs had been at the 
bodies overnight, marines said. Indeed a dog skulked nearby as Iraqi medics 
carried the remains to an ambulance for transport to the shrine, where they are 
washed before burial (August 28 – 2).  
 
Would people like to read about the death of Americans like this? American 
soldiers would never be depicted like this. They would, however, be mentioned with 
more respect because as a custom in American culture people respect the dead. The 
same is true in many other countries therefore death ought to be respected no matter 
the nationality. However, if this was the circumstances with Americans then reality 
would probably be covered up or not mentioned at all.  
For every shot they took, American troops returned scores or hundreds. For 
every mortar round the guerrillas lobbed, the gunners at the Marine base here 
responded with a 100-pound artillery shell. The insurgents had donkey carts 
loaded with rocket-propelled grenades, the Americans 70-ton tanks that can 
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survive direct hits from mortars and grenades. The American advantage was 
especially large at night, when night-vision goggles allowed troops to see in 
the dark (Ibid). 
 
This is another example of how superior America appears compared to Iraq. It 
is difficult to state that the article should not include this as it is probably just a 
reporting of the facts. However, the two are contrasted to make America look 
superior.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning some of the more positive aspects of the 
situation in Najaf and how Americans’ perceptions of others are covered and treated. 
In a few articles American stereotypes prove not to hold any accuracy. However, less 
emphasis is unfortunately put on these situations. Mr. Sadr, whose army gave the 
American soldiers a lot of resistance, was often portrayed as a person who was not 
willing to cooperate and who took a strong stance toward Americans. Nonetheless,  
Mr. Khafaji's remarks aligned with the position taken recently by Mr. Sadr, 
who condemned the spate of kidnappings of foreigners across Iraq, some of 
which have ended in beheadings…Last weekend, clerics loyal to Mr. Sadr 
intervened to free a British journalist,…and appeared with the reporter at a 
news conference, claiming credit for his release (August 20). 
 
Even though there were many disagreements between Americans, Iraqis, and 
Mr. Sadr the latter still did not believe in kidnapping foreigners. Is it not worth 
concentrating more on issues like this in order not to completely alienate the Iraqi 
people and turn them into something which they are not? This could be done by 
covering the Iraqi people, describing their lives, and providing a more favorable 
picture of a people that might have more in common with Americans than depicted. 
Or is this not what Americans would want to read about? 
Another example that is not stressed very much is the fact that not every single 
kidnapping ends in the killing of the victim. In this example, Mr. Sadr again proves 
American stereotypes wrong about the fact that Iraqis are not willing to negotiate with 
Americans.  
Mr. Garen appeared in a video on Al Jazeera…saying he was being well 
treated and calling on the American military to stop the fighting in Najaf. On 
Thursday, a top aide to Mr. Sadr had urged Mr. Garen's captors to let him go 
(August 21). 
 
There are other stories of consolation that are worth mentioning like those 
described in Generation Kill.  
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But later on, when the American-led offensive was suspended, a smaller 
convoy of American soldiers left the base on another mission: to buy food for 
families of Najaf (August 15). 
 
As stated here these are the stories that make the number of little things count. 
In stories like this the superiority of Americans does not seem to be of importance and 
the interest of the ‘other’ is at heart.  
Americans appear to care for the civilians in Iraq and who wants to see an end 
to the war. The people who experience the horror of a war also learn to appreciate 
what they can do to make the ones that are hurt more at ease. Guilt is probably one of 
the factors that lies at the heart when soldiers react the way they do. However, they 
also learn that the Iraqi people are not so different from them. They feel the same loss 
of someone dear to them and they too express sorrow and happiness the way 
Americans do. 
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Discourse and Appearance 
To achieve a general picture of how Americans perceive and treat the Iraqi 
people following the invasion of their country it is helpful to look at the discourse and 
perception of Iraq from the top and down. This implies that the discourse American 
leaders of this war might affect those doing the actual fighting.  
 
American Discourse 
The reason for America to invade Iraq was based on the fact that the Bush 
administration claimed Saddam was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
However, it has later been proved that these allegations were not true.  
Iraq had destroyed its illicit weapons stockpiles within months after the 
Persian Gulf War of 1991, and its ability to produce such weapons had 
significantly eroded by the time of the American invasion in 2003, the top 
American inspector for Iraq said in a report made public Wednesday (October 
7).  
 
According to this report many allegations made against Saddam and used to 
justify the war were not true. The Bush administration therefore did not believe that 
Saddam was able to change and that he posed a threat to America. This situation is 
similar to one of Edward Said’s points which illustrates the fact that the West has 
always seen the Orient as a passive and unchanging object. This could explain why 
America has not been able to believe that Saddam could change. All these accusations 
are based on beliefs rather than proper human intelligence which involves gathering 
accurate information in order to diminish the level of uncertainty. This example is 
from a statement made by Mr. Rockefeller, a Senator from West Virginia.  
“The administration would like the American public to believe that Saddam's 
intention to build a weapons program, regardless of actual weapons or the 
capability to produce weapons, justified invading Iraq…In fact, we invaded a 
country, thousands of people have died, and Iraq never posed a grave or 
growing danger” (Ibid). 
 
As these extracts state, Saddam was able to change in the sense that his 
attitude and political tactics changed. He cooperated with America by destroying what 
he possessed to produce weapons. 
Furthermore, this particular way of thinking about others is all too evident in 
the discourse that the Bush administration uses when referring to the war. It sees the 
war as something much bigger than removing Saddam. From this article it sounds 
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more like a quest for American authorities to destroy and remove, what they believe 
to be, all ‘evilness’ from the face of the earth so only the ‘good’ and ‘pure’ remain. As 
written by the journalist, President Bush and Senator John McCain 
…present an unusual joint defense of the war in Iraq, calling it a conflict 
between good and evil that threatened the existence of the United States (June 
19).  
 
In this example a very clear distinction is made between two peoples or 
cultures in which one is good and the other is evil. Is this how America has come to 
think of the Iraqi people? As evil? This complies with what Said believes is still 
manifested from Orientalism, in how Americans view themselves and other people 
today. From the extract below, Said’s notion about culture and imperialism appears to 
be accurate to some extent. As also dealt with by Samuel Huntington, it appears that 
Iraq is somehow an American quest to impose their own and what is thought of as 
better values on a foreign culture.  
“It's a big thing, this war, a fight between two ideologies completely opposed 
to each other,” Mr. McCain told the soldiers, many of whom fought in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. “It's a fight between a just regard for human dignity and a 
malevolent force that defiles an honorable religion by disputing God's love for 
each and every soul on Earth. It's a fight between right and wrong, good and 
evil. It's no more ambiguous than that” (Ibid). 
 
The situation is definitely much more ambiguous than the way it is represented 
here. In the statement it is also clear how Christianity is believed to be a better and 
superior religion to Islam. As Said states, the spread of Islam was seen as a threat to 
the West and Christianity. This seems to be the underlying tone of this speech by 
honoring Christianity and discrediting Islam (Said, 1979: 59).  
Since this is a speech to the soldiers that are fighting against Iraqis they are 
provided an inaccurate picture and account of whom the Iraqi people are. Many of the 
soldiers, as in Generation Kill, are probably not familiar with or know anyone from 
Iraq and upon hearing this they create a fixed idea of who these people are. They will 
enter Iraq with a notion that Iraqis are a bad and evil people and that their religion is 
the cause of this situation. 
These are only a few examples of how a negative discourse about others is 
being articulated by the American government. There is no doubt that this, along with 
the media discourse, affects the American soldiers in Iraq. Among other things, this 
influences how the soldiers behave in front of Iraqis when they encounter them.  
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The last example presented in this chapter shows how soldiers from the 
Netherlands and America appear to be using different approaches when engaging with 
the Iraqi people. This might verify that the discourse toward the war in the two 
countries is different from one another.  
The Dutch soldiers seem to be more relaxed and amicable whereas American 
soldiers have a more aggressive attitude. It is important to bear in mind though, that 
the two stories take place in very different settings. The Dutch soldiers are positioned 
in a town where there is no resistance while the American soldiers are stationed in the 
midst of war. This first extract is taken from the coverage of the fighting in Najaf 
Fighting intensified…when troops again approached the house…”The 
Americans escalated the whole situation by coming back with their armored 
vehicles and trespassing,” (August 6). 
 
It should be possible to prevent situations like this although it is perhaps not 
rational to seize upon this as the American soldiers are in great danger of being shot 
at. Nevertheless, these circumstances indicate that the soldiers to some extent impose 
a negative view upon themselves by coming across in an aggressive manner. 
Moreover, in the small town of Samawa, which is a quiet place, American soldier are 
compared with the Dutch soldiers that are staying in the town in order to prevent any 
uprising. As in the previous example, American soldiers appear hostile and forceful 
when it does not seem necessary.  
Yet, perhaps unfairly, the Americans do get compared with the Dutch here, in 
a way that underscores how difficult it will be for Americans to win back 
some of the popular support they enjoyed after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein…American convoys traveling the main highway between Baghdad 
and Kuwait force their way through Samawa's crowded main street at full 
speed and, fearful of becoming targets, do not stop even after causing fatal 
accidents, Dutch and Iraqi officials here say. Worried about car-bombers, 
American soldiers in armored vehicles point guns at drivers to keep cars away 
(October 24). 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the example of how American leaders 
perceive the Iraqi people seem represented in the way American soldiers behave. The 
distance between them and the Iraqi population seems great and antagonistic where it 
is not necessary.  
On the other hand, the Dutch soldiers use a completely different approach 
which is much more friendly and respectful of the Iraqi people, whose country they 
stay in.  
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Dutch soldiers in Iraq are having a much different experience than American 
soldiers; they are patrolling a relatively peaceful area and are using non-
confrontational methods, such as using soft-topped vehicles, not wearing 
helmets and trying to engage the local people, in order to be seen as friendly 
guests rather than an occupying force (Ibid). 
 
By interacting with the locals of this town the soldiers try to avoid anyone 
from disliking them and thereby avoid uprising. They moreover try to get to know the 
locals and help them. Communicating with locals means a lot to them which also 
makes the soldiers feel more comfortable doing what they have been sent out to do. 
“Hello, Mister!” some boys cried out, and they followed the soldiers to the 
bend in the road. Driving through the town later, the Dutch called out “Salaam 
Aleikum” to pedestrians. Many Iraqis, adults and children, waved at them 
(Ibid). 
 
Even though the soldiers might not be able to speak with the Iraqi people they 
still greet them in their language. In using the native language the soldiers 
demonstrate that they care about the locals and that they are interested in them as a 
people as they have taken the time to learn some of the native language.  
The sergeant leading the evening patrol, who spoke on condition that he be 
identified only by his first name, Rene, said: “We must be respectful. It's their 
country. We are only guests here.”  
Karim Hleibit al-Zayad, the police chief here, made a clear distinction 
between the Dutch and Americans: “The Dutch have tried seriously to 
understand our traditions. We do not view them as an occupying force, but a 
friendly one. The Americans are an occupying force. I agree they helped us 
get rid of the past regime, but they should not take away our dignity” (Ibid). 
 
It is evident that the Dutch have a completely different stance and approach 
when it comes to engaging with the Iraqi people. Their mind-set is more positive. 
They see themselves as guests and not as the occupying force. Entering Iraq with this 
attitude will naturally affect their relations with one another as well. Another aspect is 
that the Iraqi people feel that the Dutch respect them and understand their traditions. 
The fact that the Dutch try to learn the customs of Iraq shows that the effort they put 
in is greater than that of the Americans. 
In Samawa, Chief Zayad and others here said, the American convoys represent 
the greatest affront to Iraqi dignity. The Dutch and Iraqis say the convoys 
indiscriminately hit private cars and pedestrians, treating Iraqis only as 
obstacles to be removed. A few weeks ago, one such convoy struck a car, 
killing two Iraqi passengers and injuring three, the Dutch said. The convoy 
never stopped.  
“Of course, an American is a different type of human than a Dutchman,” the 
colonel said. “We have our own culture. But I think the Americans could have 
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a way of operating with more respect and more understanding toward the 
population” (Ibid). 
 
From the way American soldiers in this extract come across it is clear why 
many Iraqis do not like them. It is difficult to imagine how Americans are able to 
come across with such disrespectfulness and such superiority toward another people. 
However, the discourse of America is again at fault as this affects the way the soldiers 
perceive the Iraqi population.  
In conclusion, by stating that Americans are “… treating Iraqis only as 
obstacles to be removed” corresponds with what Said claims to be a problem in how 
the West has perceived other people. In Orientalism he states that the others are 
viewed as mere problems that need to be “solved or confined” (Said, 1979: 207). 
Again, it is to a large extent evident that some Americans view Iraqis as objects and 
not as human beings like themselves. 
Altogether, the three themes deal with different aspects of the war in Iraq. The 
last chapter Discourse and Appearance demonstrated some of the influences on the 
American mind-set in the sense that American authorities pass on views and beliefs 
on how to think about Iraq, its people and culture. They offer a degrading view of Iraq 
and unfortunately this is not questioned or disagreed upon.  
Rebuilding Iraq dealt with American foreign aid along with the problems that 
occurred when rebuilding a country. In this chapter American authorities caused 
problems and major delays with their priorities and poor planning. America has one 
way to carry out assignments and therefore some Americans are not able to work on 
other premises than what they are used to. 
The last chapter told of Americans in the midst of war. This analysis 
illustrated some of the stereotypes that were present in the perception of Iraqis and the 
war in Iraq. However, this chapter also presented more positive aspects of the war 
which were created by Americans who stayed in Iraq and thus knew how to help and 
understood the importance of this help.  
The origin of the American discourse is thus to be found in the descriptions of 
the last chapter. American leaders have a certain way of thinking about Iraq and 
create knowledge about the Iraqi people based on negative characteristics. This 
knowledge and discourse influence the American public and dominate some 
Americans’ way of thinking. 
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Moreover, power is expressed through knowledge in that the ‘other’ is evil 
and must be fought. Additionally, the knowledge and ability to help Iraq in the 
process of reconstructing together with taking control of the country prove that 
America act as superior and that these aspects are carried out on the basis of 
American interests. This, however, is not done without resistance but even though 
America and its allies put parts of Iraq to ruins Iraqis still depend on America to 
rebuild their country.  
To some extent Said is valid in his criticism of Western discourse. Some 
aspects are familiar in Orientalism such as the fact that the perception of the Iraqi 
people is based on an overall negative dominating discourse. However, it is not all 
Americans who are subject to this way of thinking. Thus, it is impossible to speak of 
one set of American characteristics. 
The difference between the two peoples is clearly throughout the three 
analyses. In the first it is conveyed through the fact that some Americans are not able 
to work by simple techniques because they can only work with the newest and most 
expensive equipment. The second theme expresses a difference through the coverage 
of the newspaper in that the journalists use expressions and words that would not be 
used about American soldiers. Finally, the last analysis deals with difference on a 
higher level. It is apparent in the way the Bush administration refers to Iraq and 
compares it using terms like evil and terrorism.  
The stereotypes that occur in the texts are expressed through the difference 
between the two countries. The Iraqi people are talked about as terrorists and as evil 
simple-minded people while Americans are to save the world from these. Moreover, 
the stereotypes that are used to explain who the Iraqi people are become biased and 
not many counter stories exist to prove otherwise.  
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Discussion 
 In the examination of the American involvement in Asia and Iraq it becomes 
clear that there is a governing American discourse which influences American 
behavior and way of thinking. However, some Americans choose to take a different 
approach and are not guided by the overall discourse.  
The analyses present a picture of two characteristic types of Americans. One is 
selfish which is obvious in the characters of Joe Bing and Louis Sears from The Ugly 
American. It is less obvious in The Quiet American’s Alden Pyle, whose intentions 
are hidden behind his facade of innocence and amiability. Altogether, these characters 
are in general more concerned about their own needs than the people they have come 
to help. Moreover, the American self-interest is present in their choices regarding the 
rebuilding of Iraq and their strive to achieve a certain public image. Money is poured 
into Iraq to finance grand plans but America seems to neglect a bigger need for clean 
water and electricity.    
 These Americans have difficulties with communicating with the people from 
the foreign country. Communication is affected by the cultural differences and the 
fact that they know little or nothing at all about the foreign culture. Furthermore, it is 
clear that stereotypes also affect communication as these are illusions of attributes that 
might not hold much truth to them and provide an identity which is not accurate. It is 
obvious in these characters that the idea of America as a superpower affects them and 
they act accordingly. They take a superior stance toward the natives and believe that 
their values and lifestyle are more worthy which results in the fact that they do not 
respect the natives. 
Foucault’s theory on discourse and discipline makes it clear that some 
Americans intentionally act on their power of knowledge. They act on their 
knowledge of the ‘other’ and use this information to demonstrate the differences 
between themselves and the ‘other’. Moreover, it is evident that these Americans are 
influenced by the distance established by the institutional sites that surround them and 
that their way of thinking is dictated by this distance. Authorities in America have a 
certain way of speaking about and thinking about people in Asia and Iraq and this 
highly affects the Americans who work on the ground in the respective countries.  
The different sites that are able to create and make objects of knowledge 
appear are illustrated in the analyses. With regards to the war in Iraq the last chapter 
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in the case study shows that the American government creates a discourse where 
certain attributes are given to another people. Thus, it is able to control or establish a 
certain way of thinking in the American public. An example is the relation between 
Christianity and Islam and good and evil. By applying terms with reference to ‘evil’ 
to the Iraqi people and their culture this site, namely the Bush administration, is able 
to produce a body, give it identity, and thus control it through discourse. 
 An interesting aspect in the case study is the difference between American and 
Dutch soldiers. Why do they act differently? The Dutch and American discourses are 
very different. American soldiers take a more aggressive standpoint which originates 
from the discourse of the Bush administration which takes a good versus evil 
approach to the war. The Dutch soldiers are influenced by another discourse which 
clearly speaks of the war in another way and therefore the soldiers also behave 
differently. 
Certain aspects in the process of American foreign policy that are criticized in 
The Ugly American are also evident in the invasion of Iraq. Even though the novel is 
fictional there is obviously still some truth to what is happening in the relations 
between America as the superior and the Orient as the inferior.  
The resemblances in the descriptions of the American mind-set in The Ugly 
American and the chapter on Rebuilding Iraq are striking. Many of the same problems 
occur such as large budgets without any real results and broken or delayed promises. 
Moreover, it seems that the authors of The Ugly American are genuine and 
contemporary in their criticism of how America chooses to aid a country. The Ugly 
American was written more than fifty years ago but to a certain extent it seems history 
is repeating itself. What does it take to convince American authorities that there is 
something wrong with their approach to other countries and cultures? 
 As a contrast, the project also described Americans who are selfless and who 
are interested in the needs of the country they stay in. MacWhite and Atkins are 
humble which enables them to put aside the discourse and influences of the American 
authorities to create their own discourse. They work on equal terms with the natives 
and pass no judgment prior to the encounter. Thus, they are able to achieve their goal 
of helping people and do so without big budgets and broken promises. These 
characteristics are also evident in the reconstruction of Iraq where some Americans 
also focus on the bare necessities of the Iraqi people. These Americans do not set up 
certain rules which initiate certain standards for the other person. They instigate a 
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good basis for work relations and cultural relations. They possess cultural relativism, 
which according to William Gudykunst is the ability to set aside their own culture and 
see things from the other person’s perspective. 
The marines in Generation Kill fall outside these characteristics and in relation 
to Stuart Hall it is especially interesting to look at these Americans. The book follows 
the marines from the day they enter Iraq to the day they leave and presents a transition 
of their mind-sets. In other words, the marines initially belong to the first group of 
Americans but during their stay in Iraq they move towards the second group. Prior to 
engaging with the Iraqi people the marines established a certain picture of the Iraqi 
identity which was primarily influenced by the media and the overall American 
discourse in relation to the war on terror. Consequently, the marines have given the 
enemy an identity that does not fit reality and therefore initially, they have problems 
in establishing who they are fighting against. As known now, there are no ties 
between the events of September 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq.  
Though it is not possible to obtain a clear definition of a terrorist, he has come 
to symbolize a great threat to Western values and a willingness to fight people from 
the West using whatever methods will kill the most civilians. Prior to entering Iraq the 
marines identified the Iraqi people as terrorists even though Iraq never posed a great 
threat to America. They did that on the basis of the discourse of American authorities 
as, among others, evident in the last chapter of the case study. This is an obvious 
example of how representation, according to Hall, becomes reality. However, the 
marines later learn the reality they have created is inaccurate and they are forced to 
change their attributes and question the discourse about the Iraqi people.   
 In addition, Generation Kill describes how the marines, to begin with, think in 
terms of stereotypes and Western terminology, which are the only tools they possess 
to describe the Iraqi people and the situation they are in. As the marines become more 
and more exposed to Iraqi culture and values their stereotypes are slowly broken 
down and new ones are created. They also come to learn that the people in Iraq are 
not so different from themselves. Thus a little knowledge of the foreign culture goes a 
long way in terms of creating better communication and understanding between 
people. 
Finally, it is possible to establish certain similarities between Said’s views in 
Orientalism and what is written about Iraq. Certain discourses and stereotypes might 
have remained the same but it is somewhat difficult to completely determine whether 
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or not Said’s criticism is valid today. He only presents negative aspects of the 
Western study of other cultures and peoples, which to some degree allows limited 
results in relation to the aim of this project. It is clear from the case study that the 
situation in Iraq is not merely negative; there are Americans who understand how to 
help the Iraqi people and who are not blinded by stereotypes. The positive 
characteristics are important to consider when the aim is to provide an overall picture 
of the circumstances in Iraq. Unfortunately, less emphasis are put on these in the 
media etc. The same is true in Orientalism as Said presents a very negative picture of 
how the Western part of the world has presented the Orient. However, like the case 
with The Ugly American and Iraq, positive aspects ought to be presented as well. By 
not offering a contrast, this presents a biased picture of reality which might cause 
people to merely obtain one perspective and one view on the identity of other people. 
 In addition, Said’s theory on orientalism and discourse is based on seeing the 
West as having one view of the Orient. His overall theory is not valid for this 
examination in the sense that it does not fully apply to and distinguish between 
Americans and former colonial powers including the Netherlands. As mentioned in 
the reflections on Orientalism, it is now obvious that it is not possible to talk about the 
West as a whole or the Orient as a whole for that matter. This is a clear example of 
where Orientalism fails when regarding several countries as one – Said criticizes this 
but does it himself. 
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Conclusion 
 The theory and case study are not supposed to establish a frame of a particular 
American discourse or rather a discourse that might have replaced that of orientalism. 
The point of this project, however, is to stress certain tendencies in how Americans 
are described when they perceive other people and thus themselves. The theory 
examined some of the events and developments that influence the American mind-set 
while the case study provided a look into how Americans are described from both a 
critical point of view and reportage from their involvement in Asia and Iraq.  
 It is difficult to explain the origin of various discourses without carrying out a 
thorough examination like Edward Said has done in Orientalism. It is not possible to 
pinpoint one identifier for the derivation but the project can point towards some 
events which seem to have influenced the current way of thinking. One thing which is 
evident is that the events of September 11, 2001 had a great influence on the overall 
American discourse. In the American discourse it is evident that the events increased 
the gap and minimized the cultural understanding between East and West.  
It is important to examine discourses in order to change or improve the way 
people perceive one another. This project has tried to offer a representation of 
tendencies in American discourse and thus should not be seen as a guideline but rather 
as a starting point in a debate of how it would be possible to create better 
communication and thereby better relations among cultures. It is important to 
strengthen relations between cultures to avoid clashes but also to create an 
environment in which every nation can contribute to the international community on 
equal terms. Moreover, it is essential to improve intercultural communication and 
understanding on a personal level as this would diminish stereotypes and 
ethnocentrism. 
 In relation to the war in Iraq the general American attitude is polarized which 
creates uncertainties in how the American public actually feels and what sources to 
rely on to answer this. One party provides a very successful account of the war in Iraq 
while another reports of poor planning, lack of intelligence, and inadequate military 
equipment.  
 The media has its own discourse which is split in opinion as well. Among the 
American population the support for the war has decreased drastically within the past 
year and a much more critical discourse is emerging. However, it is not possible to 
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obtain a complete picture of this through the media as many newspapers and 
television channels are subject to political influence or pressure. It is thus essential to 
reflect upon this as media discourse and the American people’s point of views and 
attitudes might not cohere. On the other hand, media that earlier supported the 
decisions and actions of the American government are becoming more critical which 
reflects a change of attitude among the population. The media is thus affected by the 
governing American discourse and a discourse which might divert and originate from 
lower levels of society. Discourse thus takes many directions and the influences are 
numerous. As with intercultural communication and understanding it is only possible 
to achieve a full insight into a culture and the opinions of this culture by experiencing 
it firsthand and including as many sources as possible. 
 One of the great inequalities between America and Iraq that has been 
illustrated by the American authorities and through media discourse is identity and the 
lack of intelligence. Basic information about the Iraqi people has been ignored. The 
public knows exactly how many Americans have died but the number of Iraqi 
casualties is unknown or uncertain. Moreover, who are the Iraqi people? Have any of 
the American authorities ever asked that question and attempted to answer it? 
Moreover, the discourse of the Bush administration, which continuously has been that 
of success and praise of the American involvement gives the public a biased view of 
reality. 
 Since September 11, 2001 the Western part of the world is coming closer to 
creating a definition of terrorism and identifying the enemy. The enemy is Osama bin 
Laden’s Al Qaeda network which was the target in Afghanistan. In Iraq, America has 
not been able to identify an enemy because it does not exist in accordance with the 
original target. Many innocent Iraqis die because American soldiers do not know who 
they are supposed to fight. 
 A relation between the American involvement in Asia in the 1950-60s and in 
Iraq is that the enemy is a term that lacks a clear definition. The enemies, namely 
communism and terrorism, are constructions of what is expressed through 
representations and perceptions which do not reflect reality. America incited terrorism 
in Iraq and it is clearly not the same terrorism as experienced on September 11, 2001 
or in Afghanistan, as it has been proved later that these events are not connected. 
Thus, to fight terrorism it is essential to understand it, search for, and examine its 
underlying identity. 
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Based on these considerations, my thesis is that it is possible to obtain 
representations of how some Americans perceive other people with regards to their 
involvement in Asia and Iraq. In the light of this, it is feasible to draw out aspects that 
describe the overall American discourse. However, it is important to remember that 
not all Americans are affected by this and thus the results should only be looked upon 
as representations. Therefore, relying entirely on Said’s Orientalism does not provide 
a thorough and accurate picture as it mainly deals with a negative aspect of the 
Western attitude toward the Orient. It is important to include as many different views 
as possible to provide an overall representation and coverage of people who are able 
to learn about another culture and who do not follow the governing discourse.  
 Additionally, the influences on the Western, and in particular, the American 
mind-set, are numerous. Nevertheless, a good place to begin an examination of mind-
set is to look at the governing discourse and some of the historical conditions that 
shape and have shaped a country and its culture. However, it is not only aspects that 
are related to America that influence people’s way of thinking about others. 
Stereotyping, which is common to all people, is also an aspect that impedes 
communication among cultures which might create hostile relations among countries. 
In order to establish a more peaceful environment and promote understanding among 
nations it is essential to examine the way people think of one another and analyze 
stereotypes and discourses. The aim is to redefine stereotypes and discourses and 
communicate on the basis of new knowledge which aspires more balance and 
honesty. 
 As argued by Foucault, Hall, and Said, knowledge is created through 
representations taken from the dominant discourse. The West has continuously 
represented other people and written history on the basis of this. The ‘other’ has not 
represented him- or herself or, as Said argues, been able to do so. Thus the West has 
merely learned about others through their own culture and discourse. Through both 
the theory and the case study the project has shown that by way of discourse together 
with a strong economy and powerful army it is possible to dominate other parts of the 
world. However, it has also shown a different approach; that it is possible to go 
against discourses, create new, and thereby look at others in a different light.  
 If this approach is not considered is it possible that a cultural clash might 
occur? International relations and understanding among cultures need to improve if 
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countries around the world wish to avoid conflicts and clashes based on cultural 
grounds. 
In conclusion, in order to improve these relations it is important to be able to 
see through and take a critical stance toward the dominant hegemonic discourse in 
order to let other peoples speak for themselves. It is thus essential to be self-critical 
and reflective of the discourses in society that one produces, reproduces, and is part 
of. The understanding of truth is biased but by thorough study and firsthand 
experiences it should be possible to find a truth that corresponds more accurately with 
reality. Moreover, in order to improve one’s own mind-set it is important to think 
about the stereotypes that are used in everyday speech and way of thinking.
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Time to Face Reality 
 The situation in Iraq needs to improve radically to save the lives of Iraqis 
and Americans and to provide an acceptable future for the Iraqi people. 
America needs to make changes in its foreign policy and aid. More importantly, 
American authorities must soon realize that they need to change their attitude of 
how they perceive and thereby deal with foreign people. 
 It is evident in relation to the war in Iraq that there is an overall governing 
discourse in America which reflects certain influences and historical events. This 
discourse is negative and mainly expressed by the media and the American 
authorities. The problem is that this message is communicated to the American public 
who then obtain negative images of the Iraqi people based on inaccurate information. 
The events that mainly reflect this discourse are September 11, 2001 and America’s 
identity as a superpower.  
 The attacks on the World Trade Center have left many Americans in fear of 
the Muslim world and the beliefs it has come to be known for, such as terrorism. 
America’s image as a superpower causes some people to see others as inferior and in 
need of Americanization in order to implement what is believed to be better values. 
 This, among others, becomes evident in how some Americans behave when 
going to Iraq for employment. In general, these Americans are more concerned about 
their own needs than the people they have come to help. An American self-interest is 
apparent in their choices regarding the rebuilding of Iraq and their endeavor to 
achieve a certain public image. Money is poured into Iraq to finance grand plans but 
America seems to neglect a bigger need for clean water and electricity which is vital 
for the Iraqi people.  
 Another problem is that stereotypes highly affect American communication 
with Iraqis. Many of the stereotypes that are evident in the American discourse 
originate in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Iraqis are believed to be terrorists, 
which is purely based on inaccurate information. Though it is not possible to obtain a 
clear definition of a terrorist, he has come to symbolize a great threat to Western 
values and a willingness to fight people from the West using whatever methods will 
kill the most civilians. 
 
 100
It is an illusion of attributes that has been applied to the Iraqi people by the 
Bush administration as a result of poor intelligence. Viewing Iraqis as terrorists 
causes Americans to distance themselves and this affects both work relations and the 
identity of the respective parties. Americans take a superior stance toward the Iraqi 
people and believe that their values and lifestyle are more worthy which results in the 
fact that they do not respect Iraqis. 
  Authorities in America have a certain way of speaking about and thinking 
about people in Iraq and this highly affects the Americans who work on the ground. 
What does it take to convince American authorities that there is something wrong 
with their approach to other countries and cultures? 
 Essentially, they do not have to look far for guidance to solve this problem 
since the American population includes people who know how to act when abroad. 
These Americans understand how to help the Iraqi people and are not blinded by 
stereotypes. Further, they do not act according to the negative discourse even though 
it is difficult not to be affected by it.  
 Americans like this are selfless and interested in the needs of the country they 
stay in. They are humble which enables them to put aside the discourse and influences 
of the American authorities to create their own discourse. They work on equal terms 
with the Iraqis and pass no judgment prior to the encounter. Thus, they are able to 
achieve their goal of helping people and do so without big budgets and broken 
promises. They focus on the bare necessities of the Iraqi people. These Americans do 
not set up certain rules which initiate certain standards for the other person. They 
instigate a good basis for work relations and cultural relations.  
There are many Iraqis who are qualified to be part of the reconstruction of 
their own country and working side by side will diminish the gap and increase the 
understanding between American and Iraqi culture.  
 It is evident that some Americans who stay in Iraq and become more and more 
exposed to Iraqi culture and values their stereotypes are slowly broken down and new 
ones are created. They also come to learn that the people in Iraq are not so different 
from themselves. Thus a little knowledge of the foreign culture goes a long way in 
terms of creating better communication and understanding between people. 
 It is regrettable that the Bush administration does not take the time to evaluate 
and turn to Americans who do well in Iraq in terms of intercultural communication. 
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They are many. It would certainly improve the situation. Before American authorities 
realize they need to change their attitude nothing else will change.  
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Reflections on Article 
 The subject in this article is something that affects all people regardless of 
what country they come from even though it reports on Americans. I think it is 
important that we all take responsibility in the world to improve cultural relations and 
try to understand one another. I believe it is crucial that some countries do not have an 
attitude of superiority and that we achieve the ability to see things from other cultures’ 
perspective as well. It might sound like an easy way to establish peace in the world. 
However, there is no simple solution to this and it is not the case that doing what it 
says in the article people will live happily together. Nevertheless, I do believe that 
with a little consideration and awareness we might be able to avoid certain conflicts 
that arise because of cultural differences. 
 As mentioned, this article could be aimed at anyone. However, to narrow 
down the target audience the focus should be on people who deal with intercultural 
relations or is interested in other cultures. This could be people who work abroad, 
travel, or who are interested in international affairs. It concerns both men and women 
and perhaps age 25 and up. It is difficult to put an exact age on the target audience 
and the reason for choosing age twenty-five is based on my own experiences. I have 
not always been interested in international relations and have not possessed the ability 
or the will to examine my own views critically. Moreover, this article is something 
that the target audience would pick up because of interest and thus not something they 
would be exposed to by simply turning on their television set. 
 These considerations are based on the media this article is aimed at and vice 
versa. The article could likely appear in the weekly magazine TIME which is 
available in many parts of the world. Every week TIME has one cover story which is 
dealt with in more detail than others. This could be of different contributors or aspects 
of the subject. The subject could be on Iraq or intercultural affairs altogether.  
Based on this, I believe that my article would appear as part of a cover story 
which aims at opening a debate about either what to do next in Iraq or how we can 
avoid cultural conflicts based on preconceptions. Further, intercultural relations would 
be the focus and how different cultures interact and view one another. 
Therefore, the target audience is older and has an interest in current affairs and 
in-depth stories. They have a will to learn and are interested since they have to 
 103
purchase the magazine. The coverage could appear in all issues of TIME thus both the 
American and European issue.  
In conclusion, the aim of the article and thus the effect I want it to have on 
people is the same it had on me when I conducted my research. I would like more 
people to give more thought to how they perceive certain peoples and cultures and, if 
negative, how they could change that. We should be more critical of the things we 
hear daily in the media and from the leaders of our respective countries. 
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The New York Times, June 28, 2004 
Brackish Waters of a Leaky, Ramshackle Canal Reflect the Woes of Trying to 
Rebuild Iraq.
(Foreign Desk)(THE REACH OF WAR: BASRA) 
James Glanz  
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 The New York Times Company 
A journey down the wandering, ramshackle course of the Sweet Water Canal, the 
hapless and ironically named waterway that was designed as a lifeline for the people 
in this country's parched southern desert, could be seen as an allegory for everything 
that has gone wrong with the American-led reconstruction of Iraq.  
American engineers figured that the canal, completed only six years ago, was a 
basically sound source of water for this city of two million people. A little dredging 
and patching and it would be like new. Instead, they found a nightmare of substandard 
construction, malfunctioning equipment and haphazardly repaired leaks. Looting after 
the American-led invasion made matters immeasurably worse.  
The first big leak that caught the attention of the American engineers came last 
December, 117 miles below the spot where the canal taps into a relatively unpolluted 
tributary of the Tigris River. In the chaos and lawlessness of the occupation, 
inspections of the canal had ceased, and the flowing water gnawed a huge hole that 
created dire shortages until it was fixed.  
The leaks kept coming, even though the Americans and their allies had begun pouring 
millions of dollars into repairs on the canal and on the silt-choked reservoirs, 
nonfunctioning water-treatment plants and porous underground piping networks that 
try -- and abysmally fail -- to bring clean and safe water into citizens' homes.  
On June 18, workers swarmed around the latest giant leak in forbidding country about 
15 miles from the first gusher, as a snorting backhoe scooped and swatted at the soupy 
mess, trying to pat clay into place and make a temporary plug. Now, even Iraqi 
engineers who praise the Americans' efforts say that water supplies here are at best 
still no better than they were under Saddam Hussein's government.  
''As with a lot of things here, the canal was reaching the point where it was going to 
break down,'' said Thomas H. Stahl, regional representative for southern Iraq for the 
United States Agency for International Development. Mr. Stahl grew up in Basra and 
other towns in Iraq and Kuwait as the son of missionaries in the 1950's and 1960's.  
''If you think of Iraq as a used car,'' Mr. Stahl said, quoting an epigram that he said 
was making the rounds among development officials, ''Saddam sold it just in time.''  
To date, the development agency has financed roughly $50 million in work on the 
canal and other regional water systems, and it has been carried out by the engineering 
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giant Bechtel and its Iraqi subcontractors. The project is months behind and may 
never be completed as originally envisioned.  
Nassar Hussan, the director general of the central water treatment plant for Basra, said 
the Western engineers had done a good job on the parts of the project they had been 
able to finish. But Mr. Hussan said that for the moment, lagging repairs to the canal 
and soaring demand in the hot weather had left him with less than half the water he 
needed to meet the city's requirements.  
''Because of the summer season and the slow maintenance, this causes big problems,'' 
Mr. Hussan said.  
Moreover, Basra is a town where the peace is especially fragile, as shown when 
violent protests over electricity and gasoline shortages broke out here last August. At 
a raucous but peaceful protest in front of the governorate building recently over 
shortcomings in a variety of city services, Hussein Ali, who said he was head of the 
local democratic party, was asked about the quality of the city's tap water.  
''What water?'' Mr. Ali said. ''There isn't any water.''  
In fact, Mr. Ali eventually conceded, city taps do sporadically flow with hard, unclean 
water, suitable at most for washing. He said the poor, who cannot always afford 
bottled water, were forced to drink the unpalatable liquid. But Samer Murtadha, a 
guard at a used car lot in Basra's Al Jazair neighborhood, made it clear how 
undesirable that expedient was. He said he would drink the water only ''if I have to 
die.''  
For all its desert wasteland, with summer temperatures routinely rising above 120 
degrees, Basra was not always a place without potable water. The Shatt al Arab, the 
waterway formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates, flows through 
town.  
But dozens of dams and hydroelectric plants built on the two rivers in Turkey and 
Syria in the 1980's and 1990's drastically reduced the flow of water downstream and 
accelerated a long trend toward brackish, unhealthy water because of agricultural 
runoff and other pollution. Raw sewage dumped into the Tigris in Baghdad fouled the 
river further.  
Even worse, shelling during the 1980-to-1988 Iran-Iraq war tore up underground 
water pipes in Basra. The leaks are still so bad that sewage seeps into the system and 
at least 60 percent of the water is lost. Ponds from the leaks were so large that they 
began appearing on official city maps. Mr. Hussein's government, with astonishing 
indifference to Iraq's infrastructure, did little or nothing to fix the problems.  
''Everything is destroyed in Basra,'' said Muhenned A. al-Suhail, a civil engineer in 
the city who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and another Western 
contractor, Mott MacDonald, on repair projects. ''It is destroyed because of the war 
and because of the lack of maintenance.''  
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Finally, the government built the Sweet Water Canal, finished only in 1998, and 
traveling nearly 150 miles across the desert from the Nahr Al Gharaf River. But the 
work was so substandard that long stretches of the concrete and clay liner already 
look like a crumbling ancient ruin.  
''The leakage problem with the canal is so much worse than anybody anticipated,'' said 
James Stephenson, the mission director in Iraq for the development agency.  
Initially, the agency and Bechtel figured they would be in business with a little 
patching and a refurbishment of the canal's pumping stations. But the canal turned out 
to be so delicate that the friction generated by pushing much more water through the 
canal with stronger pumps could have torn the structure apart.  
And doing really major fixes on the holes that kept cropping up would have required 
damming the canal for long periods. Because Basra has almost no capacity for storing 
water, it was not possible to stop the flow for more than a few days.  
Scorching, gritty winds swept across the spot where the latest leak had created a big 
pond on the desert, while workers struggled with heavy equipment to create a plug. 
As guards armed with automatic weapons scattered around the area to protect a group 
of visitors from attacks, it was hard to see how workers could make it through a full 
day in good health, let alone complete a construction project.  
''If this washes out,'' a Bechtel engineer shouted over the wind and the din of the 
equipment, ''it could shut down the supply of water to Basra for two to four weeks.''  
Farther downstream, other problems are apparent. A man in a dirty white T-shirt was 
bathing in the canal at one spot, and pipes for illicitly siphoning the water -- probably 
by the Bedouin tribes that rove through the area -- emerged from the side of the canal 
at another place.  
By the time the water reaches Mr. Hassan's water-treatment plant, its level is well 
below the dark stain on the concrete. ''You can see the line that is the normal level 
before the war,'' Mr. Hassan said.  
Farther along in the water's journey, a neighborhood project to lay new underground 
pipes and reduce the leakage was delayed because a Western supply company said it 
was too dangerous to deliver materials. Trenches were dug for the pipes along a busy 
road, but now they have filled with trash and partly collapsed, so workers are digging 
them out again.  
The blue pipes have finally arrived and are lying next to the trenches, but engineers at 
the site are talking about two sisters, translators for the local Coalition Provisional 
Authority, who only a few days earlier were murdered for working with the 
Americans.  
Mr. Suhail, in as understated a way as he could manage, said, ''There is a little risk, 
really.''  
Article A118661645 
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The New York Times, June 14, 2004 
In Race to Give Power to Iraqis, Electricity Lags.
(Foreign Desk)(U.S. has missed its goal of restoring Iraq's electricity output in time 
for the summer by 30 percent) 
James Glanz  
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 The New York Times Company 
Tripped up by problems ranging from sabotage to its reliance on by-the-book 
engineering, the United States has failed by a wide margin to meet its long-stated goal 
of reviving Iraq's electricity output for the start of the searing summer.  
The American-led occupation missed its goal by as much as 30 percent, starving air-
conditioners, lights, factories and oil pumps. That has damaged the occupation's 
efforts to foster stability and good will among a populace already traumatized by the 
failure to guarantee their security.  
The goal, one of the American-led civilian administration's highest priorities, was set 
soon after occupation forces overran the country in the spring of 2003. It seemed 
within reach, but with little progress so far, the occupation is now talking about 
succeeding well into this summer.  
The United Nations estimated that before the war, Iraq could produce 4,500 
megawatts of electricity at any given time. With the fighting and looting, the 
production capacity plunged wildly, before beginning to rebound.  
Capacity has been stuck in a range around 4,000 megawatts for months. Not only is 
that less than during the Saddam Hussein era, but it is also far below the American 
promise of 6,000 megawatts.  
Even if that level is attained, demand is leapfrogging higher. That could portend a 
difficult season, just when the interim government takes up its duties and tries to 
claim popular support.  
The reasons for the shortfall are both obvious and subtle. They include insurgents' 
attacks on plants and power lines, the harassment and killing of engineers, pullouts by 
companies doing repair work, and problems finding spare parts for outdated Iraqi 
equipment.  
Some Iraqis also complain that Western engineers have been unable to grasp the 
complexities of a creaky electrical grid that is a patchwork of ancient Russian, 
German, Yugoslavian, Chinese and American equipment. The Iraqis say that the 
engineers, often Americans, reflexively reach for fancy new gear costing tens of 
millions of dollars that can take months or years to order, ship and install.  
Iraqis are skilled at balancing the vast swirl of electrical supply and demand on their 
grid with phone calls and intuition, while Americans rely on computerized sensors 
and automatic control circuitry.  
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The Iraqi way of doing business is equally strange to American engineers. Beneath a 
yellowed, sagging drop ceiling in the control room of one electricity plant in 
Baghdad, a swarm of technicians in grimy blue jumpsuits laughed at a man sleeping 
on cardboard as an alarm for high oil temperature in an ancient turbine began to 
sound.  
Another man sat finishing a cigarette, his feet in a puddle of dirty oil, before throwing 
the glowing butt into the middle of the puddle and then crushing it out. A nearby 
banner called for revenge for the death of Imam Hussein, a martyr of the year 680. 
Meanwhile, two huge turbines groaned away, and workers struggled to fix another.  
The shortage has left ordinary Iraqis seething, particularly in Baghdad. The city was 
generously supplied with electricity at the expense of the rest of the country under 
Saddam Hussein, but now receives a more proportional share of the smaller pie, and is 
subject to frequent cutoffs.  
''They said early March, and then they said early May, and finally they said early June 
the electricity would be perfect,'' said Feras al-Rubae, a money changer who sat 
sullenly in his shop in the middle-class shopping district of Outer Karada during a 
power failure. ''But now it is early June, and where is the promise?''  
As for how important electricity is for resuming a normal life and getting his business 
back on its feet, Mr. Rubae said: ''I would put it first. No. 1.''  
As reconstruction money flows in, that importance to the political and economic life 
of Iraq has hardly been overlooked.  
L. Paul Bremer III, the top American administrator in Iraq, has long emphasized the 
importance of restoring electricity, engineers and construction managers said. In an 
interview last Monday, Mr. Bremer said it was for that reason that $5.5 billion of last 
fall's $18.4 billion emergency spending bill was apportioned to restoring electrical 
power.  
''It's quite important, mostly because, first of all, it affects our capacity to deal with 
other problems like being able to pump oil,'' Mr. Bremer said. Electricity is needed to 
produce the oil, exports of which are the lifeblood of the economy.  
Besides that, Mr. Bremer said, ''it's important because it affects the lives of ordinary 
Iraqis.''  
The money from the emergency bill comes on top of hundreds of millions of dollars 
that were dedicated to the power grid last year. The United States Agency for 
International Development budgeted $1.3 billion for work on the grid, and $500 
million of that was budgeted earlier last year.  
The United States Army Corps of Engineers, which began some of its work as early 
as the spring of 2003, has budgeted $1.36 billion for electrical work.  
Estimates of the ultimate cost of restoring the Iraqi grid have varied wildly. In an 
assessment last year, the United Nations and the World Bank estimated that Iraq 
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would need about $12 billion to repair its electrical system through 2007. The Iraqi 
electricity ministry has quoted numbers as high as $35 billion for the overall cost, 
without giving specific dates.  
The money is being spent rapidly, but the goal is unmet. Mr. Bremer said he now 
expected capacity to reach 6,000 megawatts during the summer. (By contrast, a single 
American plant often produces 1,000 megawatts, and production in Texas can soar to 
60,000 megawatts during an exceptionally hot day.)  
Tom Crangle, the Coalition Provisional Authority's acting senior adviser for 
electricity, said, ''We see the air-conditioners in the back of pickup trucks, and we see 
a lot more economic activity. So we're chasing an upwardly rising target.''  
The lower-than-expected output was the result of ''a combination of factors,'' said Mr. 
Crangle, who was a senior manager at the Tennessee Valley Authority, the largest 
public power company in the United States.  
Rebuilding older generators, ordinarily time-consuming, has been drawn out further 
after engineers discovered that Saddam Hussein's government had left them in a 
decrepit state, Mr. Crangle said. Importing new generators into a country in chaos 
meant new challenges.  
Sabotage has been directed at transmission lines, power plants and some oil and gas 
pipelines that provide fuel for the plants. According to an internal Iraqi government 
report obtained by The New York Times last week, more than 100 of the main 
electrical lines and nearly 1,200 of the towers supporting them have been damaged or 
destroyed since the invasion.  
Mr. Crangle said that about 90 percent of that damage has been repaired, and that the 
destruction from new attacks is being fixed nearly as fast as it occurs.  
A Web site of the Coalition Provisional Authority used to give daily scores of 
electricity production beginning Aug. 1, 2003. But it abruptly stopped giving updates 
on May 18, when the peak production was listed at 4,039 megawatts.  
Officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority say they halted the updates so that 
saboteurs could not see the impact of their strikes.  
In an interview this month, Abdul Wahab, chief engineer at the General Establishment 
for Electricity Generation within the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, said that current 
production was running at just under 4,000 megawatts, but that because of damaged 
transmission lines, not all of that could be delivered and used.  
A spokesman for the provisional authority, Dallas Lawrence, said Iraq was producing 
4,273 megawatts on June 7, compared with 3,222 megawatts exactly one year before.  
''No matter how you dice this,'' Mr. Lawrence wrote in an e-mail message, ''either by 
peak megawatts or by megawatt-hours, we are providing 24 to 25 percent more power 
today than one year ago.''  
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But those numbers failed to impress many Iraqis.  
''The Americans, all of them, move very slowly,'' said Raad al-Haris, the deputy 
minister of electricity. ''We thought before that the Americans will do some excellent 
job and they can cover the demand,'' he said, spitting out the words in slightly 
imperfect English. ''But until now,'' he said, his voice rising, ''we have only peanut.''  
Mr. Haris, the deputy minister, said that demand was running at just over 5,000 
megawatts and that he expected it to rise to 7,000 this summer. Mr. Wahab, the chief 
engineer, said demand could soar even more, to 8,000 megawatts.  
''In July and August there will be a huge demand,'' said Raqi Rahem, director of the 
Baghdad South power plant.  
Although some Iraqis congratulate the Americans and their allies for technical 
successes, like replacing hundreds of the damaged transmission towers and shipping 
new parts that were unobtainable under Mr. Hussein, many others suggest that 
engineers from economically developed countries do not have the jury-rigging skills 
of Iraqi colleagues.  
Iraqis engineers are masters at taking from one damaged piece of equipment to make 
another piece work. Instead of employing the careful American method of erecting 
wooden poles to support lines while towers were rebuilt, Mr. Crangle noted with 
undisguised admiration, Iraqis had found a way to do it safely with mobile cranes.  
Carrying out a project by the book, with brand-new equipment, ''might take you six 
months,'' said Saad Shakir Tawfiq, an engineer at the Iraqi Ministry of Industry who is 
involved with several power plants.  
''You need power because it's the people's lives,'' Dr. Tawfiq said. ''I don't care about 
the book; you need power. Just do it, the basics, with what you've got.'' 
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Impatient with slow progress in the rebuilding of Iraq, the State Department is 
conducting a major review of the $18.4 billion program, seeking ways to provide 
more jobs and visible results more quickly to Iraqis, according to American diplomats 
and private advisers.  
The aid effort, intended to transform Iraq's crumbling infrastructure as it wins the 
support of the Iraqi people, was adopted by Congress in the fall of 2003. While the 
Pentagon was initially put in charge of designing projects and doling out contracts, it 
has increasingly shared authority with the State Department.  
But the program has moved more slowly than many officials had expected: only about 
one-third of the money has been designated for specific projects so far, and most of 
those ventures are still in planning stages.  
The Pentagon's approach to the aid -- focusing on huge power, water and other 
building projects, with billion-dollar-plus ''prime contracts'' given to a small number 
of American companies -- has been criticized by development experts and some 
diplomats as misdirected and wasteful.  
A new look at spending goals and methods has been a priority of the new American 
ambassador to Iraq, John D. Negroponte, who took charge of the American mission 
after the transfer of formal sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government on June 28.  
William B. Taylor Jr., a State Department official who previously worked in 
Afghanistan, is managing the review, which officials hope to complete by early 
August. Later this year, he is expected to take over as the Baghdad-based chief 
coordinator of aid, replacing David J. Nash, the retired navy admiral who has directed 
rebuilding so far.  
State Department officials agree that Iraq's decayed and war-damaged infrastructure 
needs an overhaul, and they say they do not expect to fundamentally alter the aid 
program's aims, although they will consult with Congress on recommended changes.  
But they are asking, for example, whether larger amounts should pass through Iraqi 
ministries with careful conditions rather than be handed to Western firms; whether 
labor-intensive building methods, spreading jobs and benefits, can be more strongly 
supported; and whether some large-scale infrastructure needs might just as well be 
met by international lending agencies like the World Bank, according to a senior State 
Department official.  
''The Iraqis deservedly have a reputation for knowing their own system,'' the official 
said in an interview on Monday, noting the enormous confusion and start-up costs as 
Western firms moved quickly into the alien territory of Iraq during the past year. 
Diplomats are going out of their way to describe the review as a routine and long-
planned step. But after the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, some 
officials complained that the Pentagon pushed aside the State Department's planning 
for restoring the traumatized society. Aid experts criticized what they saw as the 
military's reflexive ''big project, big contract'' approach to aid. The Defense 
Department remains formally in charge of most contracting in Iraq, but must share 
increasing authority with the State Department.  
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''The projects have been way too large,'' said Rick Barton, an expert on economic 
reconstruction at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a private research 
organization in Washington. ''Building large infrastructure is not usually what you do 
first in a post-conflict society.''  
''You need to get things going in the right direction, and the process will pick up speed 
later on,'' he said of economic reconstruction. ''If you try to build pyramids in the 
beginning, it will suck up all the money,'' as well as provide easy targets for sabotage, 
he said.  
In recent days, for example, the Iraqi minister for public works noted that because of 
large and rising costs for security, insurance and administration, expensive water 
projects will end up providing only half as much potable water as projected.  
Pentagon and State Department officials have described the comparatively quick and 
positive results of small aid projects managed by military commanders in the field, 
and they are looking for ways to duplicate the success. ''People see their situation 
improve and that the coalition is paying for it,'' the senior State Department official 
said.  
The infrastructure needs are huge, Mr. Barton agreed, but many problems can be 
better attacked ''in bite-sized pieces.'' Instead of handing off most tasks to 
multinational corporations, he said, ''we need to really engage the Iraqis, possibly 
making use of the local governing councils we've created.''  
''We need to make sure the Iraqis have ownership,'' he said, ''so when something goes 
wrong, they'll fix it themselves instead of blaming outsiders.'' 
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Iraqi officials in charge of rebuilding their country's shattered and decrepit 
infrastructure are warning that the Bush administration's plan to divert $3.46 billion 
from water, sewage, electricity and other reconstruction projects to security could 
leave many people without the crucial services that generally form the backbone of a 
stable and functioning democracy.  
Under the plan, which was proposed last week and would require approval by 
Congress, the money would pay for training and equipping tens of thousands of 
additional police officers, border patrol agents and Iraqi national guardsmen in an 
 113
attempt to restore order to a land where lawlessness and violence have replaced 
Saddam Hussein's repression since the American-led invasion last year.  
But the move comes as a grievous disappointment to Iraqi officials who had already 
seen the billions once promised them tied up for months by American regulations and 
planning committees, consumed by administrative overhead and set aside for the 
enormous costs of ensuring safety for the workers and engineers who will actually 
build the new sewers, water plants and electrical generators. Of the $18.4 billion that 
Congress approved last fall for Iraq's reconstruction, only about $1 billion has been 
spent so far.  
''Nobody believes this will benefit Iraq,'' said Kamil N. Chadirji, deputy minister for 
administration and financial affairs in the Iraqi Ministry of Municipalities and Public 
Works, which has responsibility for water and sewage projects outside Baghdad.  
''For a year we have been talking, with beautiful PowerPoint documents, but without a 
drop of water,'' Mr. Chadirji said, waving a colorful printout that he received from 
American officials.  
The decision to shift the money, which had been earmarked for rebuilding everything 
from roads and bridges to telecommunications and the outdated equipment pumping 
oil, appears to signal an abandonment of the administration's original plan for putting 
Iraq back on its feet as a functioning nation.  
In the original view, restoring Iraq's physical infrastructure assumed an importance 
equaled only by the American-led military action in creating a stable democratic 
country and winning the sympathies of ordinary citizens. Propounded again and again 
by L. Paul Bremer III, the top American civilian administrator here until an Iraqi 
government took over on June 28, that approach assumed that once the conduits for 
electricity, water, sewage, oil and information were in place, an efflorescence of 
industrial and national institutions would follow.  
But with little actually being built and the deteriorating security situation making it 
doubtful that anything dramatic would happen if it were, a much more conventional 
set of nation-building priorities were put in place with the arrival last June of John D. 
Negroponte, the United States ambassador to Iraq. Those priorities are security, 
economic development and democracy building.  
Somewhere implicit in the economic peg of this three-legged stool is the concept, 
much demoted, of physical reconstruction. And even then, said officials at the United 
States Embassy in Baghdad, the rebuilding is best done not by Americans but by 
Iraqis, who can not only hone their construction skills but also do the work more 
cheaply.  
''It doesn't matter what we build,'' a senior embassy official said in a succinct 
expression of the new principles. ''In the end, it's got to be an Iraqi solution.''  
''I feel a lot better about this mission than I did about 'rebuilding Iraq,''' the official 
said. When asked why, the official said, ''Because this one makes sense.''  
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William B. Taylor Jr., director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office at the 
embassy, said the change represented something more akin to a shift in emphasis 
rather than a complete reordering of priorities.  
''In the original allocation, the dollar winner, the sector that got the most resources, 
was electricity,'' Mr. Taylor said. ''Now security is at the top.''  
He said some or all of the diverted financing could be restored if Congress decided to 
allocate more money to reconstruction in a future budget or if other countries 
provided donations.  
The shift would take $1.07 billion out of the electricity sector's original allocation of 
$5.54 billion. Dr. Moayed al-Maayouf, director general for studies and planning at the 
Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, said he was puzzled that nearly all the cuts in his sector 
would affect work at power plants -- a technically difficult, long-term affair whose 
disruption would affect his planning for years.  
Dr. Maayouf said he had not been consulted on the plan, but embassy officials said 
discussions might have occurred at higher levels in his ministry. In any case, even 
with the cuts, the ministry should be able to meet its goals for increasing electrical 
output over the next year, Dr. Maayouf said.  
Clearly the most severe impact would be felt in the area of water and sewage, which 
would have its budget cut to $2.21 billion from $4.15 billion. With the insurgency in 
Iraq, the estimated cost of providing security for the projects had already tripled -- 
from 10 percent to 30 percent of each construction contract -- and had forced dozens 
of projects to shrink in size or be eliminated.  
Now, Mahmood A. Ahmed, director general of water at the public works ministry, 
said that of an original list of about 100 projects, he knew of only four that are 
scheduled to start even in the next few months.  
Mr. Chadirji, the deputy minister, said fewer than 30 of the original projects, which 
include municipal drinking water and sewage systems in towns across Iraq, were 
assured of surviving in the long run.  
''We tell them, please, the problem is big, and let's work faster,'' Mr. Ahmed said. 
''And we must have a result.''  
In another indication of new American priorities in Baghdad, some money was also 
shifted away from the major public works projects to small-scale initiatives in 
economic reform, private sector development, agriculture and higher education.  
Mr. Taylor, in a bit of wry humor, explained why water and electricity were tapped 
for all these programs by citing Willie Sutton, who said that he robbed banks because 
that was where the money was.  
''If you're looking for $3.46 billion,'' Mr. Taylor said, ''you can't get it out of health 
care. Where the money is, is electricity and water.''  
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More than six weeks after guerrillas retreated from the Imam Ali Shrine, leaving a 
ring of devastation after a three-week battle with American troops, little rebuilding 
has occurred in some of the most heavily damaged zones, and residents say they are 
worried and confused about the future of their restaurants, shops, hotels and homes.  
American officials say they can do little about the pace of reconstruction in the part of 
the Old City surrounding the shrine, one of the holiest places in Shiite Islam, because 
the Iraqi government has taken over responsibility for the job. But American and Iraqi 
rebuilding officials say that they have recently made progress in compensating people 
who were hurt in the fighting or who lost family members.  
Those officials also point to tens of millions of dollars in rebuilding projects 
elsewhere in the city in what they describe as an extensive effort to put it back on its 
feet.  
Still, during a recent visit by Western and Iraqi reporters, disputes broke out among 
Iraqi and American officials about the management, pace and ultimate usefulness of 
three of those rehabilitation projects: those at a major hospital, the main water 
treatment plant and a sewage treatment plant.  
In separate interviews, some business owners said they had been stonewalled in their 
efforts to collect the payments that had been promised for damage inflicted by 
American weapons, which turned walls into rubble and caused whole buildings to 
crumble.  
Ali Hussein Abed Zahid said that he submitted a damage claim for 150 million Iraqi 
dinars, or $105,559, to the hotel he owns, but that no action had been taken, and that 
his losses were increasing as it remained closed. Adnan Rashid Kadhim, who owned 
two watch shops that were destroyed, said recently that he had received ''only 
promises and postponement.''  
Mr. Kadhim called the scene in the Old City painful, adding, ''You can see destruction 
everywhere.''  
Capt. Carrie Batson, a spokeswoman for the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, said 
that the pace of payments for injuries, death and damage had picked up and that more 
than $1 million had been given out. ''We will pay for damage, death, injury caused by 
us,'' she said.  
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As American-led forces lay siege to areas around the country that had slipped from 
their control, it seems likely that a delicate issue the Americans thought they had left 
behind after the invasion last year -- rebuilding areas devastated by fighting -- will 
crop up again and again before the Iraqi elections that are planned for early next year.  
A senior American official said the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office at the 
United States Embassy in Baghdad was aware of the issue and would be searching for 
money to carry out this new task.  
The office ''is making an effort to focus other resources, reconstruction work, on cities 
that have been the location of military action, like Najaf,'' the official said.  
Whole blocks were obliterated during the fighting between the American military and 
guerrillas loyal to Moktada al-Sadr, a young cleric who had taken a militant stance 
about the American occupation. ''Everything was done to minimize the damage,'' said 
Maj. David Holahan, a Marine commander who was involved in the battle, ''but 
there's only so much you can do.''  
The area within roughly 100 yards of the shrine may never be rebuilt, said Majid 
Jebreen, chief of the supervisory committee for reconstruction in Najaf and the local 
coordinator for the Project and Contracting Office, which is affiliated with the 
Pentagon and the United States Embassy in Baghdad and is managing $18.4 billion in 
rebuilding money.  
The reason, Mr. Jebreen said, is that the Iraqi government has decided to clear some 
of the warrens of serried buildings, with their narrow alleyways and innumerable 
passages, to give more room to the millions of Muslims who visit the shrine each 
year. American and Iraqi officials denied that the move was an effort to improve 
security around the shrine.  
Mr. Jebreen said that ''not much rebuilding or reconstruction has been done'' in the 
Old City. The exception, he said, was work on utilities like electrical and water lines. 
Amir Muhammad Hasan, the owner of an optics shop in the Old City, said some 
electrical work was taking place.  
About 1,500 of 9,000 claims involving death or injury have been paid, said Ahmad al 
Fatlawi, chief of the committee handling compensation. ''The problem is that the issue 
of hotels and building owners has been postponed,'' Mr. Fatlawi said, while the other 
claims were addressed.  
Mr. Zahid and other residents remained confused about when, or if, they would get 
help. Ahmed Jasem Abod, a shop owner whose business was damaged, said he filed a 
claim two months ago but had received no payment.  
Farther from the center of the city, the mood on the streets seemed lighter, and 
construction work on a modest scale was seen at a number of homes and businesses. 
American officials asserted that in the Najaf area alone, hundreds of projects totaling 
tens of millions of dollars were in progress or had been completed -- claims that are 
notoriously difficult to check in a country so treacherous for travelers.  
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When the visitors arrived at one of the most prominent of those projects, a $4.5 
million hospital renovation financed mostly by the Project and Contracting Office, 
disagreements broke out between Iraqi and American officials over whether the effort 
would ever produce a functioning medical center.  
An Iraqi engineer working on the project said the Americans had put most of their 
effort into cosmetic work like fixing the ceilings and drywall on the ground floor, 
where visitors could see the renovations. But he said maintenance work on seriously 
damaged water and sewerage systems in the building was so inadequate that the 
hospital could not be used soon.  
''I'm sure the maintenance process is useless,'' the engineer said. ''I'm sure.''  
He was largely backed up by Dr. Safa al-Amedy, the hospital's director, who said 
parts of the sewerage system remained plugged even after renovation. He also 
contended that the American contractor in charge of the work, Parsons Corporation, 
based in Pasadena, Calif., had behaved arbitrarily and did not consult Iraqis on the 
scheduling of the work or its priorities.  
Americans at the contracting office defended the work and said the hospital would be 
fully functioning by the time it was handed over to the Iraqis.  
''We will do whatever it takes to fix the sewage problem to ensure that the people of 
Najaf have a quality hospital,'' said Col. Jeffrey E. Phillips, an Army Reserve officer 
who is a spokesman for the contracting office.  
On the same trip, questions arose about nearly $10 million in American-paid work on 
Najaf's main water and sewage treatment plants. Mr. Jebreen and an American 
military engineer said both plants were largely nonfunctional, but the American 
contractor involved, the Bechtel Corporation, based in San Francisco, said the water 
plant was running between 65 percent and 75 percent of capacity.  
A Bechtel spokesman later wrote in an e-mail message that the water plant ''now has 
the capacity to run at 100 percent if operated and maintained properly.'' Several 
American officials asserted that the plant was, however, being operated inefficiently 
by the Iraqi ministries that are in charge, failing to staff the project sufficiently and 
causing it to lack money for operating costs.  
All sides agreed that the sewage plant was not working. A spokesman for the United 
States Agency for International Development, which is overseeing the work, said that 
violence and other problems in Iraq had delayed the project but that it would be 
completed by February.  
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The four big smokestacks at the Doura power plant in Baghdad have always served as 
subversive truth-tellers. No matter what Saddam Hussein's propagandists said about 
electricity supplies, people knew they could get a better idea of the coming day's 
power by counting how many stacks at Doura were spewing smoke.  
Mr. Hussein is vanquished and a new Iraqi government has just gained formal 
sovereignty, but those smokestacks remain potent markers -- not only of sporadic 
electricity service but of the agonizingly slow pace of Iraq's promised economic 
renewal.  
More than a year into an aid effort that American officials likened to the Marshall 
Plan, occupation authorities acknowledge that fewer than 140 of 2,300 promised 
construction projects are under way. Only three months after L. Paul Bremer III, the 
American administrator who departed Monday, pledged that 50,000 Iraqis would find 
jobs at construction sites before the formal transfer of sovereignty, fewer than 20,000 
local workers are employed.  
Inside the high-profile Doura plant, American-financed repairs, originally scheduled 
to be completed by June 1, have dragged into the summer even as the demand for 
electricity soars and residents suffer through nightly power failures.  
At the same time, an economy that is supposed to become a beacon of free enterprise 
remains warped by central controls and huge subsidies for energy and food, leaving 
politically explosive policy choices for the fledgling Iraqi government.  
While the interim government has formally taken office, the reconstruction effort -- 
involving everything from building electric and sewage plants to training police 
officers and judges -- is only beginning.  
Scrambling to speed up the process, the Pentagon has recently begun pumping out 
long-awaited money and work orders, committing $1.4 billion in just the last week 
even as a spreading insurgency cripples the ability of Western contractors to oversee 
their projects and has made targets of Iraqi workers.  
American authorities, while admitting to a slow start and more aware than anyone of 
the security threat, insist that the rebuilding will proceed. ''Some of the power plants 
may get blown up,'' David J. Nash, the retired rear admiral who directs the American 
building program, said in an interview last week. ''But we're not going to stop.''  
Of the $9 billion in contracts the Pentagon has issued so far, only $5.2 billion has 
actually been nailed down for defined tasks. Most of those projects are still in 
planning stages, though officials insist that the rebuilding effort will soon flower.  
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From the outset the designing of projects and awarding of billions of dollars in 
contracts proved slower than some officials had imagined.  
Among other things, planning, oversight and competitive procedures were tightened 
after some of the earliest postwar contracts, awarded without competition to 
companies including Halliburton, were tainted by evidence of waste and 
overcharging.  
But even more, the glowing economic promises met the realities of Iraq. Decades of 
neglect, sanctions and war left the country's physical infrastructure in far worse 
condition than many expected. And as an anti-American uprising gained force, the 
reconstruction effort became a prime target, with oil pipes and power lines blown up 
as soon as they were repaired and Iraqi workers put in fear of retribution.  
From the start, refurbishing Iraq's dismal infrastructure and creating a thriving market 
economy were promoted by Bush administration officials as pillars of the American-
led invasion -- ''the perfect complement to Iraq's political transformation,'' in the 
words of Mr. Bremer.  
But more than a year later, supplies of electricity and water are no better for most 
Iraqis, and in some cases are worse, than they were before the invasion in the spring 
of 2003.  
Repairs of three giant wastewater treatment plants in Baghdad, for example, are 
weeks or months behind, while water supply systems in the south of the country are 
months or even years away from functioning properly. Unrepaired bridges continue to 
create monstrous bottlenecks in many parts of the country.  
For Iraqis, the delays have bred frustration and anger. Recent interviews in the 
upscale Baghdad neighborhood of Harethiya suggest that the electricity woes have, 
among other things, created a nation of insomniacs, sweltering in their apartments 
through oppressive nights.  
''We are so tired because of the electricity,'' said Abdul Razzaq, owner of a sundries 
shop, who said that to top it off, business was down so much that it was hard to pay 
for private generators.  
Just down the street, Samir Ibraheem said security problems forced him to close his 
shop, which has good air-conditioning, early each night. ''The problem is at my house, 
when I sleep at night,'' he said.  
In less prosperous areas, sorry infrastructure is even more dispiriting. On Sunday a 
local paper reported that new sewage flooding in five poorer neighborhoods of eastern 
and western Baghdad was raising serious fears of disease.  
Mais Khalid, 20, a student at Baghdad University who lives with her family in Al 
Elfain, a neighborhood in the southwestern part of the city, said a river of sewage 
entered her home whenever the door was opened. She traces the problem to a lack of 
electricity to run the pumps that keep sewer lines clear.  
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In perhaps the greatest technical success, oil exports have been restored to their 
prewar levels, bringing in money that will pay the national budget. But attacks shut 
down pipelines in the last two weeks, and exports are only partly restored.  
One clear improvement is in telephone service, but an annoying patchwork system 
does not allow mobile phones from one part of the country to communicate easily 
with those in other parts.  
The rebuilding effort is supposed to receive a total of some $24 billion in American 
grants and eventually some $13 billion in international loans. The United States 
military has already dispensed several additional billions, from oil revenue and seized 
Iraqi assets, for emergency repairs and small community projects such as renovating 
schools.  
The bulk of the aid was provided in a special Congressional appropriation last fall of 
$18.4 billion in grant money. Three months ago, mindful of rising Iraqi frustration 
over the slow pace of change, Mr. Bremer made lavish promises that have only partly 
been met.  
''Now the contracts are signed, and in the coming weeks the dirt will begin to fly on 
construction jobs all over Iraq,'' he announced on March 29. By the end of June, he 
said, ''50,000 Iraqis will be working on jobs funded by the partnership for prosperity. 
But this is just the beginning.''  
But by this week, only about half of the $18.4 billion had been allocated to 
contractors, and little of the work was visible.  
Construction has been debilitated by bombings and shootings of Western contractors 
and Iraqi workers, shortages of materials and poor planning. Many contractors have 
recently had to devote 20 percent or more of their money to armed security instead of 
building materials and to curb their oversight of subcontractors in the field, even 
evacuating workers for long stretches.  
Because of safety fears, the last Western engineers fled the Doura plant a week ago, 
leaving disassembled machines on the enormous plant floor. The engineers were from 
the Siemens Company of Germany, working on a subcontract with American 
financing.  
''They didn't contact me,'' said Bashir Khalif Omir, the plant's director. ''They took 
their luggage at midnight and they left.''  
But the transfer of sovereignty has given Mr. Omir new hopes. Because Iraqis now 
ultimately call the shots on the work, Mr. Omir said, insurgents will no longer have so 
much reason to attack building projects and their workers.  
Whether the rebels will make this distinction remains to be seen. In the meantime, the 
transfer opens new uncertainties. Will the new Iraqi government alter spending 
priorities, and how much power will it exert over American money? Will corruption 
rise as Iraqi ministries assert more influence on the subcontracting of American 
billions?  
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Will American decision-making be crippled by bureaucratic rivalries as the State 
Department takes over many functions from the Pentagon?  
The construction office that Admiral Nash heads, until now a strictly Pentagon 
operation, has been split into two entities, a strategy office reporting to State and an 
implementing one reporting to the Defense Department. Admiral Nash has been 
appointed head of both.  
''We're still a little unclear about who we will have to interface with on a daily basis,'' 
said James Cartner, vice president for Iraq operations for Fluor, a major contractor.  
On the broader question of reshaping Iraq's economy, the occupation made limited 
progress but left some of the most politically tough decisions to the Iraqis.  
The new government will inherit a new currency, a renewed banking system and, in 
measures that were pushed hard by a conservative Republican administration, low 
taxes and tariffs and a law permitting unhindered foreign investment in non-oil sectors 
of the economy.  
But American officials, fearful of fanning more unrest, put off what economists say 
are crucial steps toward a functioning market economy and an end to rampant 
smuggling. They have not carried out plans to phase out Iraq's huge subsidies for fuel 
and electricity and to end the dependency of a majority of Iraqis on handouts of 
imported food.  
''It's hard to make the economy start working with such irrational prices,'' said Keith 
Crane, an economist at the RAND Corporation who advised the Coalition Provisional 
Authority last year. ''And in the long run it doesn't make sense to build refineries so 
they can sell gas for three cents a liter.''  
The insurgency has been an obvious source of construction delays. But critics, 
including some Americans who spent frustrating months in Baghdad, also say the 
Pentagon's approach to economic restoration was flawed from the outset -- seen too 
much as a bricks and mortar task and in isolation from the country's political and 
social wounds.  
In the initial months of the American occupation, the hard-earned lessons of earlier 
nation-building campaigns by the United States and the United Nations in places like 
Bosnia, Afghanistan and East Timor were ignored by Pentagon planners, who tried to 
rush ahead with showcase infrastructure projects before securing public safety and a 
sense of participation, critics say.  
''We mostly did what we know how to do, instead of what needed to be done,'' said 
James Dobbins, a retired diplomat who led American recovery efforts in Afghanistan, 
Kosovo, Bosnia and elsewhere and said it was a mistake to put the Pentagon in charge 
of Iraq's economy. ''That's what the Army Corps of Engineers does: it hires 
multinational corporations to build infrastructure.''  
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Critics like Mr. Dobbins, who has not worked in Iraq but was President Bush's envoy 
to Afghanistan after the American invasion there, say many of the problems should 
have been foreseen.  
''What the Iraqis needed was security, and with that they could get their electricity 
back on themselves,'' said Mr. Dobbins, who is now with the Rand Corporation and is 
chief author of a 2003 study, ''America's Role in Nation-Building From Germany to 
Iraq.''  
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Across the hardscrabble Iraqi countryside, dozens of modest construction initiatives, 
many so tiny and inexpensive that they could be called microprojects, are generating 
at least a taste of the good will that Congress envisioned when it approved billions of 
dollars for grandiose rebuilding plans that have mostly been delayed.  
Typical of the little projects is a hole in the ground that was being dug last week by an 
ungainly contraption, chugging along with big, spinning wheels and an enormous 
weight that smacked the muddy earth again and again outside the isolated village of 
Khazna, south of Mosul.  
The machine was gouging out a well as part of a civil reconstruction program led by 
American military forces stationed here in the north of Iraq, financed mostly by Iraqi 
oil revenues.  
As a convoy of big armored vehicles picked their way, rut by rut, over the village's 
zigzagging lanes toward the well, the dubious scene easily evoked the skepticism that 
has dogged the rebuilding effort all over the country.  
But then a villager named Rabaa Saleh, standing among the swarms of children who 
had run out to meet the vehicles, gave his view of the proceedings.  
''It makes people think good things are on the way,'' Mr. Saleh said through a 
translator. ''When this well is done, each time somebody takes a drink of water they 
will say the Americans did something good.''  
Still, while local citizens like Mr. Saleh say they appreciate the work and are willing 
to credit Americans for paying for it, they often do not want to see Western faces at 
the projects themselves, fearing terrorist attacks and general hostility from ordinary 
Iraqis. At a ribbon-cutting for a major school renovation in Mosul on that same 
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morning, the city's education director refused to invite the American officers who had 
financed the project.  
The man digging the well in Khazna was a Syrian Kurd subcontractor. That project 
will cost the United States Army just $35,000 and affect no more than a couple of 
hundred lives in a dusty village that has never had its own well.  
It is hardly a match for the ambitious program of $18.4 billion approved by Congress 
last fall for rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure, money funneled largely through 
nonmilitary government agencies and major American contractors.  
But for various reasons, ranging from the lack of security in Iraq to bureaucratic red 
tape, the projects in that huge pot of money have taken so much longer to begin than 
initially promised that Iraqis -- those who have heard about the work at all -- often 
have a hard time believing that they will ever really happen.  
Around Mosul and elsewhere in Iraq, the American military, whether through wisdom 
or sheer luck, has hit upon an approach that seems able to overcome that skepticism, 
at least locally.  
From building a new soil laboratory to making improvements at a famous 
archaeological site to repairing a single elevator in a hospital, the projects are all 
small, fast and undertaken in response to a highly specific need identified by local 
Iraqis.  
The army here is working on dozens of projects, using about $20 million in financing, 
although that number constantly shifts as new sources of money are identified. Until 
the new Iraqi government took over on June 28, for example, the projects were 
financed from Iraqi oil revenues, and some of that money is still being spent. A little 
over $5 million, from the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid program, is 
being split among 113 projects involving water supplies, sewers, wells and clinics.  
The approach may be generating some of the good will that has been so elusive for 
America and its allies in a nation based on identification with neighborhood and clan. 
The results also come with the uncomfortable suggestion that the expensive 
rebuilding plan approved by Congress may never have the impact that lawmakers 
envisioned when they appropriated so much money.  
''At the end of the day, it is about the small things that touch people's lives,'' said 
Nesreen M. Siddeek Berwari, the minister of municipalities and public works in the 
new Iraqi government. ''The big billions number that has been mentioned doesn't 
mean much.''  
That sentiment certainly seems to hold true at the Nimrud archaeological site, south of 
Mosul, where a $28,000 grant to refurbish what remains of an ancient Assyrian 
capital has brought it several steps back from garbage-strewn chaos, said Muzamim 
Mahmoud, director of the Mosul museum and antiquities director for the province.  
Walking proudly among the ancient chambers lined with huge bas-reliefs of kings and 
servants and bird-headed gods, Mr. Mahmoud said foreign tourists had visited 
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Nimrud as recently as 2002. But looting after the American-led invasion last year left 
behind an abandoned place with little more than heavy carved stones to mark the 
glory that once inhabited this spot.  
The money let Mr. Mahmoud rehabilitate the gate and guardhouse -- now manned by 
Iraqi security officers -- and clean up the entire site and make major repairs on a 
trailer used by archaeologists during their digs. Now there are even little pitched 
sheet-metal roofs over the carvings to protect them from erosion as Mr. Mahmoud 
seeks new international donors for permanent facilities.  
''Step by step they need to repair the site for tourists,'' Mr. Mahmoud said, ''and this 
amount of money comes just in time.''  
Projects in such isolated locations, across a dusty countryside that is still troubled by 
killings, bombings and mortar attacks, also illustrate the relative ease with which 
military forces can move about in the kind of territory that Western civilian 
contractors have often fled, leaving their work unfinished.  
Approvals for the projects can take from a few days to a few weeks, said Maj. Wayne 
Bowen, a history professor at Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Ark., and a 
reservist who is overseeing projects that touch on higher education.  
But with that speed comes a great reliance on the judgment of the Iraqis. Most 
proposals have been well considered, Major Bowen said, but there have been a few 
clinkers, like the time a university professor requested money to buy a pistol.  
The informality of the process was evident during a visit by Maj. Glenn Mundt to a 
project intended to erect 31 electrical transmission towers as part of a plan to bring 
power down from Turkey. Led by Khalaf Dahan Hamoud, chief engineer at the 
Rashidiya substation near Mosul, the project was ahead of schedule.  
Standing next to a half-assembled tower on a remote hill, Mr. Hamoud casually 
mentioned a much larger project that would restore a huge electrical loop in the north 
that had been severed years ago.  
''Can you give me that project by Tuesday?'' Major Mundt said. ''Approximately. 
Within a couple of million dollars.''  
Mr. Hamoud, looking surprised, pointed out again that it was a much larger project 
than the one he was about to complete.  
''Just come up with a basic scope of work,'' Major Mundt said, ''and I'll push it down 
to Baghdad.''  
It was an exchange that the officials in charge of the Congressionally earmarked $18.4 
billion could only dream about.  
''We have to follow United States contracting laws and procedures,'' said John Procter, 
a spokesman for the Project and Contracting Office, which is affiliated with the 
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Pentagon and the State Department and is adminstering the Congressional money. 
''That's where I think some of the frustration is coming from.''  
Even so, some of the oil money was parceled out by the contracting office in a 
program called the accelerated Iraq reconstruction effort, and $500,000 of that money 
worked its way through the northern military authorities and into a project to 
rehabilitate the main terminal at the Mosul airport.  
Amid the pounding of hammers and the bustle of workers tearing down a stained old 
drop ceiling, the assistant manager of the airport, who asked to be identified only as 
General Muhammad, said there was a $10 million to $20 million project afoot to 
restore the entire airfield. But that money would come from Congress, and there had 
been no sign of it.  
''There is no bureaucratic channel,'' General Muhammad said of the $500,000 in 
accelerated money. ''It will be quick.''  
General Muhammad, who asked that no pictures be taken of his face, referred to 
himself as ''invisible,'' clearly another reference to the dangers of being identified as a 
recipient of American money.  
But for all those concerns, the projects are rolling forward, even where the strange 
contrivance was pounding away at the ground next to the village of Khazna. The 
technician who was running the machine, a Syrian Kurd named Khalid Esa, said he 
was within 15 feet of water.  
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They blew up the bridge on the road from Hilla two weeks ago. That act of sabotage 
has kept some workers -- including a daily bus load of about a dozen Iraqi widows -- 
from coming to their jobs in this dust-choked town 60 miles southeast of Baghdad, 
where $100 million in American money is being used to rebuild a decrepit and looted 
base for the Iraqi Army.  
But to hear the engineers who are leading this project tell it, the threat of the kind of 
violence that has slowed or stopped reconstruction projects around the country will 
not keep this base from being delivered on schedule sometime this month.  
''Inshalla, the 15th,'' said Maria Bock, an engineering technician, pronouncing the 
Arabic word for ''God willing'' in her native West Virginia accent.  
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It is an invocation that is surely becoming more tempting by the day for engineers 
working on civil rebuilding projects -- from huge power and water-treatment plants to 
streets, sewers and sidewalks -- who have increasingly become the target of attacks. 
The resulting delays have raised new questions about whether the enormously 
expensive rebuilding plan will ever lift the quality of life here enough to persuade 
ordinary Iraqis of America's good intentions and help create a stable nation.  
Just last Sunday, a group of civil engineers and other contractors were ambushed 
while returning from work at the Taji power plant north of Baghdad. Two Iraqis were 
killed and the project, delayed because of security fears, is likely to fall even further 
behind.  
Three days before that, gunmen killed two Russian technicians on their way to the 
critical Dura power plant in south Baghdad, and their company reportedly pulled out 
of Iraq. Now the plant limps along with only part of its equipment in service. At 
various other projects in recent months there have been Bonnie and Clyde-style 
shootouts involving engineers, their security forces and the insurgents, as well as 
death threats issued to Iraqi subcontractors working with Americans.  
''It's very hard to focus on second-level-of-importance things such as getting the 
project executed on time while you're worried about your own life,'' said George J. 
Tamaro, a member of the National Academy of Engineering in the United States, 
whose company has built a number of complex projects around the world.  
But even the assertion that security problems are the cause of the occupation's 
problems has become controversial. Ghazwan al-Mukhtar, an American-trained Iraqi 
electrical engineer in Baghdad, said security had become a convenient excuse for 
deeper failures.  
''Saddam Hussein used to tell us everything that is bad is because of the sanctions,'' 
Mr. Mukhtar said, ''and now the Americans are telling us that everything bad is 
because of the security situation.''  
A banking, roaring, tree top-level tour in a Black Hawk military helicopter to two 
rebuilding projects in central and southern Iraq on Wednesday revealed a complicated 
landscape of progress and delay, with no simple formula for winning back the 
confidence of ordinary Iraqis.  
In the vastness of the desert, the hundred or so large buildings being worked on at the 
military base, from barracks to a water-treatment plant to an ornate mosque, seem 
toylike when seen from overhead. On the ground, where tan-shirted Iraqi security 
forces are down on one knee, pointing their guns with strange precision into the hazy 
distance, the magnitude of the challenge on the military base here becomes clearer.  
Construction was started under Mr. Hussein in 1987 and abandoned a few years later. 
The buildings were looted of everything but their concrete shells after the invasion 
last year. Officials of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, which is financing 
the project and arranged the helicopter trip, are diplomatic enough not to blame local 
Iraqis for the looting. But Ms. Bock explains delicately that the base saved some 
money by buying back the old fire escapes.  
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''It was cheaper than ordering it new,'' she said.  
The situation could have been volatile, but Wes Walker, the Corps of Engineers' 
resident engineer, arranged meetings with local sheiks and was careful to learn the 
social customs of the region.  
''Sometimes I joke, 'Wes, you are from Amara,' '' said Abdullah A. Aljiburi, an 
engineer from Hilla -- both are major cities south of Baghdad -- who operates one of 
17 Iraqi subcontractors on the project.  
As this project nears completion, Mr. Walker denies that the destruction of the bridge 
carries any particular significance, but Mr. Aljiburi concedes that at least a few of his 
own workers were frightened away by the dangers of working with Americans.  
Across another hundred miles of desert to the south, at Nasiriya, the problem was 
much more severe during the height of the insurgency in April. As few as 10 percent 
of the Iraqi workers showed up at a project to upgrade a major power plant, and Iraqi 
contractors received death threats.  
''We've had threats -- a mob scene,'' said Col. Thomas L. Koning, an engineer who is 
commander of Iraq's southern district for the Corps of Engineers. ''They threatened to 
march on the plant.''  
But that scene died down, and Iraqi subcontractors were able to find more workers 
and get the project moving again. Now Ahmed Kadhum Muhsin, a diver who has 
been working to clear debris from deep in the bowels of the plant's cooling system, 
says he has no concerns about what other Iraqis think about his job.  
His biggest fear now, Mr. Muhsin said, is that he can barely see anything when he is 
near the bottom of the murky cooling reservoirs, which are fed by the placid 
Euphrates River, running directly past the plant. 
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On a garbage-strewn street of the embattled Baghdad slum of Sadr City, there is an 
unusual outpost of American might.  
Comprising a huge ditch, two backhoes and a score of Iraqi laborers, this vanguard 
operation, in a stronghold of the rebel cleric Moktada al-Sadr, is undertaking the 
repair of a cracked sewage line that pours rivers of slime into nearby homes.  
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The American Army contracted for the project, but the work is being done by an Iraqi 
firm under the glare of posters of Mr. Sadr -- and by the grace of the young Shiite 
cleric's freely roaming soldiers, who have apparently concluded that the benefits for 
the people may outweigh the pleasure of blasting an American-run operation.  
It is hard to compare this modest project with the other, more menacing thrust of 
American power into sprawling Sadr City, the tanks and bristling Humvees that prowl 
the main roads or sit at major intersections and are often slammed by rocket-propelled 
grenades or buried explosives.  
But for the military here, civil affairs programs, though a common ingredient of 
foreign operations at least since Vietnam, have become a near obsession as Iraq 
prepares for elections in January that, the Americans hope, will seat a popular 
government.  
How much good will, let alone allegiance, can be won with money and bricks, 
especially in hostile zones like Sadr City, remains to be seen.  
The Army commander for Baghdad, Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli of the First Cavalry 
Division, outlined his best case: ''If you make Sadr City look wonderful, you're still 
going to have 2 percent of the people who want to kill us. We need to kill or capture 
them. But we also need to make sure they don't have the support of the rest of the 
people.''  
After the American-led invasion in 2003, with trumpeted promises of tens of billions 
of dollars in aid, many Iraqis and not a few American officials had pipe dreams of a 
miraculously transformed landscape. Among Iraqis, those dreams have given way to 
anger as essential services like electricity and water remain spotty, lawlessness and 
violence swirl and jobs remain scarce.  
The huge hundred-million-dollar projects, using multinational corporations to rebuild 
power and sewage plants and bridges, have gathered steam slowly and have been 
hampered by security threats, but they are now proceeding on a crash basis.  
Within that large-scale infrastructure program, allotted $18.4 billion by Congress, 
visible work was under way at 262 sites around the country as of last weekend. But 
ground will be broken on 1,000 by the end of the year, said Amy Burns, a 
spokeswoman for the Project Contracting Office.  
Still, the myriad smaller local projects run by the military, including repairs of pipes 
and power lines from the household level up, can touch more lives more quickly.  
Around much of Iraq now, in thousands of small efforts to repair services, build 
schools and clinics and soccer fields and, above all, give jobs to young men, 
American commanders hope to blunt the popular hostility toward an occupation that 
many Iraqis say has brought more miseries than rewards.  
''This is force protection,'' General Chiarelli said of the hundreds of projects his 
division has nurtured throughout Baghdad. ''It's the one way I have, other than 
shooting someone, to get him to stop shooting at me.''  
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''We're really good at going out and breaking things,'' the general said. ''But the day I 
get to spend more time here working on construction rather than combat, that will be a 
very good day.''  
This week, pursuing a similar strategy in Sadr City, where official agencies have been 
afraid to operate, the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, dangled the prospect of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in construction aid if local leaders would sideline Mr. 
Sadr and his militia.  
In that dismal Baghdad neighborhood, which houses more than 2.5 million Shiite 
Muslims, the Army-sponsored sewage repair is one of only a handful the Americans 
have been able to start. Alluding to the continuing tensions, an Army spokesman said 
construction work in Sadr City was ''very limited due to current activities.''  
Ayed Hussein, who with his white turban and graying beard looked older than his 38 
years, is a local resident hired as a pipe fitter on the sewage project.  
''The people appreciate this work,'' Mr. Hussein said, speaking as the contractor's 
foreman hovered. ''It's for them.'' He said that about half the neighborhood supported 
Mr. Sadr.  
In a sign of who controls the area, a captain from Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army appeared, 
unarmed, within minutes of a recent visitor's arrival. A conversation with the captain, 
Raad Muhammad, 30, revealed the contradictory impulses that confront the American 
occupation.  
''This is a great project,'' Mr. Muhammad said. ''It's good for the people here.''  
''But the Americans say they are spending on us when they are really spending Iraqi 
oil money,'' he added, rather accurately in this case at least, since many smaller 
projects have been financed with oil revenues that were dispensed by the occupation 
authority last spring.  
''If the Americans offer to pay us $1,000 a day but Moktada al-Sadr says don't take it, 
we'd refuse,'' Mr. Muhammad said. ''The Americans come in here and kill innocent 
people. They should just stay in their own place.''  
In Baghdad's southern district of Al Rashid, where the insurgency has been 
comparatively mild and the ethnically mixed population seems more receptive to the 
Americans, the building projects are much further along.  
There, too, Army troops can only move in full battle gear. But children wave and grab 
at them gaily and officers have forged ties with local tribal sheiks, imams and other 
community leaders.  
The effort is led by battalion commanders who have enthusiastically embraced their 
dual mission, each prosecuting military operations in their sectors even as they work 
with fledgling neighborhood councils on development.  
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Lt. Col. Bill Salter is commander of the First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, a legendary 
unit whose battle early in the Vietnam War formed the basis for the book and movie 
''We Were Soldiers Once and Young.''  
''We're still soldiers,'' Colonel Salter said during a bristling Humvee tour of Al Rashid, 
noting that his unit still faces nightly encounters. ''But now I've also learned how to 
replicate the sewage lines for an entire community.''  
In a move symbolic as well as practical, a former headquarters of Saddam Hussein's 
Republican Guard has been converted into a shiny medical clinic. It will be unveiled 
by the Iraqi Ministry of Health later this month in an effort to strengthen the political 
standing of Dr. Allawi's interim government.  
In a long-neglected farming village south of Baghdad, the battalion is replacing fetid 
open trenches with sewage pipes, connecting each home to a feeder line and building 
a small treatment plant.  
Colonel Salter stopped to chat with a nearly toothless elderly man, reassuring him that 
the antifreeze-green stream flowing past his door, through which children splash 
recklessly, will eventually disappear.  
Lt. Col. Michael Baumann commands the First Battalion, 21st Field Artillery, which 
has found its big guns useless here.  
''The civil affairs work is my No.1 weapon,'' he said. ''In terms of my experience and 
training, this job is pretty complex. Every day in Iraq, I've had to bring to bear a 
whole life's experiences.''  
Empowering Iraqis to take over government and security is a major goal. Colonel 
Baumann stopped by the new neighborhood committee office to speak with the 
chairman, Hamza Kadhum, a former local businessman. Mr. Kadhum, for his part, 
brandished a threatening letter he received 10 days before.  
''You are an agent for the Americans who sold out his religion and his country and 
shook hands with the infidels,'' the letter reads.  
Mr. Kadhum has a bodyguard and the offices are protected by newly trained 
government security agents -- another small step forward, the Army believes.  
Among dozens of initiatives in Al Rashid, many carried out in cooperation with the 
Agency for International Development or private aid groups, the Army started a 
women's sewing factory. Then they gave it a big contract: producing 25,000 
knapsacks to be handed to students before school reopens this month.  
Colonel Baumann smiled for more than one reason as he was rushed by merry 
children outside a newly refurbished grade school: when attackers are lurking, the 
streets become eerily empty.  
''You know it's safe when the kids crowd around you,'' he said.  
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For the second day since a truce was declared between militiamen loyal to a rebel 
Shiite cleric, Moktada al-Sadr, and American soldiers, clashes erupted Saturday in 
Kufa, near Najaf. Again, each side said the other had caused the violence.  
[Three United States marines were killed Saturday in Al Anbar Province, in the 
western part of Iraq, the American military said Sunday. The deaths of three marines, 
assigned to the First Marine Expeditionary Force, brought to more than 800 the 
number of American servicemen and women who have died since the start of the 
American-led invasion of Iraq last March, according to Pentagon figures.  
[The military said the marines were ''conducting security and stability operations'' 
when they were killed. No other information was immediately available.]  
An aide to Mr. Sadr, Ahmed Shaibani, said heavy fighting erupted after American 
troops advanced into Kufa from three directions, and on news that Iraqi policemen 
from outside Najaf were being sent in.  
''Our fighters do not deploy in the streets unless there is an escalation from the 
American side,'' he said.  
Mr. Shaibani called the fighting an ''American attempt to violate the truce, or to 
provoke the Mahdi Army to deploy its forces and appear to the world as if they have 
not stopped carrying weapons.''  
But an American military spokeswoman said fighters with Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army 
fired rocket-propelled grenades at an American patrol east of Kufa on Saturday 
morning. ''The patrol returned fire, killing the attackers,'' she said.  
She gave no numbers for the Iraqi dead and said there were no reports of American 
casualties.  
Local hospital officials said a number of rebels were wounded.  
On Friday, at least five militiamen were killed after fighting broke out. While the 
fresh violence has raised doubts about the durability of the truce, neither side has 
officially abandoned it.  
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Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the chief American military spokesman, had said on Friday 
that the clashes ''appear to be violations'' of the truce, but he said it could be a few 
days before the cease-fire took hold.  
The truce, announced Thursday, appeared to be a major step toward ending a seven-
week uprising that has included battles around some of Shiite Islam's holiest shrines.  
The deal requires militiamen who are not from Najaf or Kufa to leave, and those who 
are from the two cities to hide their weapons. It says nothing about asking Mr. Sadr to 
surrender to the authorities, even though an Iraqi judge has issued an arrest warrant 
for him related to the murder last year in Najaf of a cleric backed by the Americans.  
Iraqis in Kufa and Najaf said the Sadr fighters were back on the streets, armed with 
AK-47's and grenade launchers.  
The expected arrival of Iraqi police officers from outside Najaf, a city considered holy 
by Shiites, was an aggressive move by the American side, Mr. Shaibani said.  
''This force represents the American military,'' he said.  
The Iraqi police have been repeatedly attacked by rebels who see them as allied with 
the occupation.  
Mr. Shaibani said the militia fighters had attacked a helicopter, tanks and a Humvee, 
and Mahdi Army members said that they had killed one police officer and captured 
another. There was no confirmation from Iraqi or American sources. 
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An uneasy peace settled on this city on Friday as guerrillas loyal to the insurgent 
cleric Moktada al-Sadr streamed out of the Imam Ali Shrine before a cordon of 
American troops, ceding control of the Shiite holy site to the mainstream religious 
leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and appearing to end a bloody three-week 
standoff that left much of the area in ruins.  
The surrender of the shrine, carried out under the terms of a peace deal struck by the 
two clerics the night before, unfolded in a theatrical fashion at 8:30 a.m., after an 
urgent appeal by Mr. Sadr.  
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With thousands of civilians having poured into the shrine from all over Iraq, some of 
them weeping and kissing the walls of the damaged building, the insurgents who had 
commandeered the holy site for nearly a month joined the departing pilgrims and 
headed out through its vaulting gates.  
''In the name of Allah, my brothers in the Mahdi Army, I beg you, if civilians are in 
the shrine, leave with them, and leave your guns behind,'' intoned a voice from the 
shrine's loudspeaker, reading a message from Mr. Sadr. ''This is an order that you 
must obey.''  
With that, the fighters, many of them hollow-eyed and hunted-looking after days 
under fire, walked into the streets and left the city, moving through what appeared to 
be an agreed-upon exit route. Others simply hung about, boasting of what they told 
themselves was an epic stand against the American Army.  
They stood in a scene of devastation. Hotels had crumbled into the street. Cars lay 
blackened and twisted where they had been hit. Goats and donkeys lay dead on the 
sidewalks. Pilgrims from out of town and locals coming from home walked the streets 
agape, shaking their heads, stunned by the devastation before them.  
As the Mahdi Army fighters did not surrender themselves, neither did they give up 
their guns. Instead, they took the assault rifles and rocket launchers with which they 
had commandeered the shrine and loaded them onto donkey carts, covering them with 
blankets, grain sacks and television sets, and sending them away.  
Hours later, Mahdi fighters, some still dressed in their signature black uniforms, could 
be seen stashing rocket launchers in crates and pushing them into roadside shops.  
As the fighters streamed out of the city, the American troops who had fought their 
way to within 75 yards of the shrine in some of the war's most ferocious fighting kept 
their distance, neither shooting the militiamen nor arresting them. American 
commanders said they were under orders to arrest no one, least of all the Mahdi 
insurgents.  
Later in the day, obviously tipped off about a cache of guns, a platoon of American 
troops rumbled up Rasool Street to the gates of the shrine and began searching 
sidewalks and cars.  
Aides to Ayatollah Sistani, who brokered the peace agreement upon returning to the 
city on Thursday, moved into the shrine early Friday and told Mr. Sadr's men that 
they were in charge.  
''We are taking over the shrine,'' one of Ayatollah Sistani's senior clerics said. ''We 
will not be making another comment.''  
By early evening here, aides to the ayatollah were fully in control of the shrine itself. 
The Iraqi police, backed by American troops and tanks, converged on the area around 
the shrine, with the Americans moving to within 75 yards and then dropping back.  
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The reassertion of Iraqi government control, symbolized by the entry of the police, 
was one of the crucial demands made by Ayatollah Sistani of Mr. Sadr.  
The agreement also calls for the Mahdi Army to withdraw from neighboring Kufa, for 
American forces to pull out of Najaf and for the Iraqi government to compensate 
Iraqis for losses sustained during the fighting.  
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell praised the peace agreement, saying it 
demonstrated the new working relationship between the United States and the Iraqi 
government. American military pressure, he said in an interview on Fox News Radio, 
''shaped this situation to the point where the leadership of the Iraqi interim 
government, working with the Ayatollah Sistani, could bring about a resolution that 
did not require troops to go into that mosque.''  
The Mahdi Army fighters streamed out of the shrine Friday morning in various states 
of physical and emotional distress. One fighter, with a comrade on each side, limped 
out, bloodied and wearing a bandage on his right hand. Another fighter, dead for some 
time, was carried out on a stretcher.  
Some of the young men seemed visibly reduced by the siege. And after three weeks of 
relentless Americans assaults, the number of Mahdi Army fighters in Najaf's Old City 
had fallen to just a few hundred from several thousand.  
But for most of the Mahdi fighters still standing, morale seemed undiminished. In 
their days battling the Americans, they had constructed their own mythic tale about 
themselves, as the stalwart defenders of the shrine against a foreign army and its local 
satraps. It mattered little that they were vacating the place they had sought to defend 
or that the city had been destroyed in the event.  
''Today is a victory,'' said Arkan Rahim, a 30-year-old Mahdi fighter, standing amid 
the wreckage near the shrine. ''We didn't surrender the shrine to the Americans, the 
biggest army in the world. We didn't surrender it to the Iraqi police. We protected it 
for our religious leaders.''  
It was clear, from a sampling of the opinions of people milling in and around the 
shrine today, that many Iraqis rejected that view.  
''I blame Moktada al-Sadr for what happened here, and the Iraqi government, too,'' 
said an old Iraqi man, identifying himself as Abu Muhammad, who had traveled from 
the city of Kut to show his support for Ayatollah Sistani. ''We, the simple people, are 
paying for their mistakes.''  
Mr. Muhammad seemed to speak for many Iraqis here, who in dozens of interviews 
over the last several days denounced not only Mr. Sadr but the Iraqi prime minister, 
Ayad Allawi, as well. With their homes and businesses in ruins, it seemed for many 
Iraqis that most of Iraqi's new leaders had failed.  
''Look at all the damage,'' an Iraqi man said to a friend as he walked down a street 
whose every building had been broken and crushed. ''Let God take revenge on the 
Americans for this.''  
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While the militiamen began heading home, the larger mystery seemed to be the 
commitment of Mr. Sadr. The upstart cleric began his latest uprising on Aug. 5, when 
his men attacked a Najaf police station after the arrest of one of his aides. The August 
uprising was his second; in April, he called on his followers to expel the Americans 
after the closing of his newspaper.  
This time, as before, the Americans and the Iraqi government, fearing his surging 
popularity, allowed him and his followers to go free in exchange for a promise not to 
cause any more trouble.  
And this time, as before, Mr. Sadr's commitment to the peace deal he had signed 
seemed shaky at best. After his meeting with Ayatollah Sistani on Thursday night, 
Mr. Sadr dropped from view, making neither public appearances nor statements of 
support.  
On Friday, senior clerics around Ayatollah Sistani seemed determined to hold Mr. 
Sadr to his word, sharing with a reporter a copy of the peace deal he had signed the 
night before.  
''This agreement is by the order of the religious leadership,'' said a note signed by Mr. 
Sadr on the bottom of the agreement, ''and I am ready to obey all orders with all my 
respect.''  
Under the agreement, the Americans are to withdraw their forces from Najaf while 
Mr. Sadr's fighters are obliged to leave Najaf and the neighboring city of Kufa and 
promise not to come back. The Iraqi police will take control in both places, and the 
Iraqi government must pay compensation for the losses caused by the fighting. Mr. 
Sadr also agreed to cooperate in preparing for the country's first nationwide elections, 
to be held by Jan. 31.  
Indeed, the decision to allow Mr. Sadr to go free seemed to be based on the hope that 
the young leader, who commands a large following in Iraq's Shiite slums, could be 
coaxed into the political mainstream. So far, he has shown little interest in taking part 
in the fledgling democratic process that the Americans are trying to nurture here, 
rejecting an offer just a few weeks ago to join a national conference.  
For Iraqis, particularly those living or working in the vicinity of the shrine, the more 
immediate concern was to pick up the remnants of their old lives. While the wreckage 
inspired anger in many here, for others it prompted mainly despair. At a Najaf 
intersection, an Iraqi named Fadel Hejab spent much of the day trying to reassemble 
his livelihood: a small metal cart from which he sold light bulbs and electrical fixtures 
and parts.  
Somehow, the fighting had tossed Mr. Hejab's stand out into the street, blown it over 
and smashed it flat. Crouched over the mess, he paused to consider his future.  
''I will try to fix it and start again,'' he said. ''What else shall I do?''  
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American troops fought simultaneous battles on Tuesday with rebel Shiite militiamen 
in Najaf and the Baghdad slum of Sadr City. But American commanders, preparing 
new battle orders, appeared to have deferred for the time being any decision to mount 
full-scale assaults on the rebels, weighing the consequences for their wider aim of 
bringing stability to Iraq.  
On the sixth day since fighters loyal to the rebel Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr 
renewed their challenge to the American presence here, American units showed signs 
of rising impatience. In Najaf, loudspeakers atop patrolling Humvees urged residents 
to evacuate the city and warned Mr. Sadr's fighters to ''leave the city, or you will die.'' 
As night fell in Sadr City, tanks and attack helicopters moved into militia-controlled 
neighborhoods, and American attack jets and pilotless Predator drones patrolled 
overhead.  
Faced with the uprisings in Najaf and Sadr City, and rebel attacks in Basra and other 
southern cities, the new Iraqi-American hierarchy in Baghdad -- Prime Minister Ayad 
Allawi, Ambassador John D. Negroponte and Gen. George W. Casey, the military 
commander --appeared to have reached a watershed as critical as any since American 
troops toppled Saddam Hussein's government in April 2003.  
With elections planned by the end of January, many Americans and Iraqis here say 
that Mr. Sadr's challenge offers a difficult choice. Either it will have to be answered 
with force now, at the risk of igniting an explosion of anger among Iraq's majority 
Shiite population, or with negotiation as it was at the time of Mr. Sadr's last lengthy 
uprising in the spring, with consequences that could cause the election plans and 
much that lies beyond them to unravel.  
When he emerged from hiding on Monday to speak to reporters at Najaf's Imam Ali 
shrine, the holiest in Shiite Islam, Mr. Sadr rejected Dr. Allawi's urging over the 
weekend that he take part in the elections. Mr. Sadr said efforts to build a democracy 
in Iraq could begin only after American troops leave.  
Perhaps the biggest threat posed by the rebels, to shut down oil exports flowing from 
the country's richest southern oil fields, appeared to have receded for the moment with 
the announcement by the Oil Ministry in Baghdad that full production resumed on 
Tuesday after quick repairs to a pipeline that was blown up by saboteurs on Monday. 
An official said the two main export pipelines flowing to shipping terminals from oil 
fields near Basra were pumping again, though the risk of renewed rebel attacks 
remained high.  
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For days, American troops had avoided plunging into Sadr City, remaining mostly on 
the western rim of the sprawling district, pushing back militia bands threatening to 
break for the center of Baghdad, five miles away. It was not clear on Tuesday night 
how deep the new offensive had gone. But reporters returning from another day of 
skirmishes said practically all of Sadr City appeared to be under the effective control 
of militiamen who hide down side streets and alleys, promising a potential bloodbath 
in the event of any full-scale challenge from the Americans and Iraq's new security 
forces.  
In Najaf, American armor and helicopter gunships continued to attack around the vast 
cemetery that adjoins the Imam Ali shrine, now a base and armory for Mr. Sadr.  
Thunderous explosions were audible miles away, and black smoke curled into the sky 
after an American jet bombed an inner-city hotel 400 yards from the shrine that 
American officers said had been used as a firing point by the rebels. At a base 20 
miles away, senior Army and Marine officers, awaiting orders from Baghdad, met to 
plan a wider assault on the old town, a warren of alleyways and bazaars surrounding 
the ancient shrine where hundreds of militiamen have been reported to be holed up.  
American officers said the command in Baghdad was preparing to move another 
1,000 American troops into the city, on top of the 2,000 already available to 
commanders there, with a view to pressuring the rebels and adding punch to a new 
offensive. American forces planned attacks on the old city before, during Mr. Sadr's 
uprising in April. But they pulled back and signed a series of fragile truces with the 
cleric because of concern about the repercussions, among Iraq's 15 million Shiites, of 
damaging the Imam Ali shrine or of wounding or killing Mr. Sadr, a populist leader in 
his early 30's who is the scion of one of Iraq's most revered clerical dynasties.  
The officers who spoke of plans for a new offensive acknowledged privately that they 
hoped that the disclosure of the plans, and of the American troop reinforcements, 
would persuade Mr. Sadr to back down and disband his militia, known as the Mahdi 
Army. Another option discussed by some American officers -- using the fledgling 
Iraqi security forces to carry out an assault on the mosque, and keeping American 
troops back to blunt Shiite objections -- appeared to have been ruled out after 
American commanders concluded that the Iraqis fighting in Najaf have had trouble 
achieving minor combat objectives.  
Still, American commanders insisted that they were ready to press ahead if Mr. Sadr 
fails to surrender. ''All indications are that we are committed this time,'' said Lt. Col. 
Myles Miyamasu, who commands the First Battalion of the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, 
the Army unit that took over the fighting in the cemetery on Sunday, relieving units of 
the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. ''There's a will to win this fight. There are a lot of 
people we don't want to let down, including ourselves.''  
Mr. Sadr, who vowed Monday that he would fight ''to the last drop of my blood,'' 
showed his canny, mocking brand of politics when an aide in Baghdad announced that 
the Mahdi Army had declared a curfew across the capital, starting at 1 p.m. and 
ending at 8 p.m. the next day, beginning immediately and continuing until hostilities 
against Mr. Sadr's fighters end. A day earlier, American forces imposed an indefinite 
curfew on Sadr City, one of the cleric's strongholds, ordering the slum's two million 
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people off the streets from 4 p.m. to 8 a.m., the most stringent curfew in the 16 
months since American troops captured Baghdad.  
A representative of Mr. Sadr in Baghdad, Qais al-Khazali, called on ''all citizens, and 
especially employees'' to obey the curfew and remain at home during the curfew 
hours, and to support the militiamen in their fight against the Americans. In a 
statement broadcast on the Arabic-language television channel Al Arabiya, he 
renewed the militiamen's warnings to Iraqi police, soldiers and national guardsmen, 
saying they should refuse to ''assist the occupiers,'' or face reprisals.  
The Sadr curfew, and a video-taped warning from another Sadr-linked group of 
attacks on Iraqi government workers who report for duty, appeared aimed at crippling 
the capital's economy. American commanders have said that 15,000 jobs provided to 
Sadr City residents to work on $70 million in new sewer, water and electricity 
projects have been scuttled, at least for now, by the uprising in the slum.  
The rebels' call for a citywide curfew appeared to have an almost immediate effect. 
By late afternoon on Tuesday, a tour of half a dozen of the city's inner neighborhoods 
showed that traffic that has choked many streets since the American-led invasion last 
year was sharply down. Gas stations that have had long lines in recent weeks after 
rebel attacks on refineries, pipelines and road tankers were mostly empty, or closed. 
Many other businesses were shuttered, and those that were open said they were ready 
to shut at a moment's notice.  
For American commanders, one reason for mounting a full-scale offensive on Sadr 
City would be to curb attacks on Baghdad. Since the uprising in the spring, the United 
States command has concentrated mainly on containing the Sadr militiamen in the 
slum, not challenging their control there. But leaving Mr. Sadr's fighters free rein has 
meant that Sadr City has become a Shiite counterpart to Falluja, the Sunni Muslim 
city 35 miles west of Baghdad. Falluja has been under rebel control since a Marine 
offensive there was halted in the spring. As long as the two cities are under rebel 
control, they will pose a threat to any effort to achieve lasting stability in Baghdad.  
The threat from Sadr City has been underscored in recent days by repeated nighttime 
mortar and rocket volleys fired from somewhere in the vicinity of the slum and aimed 
at the International Zone, the newly renamed American command center in what used 
to be Mr. Hussein's Republican Palace compound.  
Americans officers have often mocked the errant marksmanship of the Iraqi rebels. 
But the volleys recently have become much heavier, sometimes as many as 30 heavy 
mortars and battlefield rockets in a night, and an increasing number of them have 
struck inside the secured zone, where the Americans and Dr. Allawi work. On 
Monday night, one shell hit and severely wounded the Iraqi interpreter for General 
Casey, the American military commander. American officials said the man was 
expected to survive.  
The American offensive that began Tuesday night appeared to have curbed the 
shelling.  
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In Najaf, the American appeal to residents to evacuate appeared to have prompted at 
least a partial exodus. An Iraqi reporter working for The New York Times said that 
the Humvees making the appeal passed through neighborhoods that account for about 
75 percent of the city's population, and that traffic leaving the city picked up quickly 
in neighborhoods where people had previously stayed off the streets.  
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The wild dogs of Najaf ate well this week.  
In this holy city, in lightless basements, in empty crypts, in the shadow of the golden 
dome of the shrine of Imam Ali, thousands of men have tried desperately and often 
successfully to kill one another. They have fought with knives and guns, grenades and 
mortars, tanks and mines and roadside bombs, and sometimes even their bare hands.  
Now, as a cease-fire halts the three-week fight between American forces and Iraqi 
insurgents, the toll from the battle is only too clear. On Friday afternoon, the 
decomposed bodies of insurgent fighters lay in houses in and around the Old City, 
which surrounds the shrine.  
One house at the western edge of the city held four blasted corpses, missing arms and 
legs, their stench heavy in the hot midday sun. Dogs had been at the bodies overnight, 
marines said. Indeed a dog skulked nearby as Iraqi medics carried the remains to an 
ambulance for transport to the shrine, where they are washed before burial.  
As many as 1,000 guerrillas may have been killed since early August, American 
commanders say, along with 11 American marines and soldiers. More than 100 have 
been wounded, including dozens of serious injuries.  
About 3,000 American soldiers and marines took part in the fight, battling somewhere 
between 1,000 and 2,000 guerrillas, a number that varied as Iraqis joined or quit the 
battle.  
For every shot they took, American troops returned scores or hundreds. For every 
mortar round the guerrillas lobbed, the gunners at the Marine base here responded 
with a 100-pound artillery shell. The insurgents had donkey carts loaded with rocket-
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propelled grenades, the Americans 70-ton tanks that can survive direct hits from 
mortars and grenades. The American advantage was especially large at night, when 
night-vision goggles allowed troops to see in the dark.  
The two sides have caused uncounted civilian casualties and inflicted tremendous 
damage on Najaf's Old City. The area stinks of sewage and soot, and its streets are 
filled with rubble from bombed-out buildings. Even the mosque has been slightly 
damaged.  
Civilians walked freely around the shrine on Friday, and the area was nominally 
peaceful, but passions are running high just below the surface. Just before the noon 
prayer call, this reporter was accused of being a spy and set on by a crowd just west of 
the shrine, then briefly taken captive by Moktada al-Sadr's guerrillas, blindfolded and 
tied up, and threatened with death before being released unharmed after senior Sadr 
officials intervened.  
Overwhelming American firepower has caused nearly all of the structural damage, 
although it is unclear whether guerrillas or American troops are responsible for more 
civilian casualties.  
Unlike the guerrillas, American troops generally appeared to make an effort not to fire 
at random, but when fired upon they responded with overwhelming force. They joke 
that they are living bait, luring guerrillas out of their holes to be killed.  
''When we take fire, we just usually light it up,'' said Pfc. Anthony Johnson, a soldier 
in the Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, which fought in the southern part of the 
city.  
For three weeks, the fighting was fierce and nearly nonstop, moving from a sprawling 
cemetery just north of the Old City to the blocks in the southern part of the Old City 
and then nearly to the gates of the shrine itself.  
Armed mainly with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and light machine guns, the 
insurgents tried to counter American troops equipped with tanks and supported by 
artillery and air power.  
The resulting battle was intense but lopsided, especially after the first few days of 
fighting, when the American military brought in two heavy Army battalions to take 
over the fighting in the cemetery and south of the Old City while the marines raided 
strongholds elsewhere in Najaf and Kufa.  
Still, American soldiers and commanders say they have been surprised by the tenacity 
and toughness of the guerrillas, fighters loyal to Mr. Sadr, the rebel Shiite cleric.  
''They're brave,'' said Specialist Mark Siapco, a soldier in the First Battalion, Fifth 
Cavalry, which has fought north of the shrine. ''They're crazy.''  
In the most brazen attack, a guerrilla jumped onto an American tank in the cemetery 
two weeks ago and killed two soldiers before fleeing.  
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''You have to be careful about underestimating your enemy,'' said Lt. Col. Myles 
Miyamasu, commander of the battalion. ''Their tenacity, though not equal to our own, 
probably surprised us a little.''  
Besides the deaths and wounds, many more men have stories of close calls, dud 
mortar shells that failed to explode or bullets that smashed into body armor instead of 
skin and bone. On the front lines, soldiers no longer blink at mortars that explode 50 
feet from their armored vehicles or rocket-propelled grenades trailing sparks by their 
heads, instead methodically trying to figure out the location of the guerrillas in order 
to destroy them.  
''A close call would be getting hit in your Kevlar,'' the chest and back armor that every 
soldier and marine wears, Specialist Siapco said. ''A bullet whizzing by, that doesn't 
count. You don't have to worry about that.''  
American forces advanced daily so that by Thursday the rebels had no ground left to 
give. Early that morning, American tanks reached the gates of the shrine and fought in 
its shadow. On a bombed-out street illuminated only by the stars and the glow from 
the lights attached to the mosque's walls and minarets, the tanks and Bradley fighting 
vehicles turned their turrets left and right, searching for targets.  
Guerrillas fired rocket-propelled grenades from buildings nearby, but even direct hits 
did not seriously damage the American armor. The Bradleys returned fire, pouring 
bursts of 25-millimeter high-explosive shells, essentially miniature grenades, into the 
buildings.  
The shells glowed red, setting fires that burned orange in the night. With the shrine's 
golden dome as a backdrop, the street had a surreal beauty, and soldiers said they 
were astonished to be fighting so close to one of the holiest sites in Islam.  
But the Mahdi Army did not stop fighting. Snipers took aim at Maj. Doug Ollivant, an 
American commander directing the battle from about 100 yards away, and a hidden 
mortar position rained shells around Major Ollivant's armored Humvee. The mortar 
was so close to the Americans that soldiers could hear shells being fired 30 seconds 
before they landed, because they essentially were traveling straight up and down.  
''It's going to kill you, you know,'' Major Ollivant said, as one soldier lighted a 
cigarette not long after a mortar crashed down nearby.  
By Friday afternoon, with a cease-fire in place, the scene in the Old City was very 
different. Men walked through the streets, surveying the damage and walking past 
American troops who would soon be pulled back from their positions.  
''You never know if some of these guys were the guys fighting us,'' one soldier said to 
another, watching the men walk by.  
''I guarantee you some were,'' the second responded.  
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But First Sgt. Justin Lehew of the Marines, whose men killed the fighters whose 
bodies the medics were gathering Friday afternoon, said his troops were not unhappy 
that the fight had ended without a climactic battle.  
''They just want to go home,'' Sergeant Lehew said. ''Like everybody else.''  
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Prime Minister Ayad Allawi gave what he described as a final warning on Thursday 
to the rebel Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, saying the cleric should move quickly to 
fulfill his vow to disarm and leave the shrine in Najaf where his followers have been 
battling American troops for the last two weeks.  
The warning was accompanied by a major intensification of American military 
attacks on targets in Najaf's Old City, around the Imam Ali shrine, with bombing 
strikes and an artillery barrage that lasted deep into Thursday night and lit the sky 
with bursts of flame and smoke.  
An accompanying offensive in Mr. Sadr's other major stronghold, the Baghdad slum 
of Sadr City, saw American troops and armor pushing deep into the heart of the 
intensely populated district, scattering militiamen who have had a virtually 
uncontested run of the area for months.  
With senior officials of the American-led military alliance saying the decision on 
whether to storm the Najaf shrine was one for Dr. Allawi, not for the United States, 
there were growing signs that Iraq's provisional government leader was ready to move 
beyond threats. Aides to Dr. Allawi said an assault led by Iraqi troops, backed by 
American troops and airpower, could come in days if Mr. Sadr backtracked, as he has 
before, on the pledge to disband his militia and vacate the shrine.  
''This is the final call to them to disarm, vacate the holy shrine, and engage in political 
work,'' Dr. Allawi said at a news conference in Baghdad's heavily protected 
international zone, where the new government has its principal offices alongside 
buildings that are the seat of American military and political power. ''We have left the 
doors open, and we hope he will abide by the rule of law.''  
Mr. Sadr, out of sight somewhere in Najaf, sent out conflicting signals. One aide, 
Sheik Ahmed al-Shaibani, told reporters in Najaf on Thursday that the terms set by a 
delegation of Iraqi clerics and politicians who visited the shrine on Tuesday -- 
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essentially those restated by Dr. Allawi to reporters today -- had become untenable. 
''It's very clear that we reject them,'' he said.  
But another cleric, Ali Smeisim, said Mr. Sadr was committed to fulfilling the 
delegation's terms. ''By so doing, we have put the ball in Dr. Allawi's court,'' he said.  
Later in the day, a report by Agence France-Presse from Najaf, quoting a new letter 
said to have been written by Mr. Sadr to his followers, quoted him as saying he would 
not disarm his militia force, known as the Mahdi Army.  
''Everyone knows this army is the foundation of the Imam Mahdi, and I don't have the 
right to dissolve it,'' he said, referring to the 12th Shiite imam, a ninth century leader 
of the sect who Shiites believe will one day manifest himself on earth again as the 
mahdi, or messiah.  
A Western official here said Iraqi officials were ''trying to figure out'' precisely what 
Mr. Sadr had committed himself to in an earlier letter read to a national political 
conference in Baghdad on Tuesday. The letter was taken by many of the delegates as 
an agreement to end the Najaf crisis by disarming, but Mr. Sadr's aides threw doubts 
on that immediately by stipulating that American and Iraqi forces would have to pull 
back from positions in Najaf's Old City before steps would be taken to meet Mr. 
Sadr's side of the deal.  
A top Sadr aide issued a plea to the kidnappers of Micah Garen, the 36-year-old 
American journalist who was taken hostage last week in the southern city of Nasiriya.  
The Associated Press quoted the aide, Sheik Aws al-Khafaji, as saying the Mahdi 
Army was against kidnapping, ''especially this journalist who rendered Nasiriya great 
service.'' This appeared to be a reference to Mr. Garen's efforts over the last year to 
film the looting of archaeological sites near Nasiriya that are treasured for what they 
have revealed of the Sumerian civilization, going back as far as 5,000 years.  
Mr. Khafaji's remarks aligned with the position taken recently by Mr. Sadr, who 
condemned the spate of kidnappings of foreigners across Iraq, some of which have 
ended in beheadings, calling them un-Islamic. Last weekend, clerics loyal to Mr. Sadr 
intervened to free a British journalist, who had been kidnapped from a hotel in the 
southern city of Basra, and appeared with the reporter at a news conference, claiming 
credit for his release. The American military's attempt to increase pressure on Mr. 
Sadr appeared to be focused on bombing and shelling rebel strongholds within a few 
hundred yards of the Sadr stronghold in the Imam Ali Mosque, the holiest Shiite 
shrine in Iraq. An AC-130 gunship pounded rebel positions from above, while tanks 
and armored vehicles fired in the streets.  
Before the attacks on Thursday night, American troops and Sadr militiamen had 
traded volleys of gunfire in the Old City, and three mortars apparently fired by the 
rebels struck a police station, killing seven police officers and wounding at least two 
dozen others.  
The wounded police officers were treated at Najaf's central hospital before being 
transported to the American base on the city's northern outskirts for further treatment. 
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Some were then flown aboard American medevac helicopters to a military hospital in 
Baghdad.  
Capt. Warren Haggray, a chaplain at the Marine base in Najaf, said he had prayed 
alongside the father of a teenage officer named Muhammad whose skull was riddled 
with shrapnel. ''For someone to shoot at a building and injure a 19-year-old in that 
way, God is not in that,'' he said.  
The attacks in Najaf were accompanied by bombing raids in the Sunni stronghold of 
Falluja and the boldest American offensive in months in Sadr City, where Mr. Sadr's 
appeals to poor Shiites, and his recurrent insurrections against the Americans, have 
given him a formidable base.  
By late afternoon, clusters of tanks from the First Cavalry Division were in control of 
an area about two miles into the Baghdad slum, with Apache helicopter gunships 
skimming rooftops in support. Mr. Sadr's fighters were nowhere to be seen, having 
abandoned streets that had been their domain for weeks and melted back into the 
maze of refuse-strewn back streets and alleyways.  
''We've never moved in and stayed like this before,'' said Capt. John Meredith, a tank 
company commander, according to a pool report filed by an American journalist 
embedded with the cavalry division. ''As far as they'll really stop fighting, we'll see.''  
An intelligence officer accompanying the thrust was similarly wary. ''They'll probably 
figure they'll hole up and live to fight another day,'' said Capt. Randall McCauley.  
At briefings in Baghdad, a Western official familiar with the thinking of the top 
American officials in Iraq, Ambassador John D. Negroponte and Gen. George W. 
Casey, said the decision on how to proceed in Najaf rested with Dr. Allawi and his 
government, which took office seven weeks ago as the United States returned formal 
sovereignty to Iraq.  
''I think it would be accurate to say that it's not an American dilemma,'' one official 
said. ''It's a challenge to the Iraqi government.''  
The official added that when the Allawi government had reached a decision, ''they'll 
be communicating'' it to what is now known as the Multinational Force, the 
American-led alliance that underpins the provisional government with 160,000 troops.  
But the simultaneous ratcheting up of attacks by American troops in Najaf and Sadr 
City, Mr. Sadr's principal strongholds, suggested that American commanders already 
had the government's clearance to strike hard, in the hope of pushing Mr. Sadr into 
what, in military terms, would be tantamount to a surrender.  
Iraq's defense minister, Hazim al-Shalaan, confirmed that the military operations were 
planned as a preliminary to tougher actions later. Appearing at the news conference 
with Dr. Allawi, he characterized Thursday's operations in Najaf as a ''cleaning the 
streets'' of Mr. Sadr's militia and said Iraqi forces were poised for a much broader 
attack.  
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He offered no details on how the government intended to force Mr. Sadr's followers 
from the mosque, saying it was prepared to give Mr. Sadr ''more time to think.''  
The Western official who spoke to reporters in Baghdad said those involved knew 
that attacking Sadr militiamen in the mosque, with troops and armor that would have 
to approach down ''densely populated, narrow streets'' and then find ways to clear the 
mosque without damaging it, ''is not going to be an easy military enterprise.'' Dr. 
Allawi, the official said, would probably delay for further negotiations.  
''Over the next couple of days, I'd anticipate that you'd see emissaries running back 
and forth,'' he said.  
But ultimately, he said, Mr. Sadr ''risks having the iron fist come down on him'' if he 
prevaricates.  
He added: ''I think the Iraqi people are tired of bloodshed, and there's no doubt that 
they'd rather not have people storming into the mosque. At the same time, they are 
tired of all this insecurity, so there is a sense that this cannot continue the way it is. At 
some point, the Allawi government will say, 'We've done all we can; this far and no 
further.'''  
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Moktada al-Sadr, the rebel Shiite cleric, still seemed to retain control of the shrine of 
Imam Ali here late on Friday, though there were signs his grip might be weakening as 
the number of fighters loyal to him in the mosque dwindled to a few hundred.  
Earlier in the day, forces loyal to Mr. Sadr said he had promised to ''turn over the 
keys'' of the sacred mosque to aides to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, building 
optimism about an imminent end to the two-week standoff between Mr. Sadr's 
guerrillas, American forces and the interim Iraqi government.  
Ayad Allawi, the interim Iraqi prime minister, who on Thursday issued a ''final call'' 
to Mr. Sadr to quit the mosque, quickly hailed the cleric's offer to cede control of the 
shrine and again called on him to disband his militia and form a political party. Yet, a 
few hours later, at about 10:30 p.m., Mr. Sadr broadcast a new statement from the 
shrine's loudspeakers calling on his followers to gather and fight American forces.  
But skirmishes between American forces and Mr. Sadr's guerrillas slowed Friday after 
exploding Thursday night, and American troops said they would refrain from 
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offensive operations for the immediate future. For their part, Mr. Sadr's fighters 
reportedly said they would stop carrying weapons inside the shrine, where hundreds 
of them have been holed up since the fighting began two weeks ago.  
During the day, the fighters who make up Mr. Sadr's militia, called the Mahdi Army, 
slowly trickled out of the shrine, as American tanks and Humvees exchanged fire with 
enemy snipers less than half a mile from the entrance. ''Many people have left,'' said a 
man who identified himself as Abu Mustafa, a Mahdi Army fighter. ''The shrine is 
emptying.''  
The Iraqi Interior Ministry said Friday evening that Iraqi security forces controlled the 
shrine, a claim disputed both by witnesses and the Iraqi police.  
In Washington, a senior administration official monitoring the situation in Najaf said 
Friday that Mr. Sadr's fighters had vacated the shrine. ''We believe the Imam Ali 
mosque is now free of his fighters,'' the official said, ''but the Iraqi police are not in 
there. We're getting a variety of reports from people on the ground.''  
Dr. Allawi said he was heartened by the day's developments. ''There has been an 
improvement in the security situation in Iraq and especially in holy Najaf,'' he said in 
a statement. ''Let this be the start of a new era and a free Iraq without armed militias.'' 
Late on Friday night, CNN reported that an Iraqi government delegation was 
scheduled to travel to Najaf to negotiate with Mr. Sadr. The report could not be 
immediately confirmed.  
There were promising developments as well in the case of Micah Garen, the 
American freelance journalist seized Wednesday. Mr. Garen appeared in a video on 
Al Jazeera, the Arab satellite network, saying he was being well treated and calling on 
the American military to stop the fighting in Najaf. On Thursday, a top aide to Mr. 
Sadr had urged Mr. Garen's captors to let him go.  
All sides have treaded carefully over the treacherous political ground surrounding the 
shrine. They know they all have much to lose, should the current stalemate descend 
into all-out war.  
Mr. Sadr's guerrillas are no match for American forces and face destruction in a 
pitched battle. But any attack on the inner ring of Najaf's Old City, which surrounds 
the shrine, would inflame Shiite Muslims worldwide. And severe damage to the 
shrine, whether caused by American troops or Mr. Sadr's guerrillas, could provoke 
rebellion among Iraq's Shiites, who are a majority of the population.  
So both the government and Mr. Sadr have alternated hawkish statements and peace 
overtures, playing a tricky game of bluffs and counter-bluffs as each tries to ascertain 
the other's breaking point. Meanwhile, American commanders here continue to plan 
for an attack on the Old City, while acknowledging they were not sure they would 
ever be told to carry out the assault.  
The tightrope that the two sides are walking was clearly visible in the cemetery on 
Thursday and Friday. Late on Thursday night, American soldiers in tanks and 
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armored vehicles pushed to its southern edge, just a few hundred yards from the 
mosque, where they fired tanks and heavy machine guns at buildings in the Old City.  
But on Friday morning, American commanders at the Marine base on the northern 
edge of Najaf pulled their front line more than a mile back, supposedly to respect the 
fact that Friday is the Muslim holy day. The commanders then planned a mission for 
Friday night even more aggressive than the one they had Thursday, before abruptly 
scuttling it after it had already begun. That left the informal cease-fire in place and 
soldiers in the cemetery wondering whether they should plan for a night of violence or 
peace.  
The quiet in the mosque on Friday was broken by occasional gunfire outside. Small 
groups of barefoot men lounged on carpets spread in the shade on the shrine's 
polished white marble floor. They appeared to be fewer than 300, far less than the 
1,000 said to be in the shrine at the start of the fighting.  
Small rooms behind wooden doors also contained men, though their numbers were 
not known. One such room contained a makeshift hospital where injured Mahdi 
militiamen were treated. On Friday, doctors had five injured men including one 
civilian -- a teenage boy who had been selling ice cream when he was struck in the 
chest by a sniper's bullet.  
''The danger is less,'' said a doctor dressed in blue hospital scrubs who identified 
himself as Dr. Amil. Still, large explosions could be heard in the city just after 1:30 
a.m. Saturday morning.  
On Friday, one of Mr. Sadr's spokesmen scurried in and out of the shrine bearing 
messages from Mr. Sadr, who was in an undisclosed location that many said was 
thought to be outside the Old City. The aide, Sheik Ahmed al-Sheibani, announced 
that Mr. Sadr had agreed to turn over control of the shrine to Ayatollah Sistani. He 
said Mr. Sadr's group had contacted Ayatollah Sistani, who is in London recovering 
from heart surgery. Ayatollah Sistani agreed to accept the keys, The Associated Press 
reported from London on Friday, as long as Mr. Sadr's militiamen left altogether. ''If 
the people inside the holy shrine leave it altogether, lock the doors and place the key 
in an envelope and take it to Sistani's office in Najaf, then he has told his people there 
to receive the key,'' a spokesman for Mr. Sistani said.  
Mr. Sheibani, eager to portray the apparent plans for withdrawal to Mr. Sadr's 
advantage, cast the proposed handover as a victory of Shiites over the government. 
''The agreement of Sistani is a hit to the government,'' he said Friday. ''We cannot 
hand over this holy shrine to the government because the government is under the 
authority of occupation.''  
The government for its part also claimed victory when a spokesman for the Iraqi 
Interior Ministry, Sabah Kadhim, made a surprise announcement earlier Friday that 
the Iraqi police had taken the shrine without firing a shot. But as late as 7 p.m. on 
Friday night, Mr. Sadr's militia still controlled its main entrance.  
Though the shrine itself was relatively quiet, streets immediately to the south and east 
crackled with gunfire in a zone where Mahdi snipers fought with Americans. Passers-
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by waved white fabric and held their hands in the air while walking close to walls to 
avoid sniper fire.  
Many of the Mahdi militia members in the shrine on Friday said they were not from 
Najaf. Some had come from Baghdad, others from Shiite towns farther south. They 
said they were drawn to calls by Mr. Sadr to defend Islam against an invading power. 
Imad Hussein said he left his rug business and three young children at home in 
Baghdad to join Mr. Sadr's followers here. ''I'm defending our country, our holy 
places,'' he said. ''What is making America so crazy is that we are fighting for our 
religion.''  
In Friday Prayer in the neighboring town of Kufa, a small aid operation for Najaf was 
taking place. Men were loading plastic bags of drinking water into wheelbarrows, and 
large sacks of flour were stacked high against the mosque's walls.  
Another of Mr. Sadr's aides, Sheik Jabbar al-Hafaji, delivered the prayer on Friday. 
Mr. Hafaji said Mr. Sadr had asked Shiite elders to take over the shrine. ''Even if it's 
not under the Mahdi Army, that's best for the Shiite leadership,'' he said. Mr. Sadr, he 
said, was on his way to martyrdom as American troops advanced in Najaf.  
A woman with a 7-month-old baby knelt on a prayer rug. She said her 20-year-old 
son, Ali, was killed in April during Mr. Sadr's first uprising against the Americans. 
''I'm happy,'' she said, her face expressionless. ''This is for religion.''  
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Truce talks between Iraq's interim government and Moktada al-Sadr's rebels collapsed 
Saturday, prompting American commanders to prepare new battle plans for breaking 
Mr. Sadr's grip on this holy city and the Imam Ali mosque, the Middle East's most 
sacred Shiite shrine.  
Soon after the talks broke down, American marines and soldiers lined up in tanks and 
armored vehicles at their base in Najaf, with some anxiety but ready to begin an 
offensive. Instead, it was called off, for the second time in recent days.  
''We were sitting here waiting for authorization to go clear the militia,'' Maj. David 
Holahan of the Marines told The Associated Press. ''We never got that authorization. 
We'll continue operations as the prime minister sees fit,'' he said, referring to Iraq's 
interim leader, Ayad Allawi.  
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American commanders in Najaf said Dr. Allawi had decided to turn to Iraqi forces, 
not American, to take the lead against Mr. Sadr at such a sensitive location. That 
would be a serious test for the American-trained Iraqi military and police forces, 
which have not performed reliably in the past.  
Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the national security adviser to Dr. Allawi, announced the 
breakdown of the talks, and promised that military operations would resume. He said, 
''I feel deep sorrow and regret to announce the failure of the efforts we have exerted to 
end the crisis in Iraq peacefully. Our goal was to spare blood and preserve security.''  
Dr. Rubaie, 57, a British-trained neurologist who returned from 20 years of exile after 
the toppling of Saddam Hussein last year, added: ''The Iraqi interim government did 
not leave any stone unturned to lead to a peaceful conclusion. The government is 
resuming military clearing operations to return the city of Najaf to normal 
functioning, and to establish law and order in this holy city.''  
But later on, when the American-led offensive was suspended, a smaller convoy of 
American soldiers left the base on another mission: to buy food for families of Najaf.  
A demand that Mr. Sadr disarm his fighters and withdraw them from Najaf seemed to 
undo the talks.  
Mr. Sadr's aides said they had demanded that both sides, the American forces and Mr. 
Sadr's militia force, the Mahdi Army, leave the city. They said the cleric also wanted 
pledges by the government to release scores of Sadr fighters taken prisoner during 
combat, and to give amnesty to all who had taken part.  
The amnesty demand seemed certain to be rejected by American commanders, who 
curbed a broader national amnesty proposal announced by Dr. Allawi earlier this 
week, limiting its terms to exclude any rebels who have taken part in actions killing or 
wounding American troops. The Americans were also wary of any new commitment 
by the cleric to disarm his troops, saying he had breached an earlier cease-fire and 
seemed likely to do so again.  
Dr. Rubaie said he was leaving Najaf immediately to fly to Baghdad, 120 miles north, 
where he was expected to join crisis talks on the next step in confronting Mr. Sadr, a 
populist Shiite cleric who has used the Mahdi Army to stir a widespread insurrection 
in the Shiite heartland of southern Iraq. Since he initiated uprisings across the south in 
the spring, Mr. Sadr has entrenched himself as the most identifiable leader of armed 
resistance to the Americans and as a challenger to lead Iraq's majority Shiite 
population.  
The fighting in Najaf has set off the most serious challenge yet faced by the Allawi 
government in the seven weeks since it took power with the return of sovereignty to 
Iraq. In addition to Najaf, American military commanders and members of the 30-
nation military alliance here have faced a widening series of attacks in a dozen or 
more Shiite towns and cities across a 300-mile swath of territory south of Baghdad, 
including Basra, the second-largest city and linchpin of Iraq's richest oil fields.  
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On Saturday, an American military spokesman said 50 insurgents were killed when 
American aircraft dropped 500-pound bombs on rebel hide-outs in a ground-and-air 
assault on Samarra, north of Baghdad. Hospitals in the city reported 25 people dead 
and 86 wounded. Mosques in the city broadcast appeals on their loudspeakers blood 
donations.  
Near Falluja, the Sunni rebel stronghold west of Baghdad, American warplanes 
bombed suspected rebel positions after Marine units were ambushed with rifle fire, 
rockets and machine guns, the American command said, giving no information about 
casualties. The bombing raid was one of several carried out in recent days, including 
some on targets inside Falluja, which American commanders say is a fortress for 
loyalists of Saddam Hussein and Islamic terrorists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 
Jordanian-born militant suspected of planning suicide bombings, kidnappings and 
other attacks.  
Commanders of the 3,000 American troops deployed around Najaf, mainly from the 
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Army's First Cavalry Division, kept a tight 
lid on preparations for a resumed offensive after negotiations collapsed, saying future 
attacks would not necessarily center on Najaf's Old City and the area around the 
shrine. The short-lived truce allowed both sides to regroup.  
As the talks imploded, fresh convoys of Sadr supporters were arriving in Najaf from 
the cleric's main stronghold in Sadr City, the sprawling Baghdad slum that is home to 
two million Shiites, and from cities as far south as Basra. An Iraqi freelance reporter 
working for The New York Times said one convoy of 200 men had arrived in Najaf 
with food supplies from Falluja.  
There was no immediate sign of Mr. Sadr on Saturday. On Friday, he was reported by 
aides to have suffered shrapnel wounds during a firefight near the shrine in the hours 
before fighting was halted for the talks. Later, he reappeared in the Imam Ali shrine, 
demanding the resignation of the Allawi government, calling it ''worse than Saddam,'' 
and vowing to fight on in Najaf ''until victory or martyrdom.''  
A Sadr aide, Ali Sumeisim, who took part in the talks, told reporters that Dr. Rubaie 
had backtracked on an outline accord that would have had both sides pull back from 
the Old City, leaving the shrine under the control of the aging ayatollahs who form 
Iraq's Shiite clerical hierarchy.  
Mr. Sumeisim accused American commanders and Dr. Allawi of using the talks as a 
smoke screen while plotting a violent showdown intended to wipe out the Mahdi 
Army. ''Today, a vicious plot is being woven to commit a massacre in Iraq,'' he said. 
''I call on all honest people in the world, on all Muslims, to raise their voices and 
expose the truth.''  
It seemed clear that the decision to end the talks had been taken personally by Dr. 
Allawi, who has made a mark already as prime minister with his get-tough approach. 
Dr. Rubaie said Dr. Allawi and other senior ministers had finally concluded that 
''there is no use to continue.''  
 151
The fighting that began in Najaf 10 days ago pitched both sides into a game of 
brinkmanship, with stakes that run to the political future of Iraq. When Mr. Sadr 
began a series of uprisings in April that spread across southern Iraq, he gave notice of 
his determination to mount a violent challenge to the American presence here, and to 
use his defiance as a path to political pre-eminence among Shiite leaders. American 
officials resolved to do everything possible to curb his growing power, regarding him 
as dangerously volatile and violent, as well as deeply influenced by the ruling 
ayatollahs of Iran, who, American intelligence reports say, have funneled weapons 
and money to the Mahdi Army.  
But Mr. Sadr has proved an artful adversary, compensating for superior American 
firepower with tactics -- like turning mosques into fortresses -- that have largely 
preserved him from attack. In what has virtually been hand-to-hand combat, more 
than 360 of his fighters were killed this week in the vast cemetery next to the Imam 
Ali shrine, American officers said. The American command has said six American 
soldiers were killed, along with 20 Iraqi guardsmen.  
In Najaf, Mr. Sadr's trump card has been control of the shrine, which American 
commanders say has been used for firing at Americans soldiers and their allies with 
mortars, rockets and assault rifles.  
In the past, Mr. Sadr has pledged to disarm his fighters and return control of Najaf to 
police and national guard units under Iraqi government control.  
In practice, American and Iraqi officials say, the pledges were never kept, and Mr. 
Sadr's fighters continued to control whole neighborhoods, build up weapons caches 
and attack government buildings and police stations, sometimes taking captives.  
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Iraq had destroyed its illicit weapons stockpiles within months after the Persian Gulf 
war of 1991, and its ability to produce such weapons had significantly eroded by the 
time of the American invasion in 2003, the top American inspector for Iraq said in a 
report made public Wednesday.  
The report by the inspector, Charles A. Duelfer, intended to offer a near-final 
judgment about Iraq and its weapons, said Iraq, while under pressure from the United 
Nations, had ''essentially destroyed'' its illicit weapons ability by the end of 1991, with 
its last secret factory, a biological weapons plant, eliminated in 1996.  
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Mr. Duelfer said that even during those years, Saddam Hussein had aimed at 
''preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction when 
sanctions were lifted.'' But he said he had found no evidence of any concerted effort 
by Iraq to restart the programs.  
The findings uphold Iraq's prewar insistence that it did not possess chemical or 
biological weapons. They also show the enormous distance between the Bush 
administration's own prewar assertions, based on reports by American intelligence 
agencies, and what a 15-month inquiry by American investigators found since the 
war.  
Mr. Duelfer said he had concluded that between 1991 and 2003, Mr. Hussein had in 
effect sacrificed Iraq's illicit weapons to the larger goal of winning an end to United 
Nations sanctions. But he also argued that Mr. Hussein had used the period to try to 
exploit avenues opened by the sanctions, especially the oil-for-food program, to lay 
the groundwork for a plan to resume weapons production if sanctions were lifted.  
In addition, the report concluded that Mr. Hussein had deliberately sought to maintain 
ambiguity about whether it had illicit weapons, mainly as a deterrent to Iran, its rival. 
[Page A28.]  
The American inspector presented his conclusions to Congress on Wednesday, 
including highly charged public testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.  
With Iraq figuring prominently in the last dash toward the presidential election, 
Democrats argued that the report had undermined the administration's case for war, 
while the White House and its Republican allies called attention to elements in the 
report that highlighted potential dangers posed by Mr. Hussein's government.  
''There is no doubt that Saddam was a threat to our nation, and there is no doubt that 
he had W.M.D. capability, and the Duelfer report is very clear on these points,'' said 
James Wilkinson, a White House deputy national security adviser, using the 
abbreviation for weapons of mass destruction.  
The three-volume report, totaling 918 pages, represented the most authoritative 
attempt so far to unravel the mystery posed by Iraq between 1991 and 2003, 
beginning with the point after the Persian Gulf war when Iraq still possessed chemical 
and biological weapons and an active nuclear-weapons program. The conclusions 
suggest that the main war aim cited by the White House in March 2003 -- to disarm 
Iraq, which American intelligence agencies said possessed chemical and biological 
weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program -- was based on an outdated view 
of Iraq's weapons stockpiles.  
At the time of the American invasion, Mr. Duelfer said in the report, Iraq did not 
possess chemical and biological weapons, was not seeking to reconstitute its nuclear 
program, and was not making any active effort to gain those abilities. Even if Iraq had 
sought to restart its weapons programs in 2003, the report said, it could not have 
produced militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons for at least a year, and 
it would have required years to produce a nuclear weapon.  
 153
''Saddam Hussein ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the gulf war,'' Mr. 
Duelfer said in the report. It said American inspectors in Iraq had ''found no evidence 
to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.''  
After a closed briefing by Mr. Duelfer to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator 
John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the top Democrat on the committee, 
described the report as ''a devastating account.''  
''The administration would like the American public to believe that Saddam's intention 
to build a weapons program, regardless of actual weapons or the capability to produce 
weapons, justified invading Iraq,'' Mr. Rockefeller said in a statement. ''In fact, we 
invaded a country, thousands of people have died, and Iraq never posed a grave or 
growing danger.''  
In accounting for what happened beginning in 1991, Mr. Duelfer said Mr. Hussein 
made a fundamental decision after the Persian Gulf war to get rid of Iraq's illicit 
weapons and accept the destruction of its weapons-producing facilities as part of an 
effort to win an end to sanctions imposed by the United Nations to achieve those ends.  
Although Mr. Duelfer concluded that Mr. Hussein had intended to restart his 
programs, the report acknowledged that that conclusion was based more on inference 
than solid evidence. ''The regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival 
of W.M.D. after sanctions,'' it said.  
The report notes that its conclusions were drawn in part from interrogation of Mr. 
Hussein in his prison cell outside Baghdad. Mr. Duelfer, a special adviser to the 
director of central intelligence, said he had concluded that Mr. Hussein had 
deliberately sought to maintain ambiguity about whether Iraq possessed illicit 
weapons, primarily as a deterrent to Iran, Iraq's adversary in an eight-year war in the 
1980's.  
It was not until a series of meetings in late 2002, just months before the American 
invasion, that Mr. Hussein finally acknowledged to senior officers and officials of his 
government that Iraq did not possess illicit weapons, Mr. Duelfer said.  
The report said American investigators had found clandestine laboratories in the 
Baghdad area used by the Iraqi Intelligence Service between 1991 and 2003 to 
conduct research and to test various chemicals and poisons, including ricin. As 
previously reported, it said those efforts appeared to be intended primarily for use in 
assassinations, not to inflict mass casualties.  
Mr. Duelfer said in his report that Mr. Hussein never acknowledged in the course of 
the interrogations what had become of Iraq's illicit weapons. He said that American 
investigators had appealed to the former Iraqi leader to be candid in order to shape his 
legacy, but that Mr. Hussein had not been forthcoming.  
The report said interviews with other former top Iraqi leaders had made clear that Mr. 
Hussein had left many of his top deputies uncertain until the eve of war about whether 
Iraq possessed illicit weapons. It said he seemed to be most concerned about a 
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possible new attack by Iran, whose incursions into Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war of 
1980-88 were fended off by Baghdad partly with the use of chemical munitions.  
Mr. Duelfer said Iraq had tried to maintain the knowledge base necessary to restart an 
illicit weapons program. He said Iraq had essentially put its biological program ''on 
the shelf,'' after its last production facility, Al Hakam, was destroyed by United 
Nations inspectors in 1996, and could have begun to produce biological questions in 
as little as a month if it had restarted its weapons program in 2003.  
But the report said there were ''no indications'' that Iraq was pursuing such a course, 
and it reported ''a complete absence of discussion or even interest in biological 
weapons'' at the level of Mr. Hussein and his aides after the mid-1990's.  
The report will almost certainly be the last complete assessment by the team led by 
Mr. Duelfer, which is known as the Iraq Survey Group. But he said he and the 1,200-
member team would continue their work in Iraq for the time being. He said the team 
had not completely ruled out the possibility that some Iraqi weapons might have been 
smuggled out of Iraq to a neighboring country, like Syria.  
The report did revise several earlier judgments, including a report by the Central 
Intelligence Agency in May 2003 that said mysterious trailers found in Iraq after the 
American invasion in 2003 were intended for use in a biological warfare program. 
Mr. Duelfer said that the trailers could not have been used for that purpose, and that 
their manufacturers ''almost certainly designed and built the equipment exclusively for 
the generation of hydrogen,'' upholding claims by Iraqi officials that linked the trailers 
to weather balloons used for artillery practice.  
Article A122903350 
 
The New York Times, June 19, 2004 
Bush and McCain, Together, Call Iraq War a Conflict Between Good and Evil. 
(Foreign Desk)(THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: THE PRESIDENT) 
Elisabeth Bumiller  
 
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 The New York Times Company 
President Bush and his old political nemesis Senator John McCain shared a military 
stage on Friday to present an unusual joint defense of the war in Iraq, calling it a 
conflict between good and evil that threatened the existence of the United States.  
The united front of the president and Mr. McCain, the Arizona Republican who 
waged a bitter primary fight against Mr. Bush in 2000, was a striking development at 
a time when the president is under political siege for stating that ties between Iraq and 
Al Qaeda in part justified going to war against Saddam Hussein.  
Although Mr. McCain did not assert any link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, he gave a 
lengthy speech introducing Mr. Bush to thousands of soldiers at a steamy hanger in 
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Fort Lewis, Wash., using phrasing that closely followed the president's words about 
Iraq and the administration's battles against terrorism.  
''It's a big thing, this war, a fight between two ideologies completely opposed to each 
other,'' Mr. McCain told the soldiers, many of whom fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
''It's a fight between a just regard for human dignity and a malevolent force that 
defiles an honorable religion by disputing God's love for each and every soul on 
Earth. It's a fight between right and wrong, good and evil. It's no more ambiguous 
than that.''  
Mr. McCain added that should the enemy acquire chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons, ''this war will become an even bigger thing, it will become a fight for 
survival.''  
Mr. Bush, in a speech that was a familiar thank you to the troops as well as an update 
on the antiterrorism effort, repeated that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda. He did not dwell 
on the extent of those ties, which have been questioned by the bipartisan commission 
investigating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.  
Instead, Mr. Bush pointed almost offhandedly to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian 
jihadist who sought help from Al Qaeda in waging the anti-American insurgency after 
Mr. Hussein's fall and who has been implicated in the killing of Nicholas Berg, the 
American who was beheaded by militants in Iraq in May.  
''By the way,'' Mr. Bush said of Mr. Zarqawi, ''he was the fellow who was in Baghdad 
at times prior to our arrival. He was operating out of Iraq. He was an Al Qaeda 
associate. See, he was there before we came. He's there after we came. And we'll find 
him.''  
Later, Mr. Bush and Mr. McCain appeared at an enormous rally at the Reno-Sparks 
Convention Center, where they again reinforced each other to huge cheers.  
''Like all wars, this one has had its ups and down,'' Mr. McCain said. ''It will be a long, 
hard struggle, but it is a necessary and just war.'' Whether or not Mr. Hussein had 
possessed unconventional weapons, Mr. McCain said, ''he had used them before and 
was, I have no doubt, firmly determined to acquire them again for what terrible 
purpose we can only anticipate with dread.''  
It was last week when Mr. McCain was spurning Senator John Kerry's repeated 
proposals to be his running mate, dashing hopes of Democrats who viewed a Kerry-
McCain ticket as unstoppable. A CBS News poll recently found that a Kerry-McCain 
ticket had a 14 percentage point edge over Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney 
among registered voters, 53 percent to 39 percent, compared with most head-to-head 
polls that show Mr. Kerry alone tied or slightly ahead of Mr. Bush.  
Mr. Bush's political operatives say they never took the idea seriously, but they did not 
hide their pleasure about seeing the independent and unpredictable Mr. McCain 
suddenly at the president's side. Mr. McCain, a close friend of Mr. Kerry, has 
regularly infuriated the White House with barbs over the last few years. Mr. Bush's 
 156
political advisers reached out to him during his flirtation with Mr. Kerry, and Friday 
appeared to be a classic triumph of politics over personal feeling.  
Mr. McCain, asked why he was campaigning with Mr. Bush, genially replied, ''First 
time I was asked.''  
Mr. Bush appeared nothing but pleased that Mr. McCain was at his side.  
''Both candidates in this race are honored to be the friend of John McCain,'' the 
president proclaimed here. ''Only one of us gets his vote. And I am proud that it is 
me.''  
At both stops, Mr. Bush and Mr. McCain linked arms in a tableau, creating an image 
of the president with a Vietnam War hero and a man with a strong appeal to 
independent voters that will be of use to Mr. Bush's campaign. Neither Mr. Bush nor 
Vice President Dick Cheney served in combat.  
''There's fundamental agreement on the policies,'' a spokesman for the campaign, 
Terry Holt, said. ''This shows our party is united on the big issues.''  
At Fort Lewis, the largest Army installation on the West Coast, Mr. Bush exuded 
admiration for the military service of Mr. McCain.  
''I want to thank Senator John McCain for joining us,'' the president told the soldiers 
as he and Mr. McCain stood in front of camouflage netting. ''It is a privilege to be 
introduced to our men and women in uniform by a man who brought such credit to the 
uniform. When he speaks of service and sacrifice, he speaks from experience. The 
United States military has no better friend in the United States Senate than John 
McCain.''  
Mr. McCain praised Mr. Bush for his leadership after Sept. 11, 2001.  
''He heard the call to action on that terrible morning in September and summoned the 
rest of us to this long and difficult task,'' Mr. McCain said. ''He has led this country 
with moral clarity about the stakes involved and with firm resolve to achieve 
unconditional victory.''  
Afterward, Mr. Bush jumped into the crowd and shook hands with the soldiers to the 
recorded tunes of ''Stars and Stripes Forever'' and ''Anchors Aweigh.'' Mr. McCain 
hung back for a moment in the president's shadow, but then he plunged in, too. 
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The New York Times, August 6, 2004 
RADICAL CLERIC IN IRAQ SETS OFF DAY OF FIGHTING. 
(Foreign Desk)(THE REACH OF WAR: COMBAT) 
Alex Berenson  
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 The New York Times Company 
The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr called for a national uprising against 
American and allied troops Thursday morning, then backed off near midnight after a 
day of fighting between his guerrillas and American and Iraqi forces.  
The heaviest fighting occurred mainly in Najaf, a Shiite holy city 100 miles south of 
Baghdad that is a stronghold for Mr. Sadr. A Marine helicopter was shot down there, 
but the crew members were evacuated safely, the United States military reported.  
Baghdad, even in the Shiite slum neighborhood of Sadr City, appeared to be mostly 
quiet until 11:15 p.m., when three large explosions, probably from mortars, rocked the 
city's center. Small-arms fire followed.  
One American marine and several insurgents were killed in Najaf, where marines 
fought alongside Iraqi policemen and National Guard troops. At least a dozen more 
soldiers and dozens of insurgents were wounded in both Baghdad and Najaf, though 
exact casualty counts were unavailable late Thursday night.  
Near midnight, Mr. Sadr offered a tentative cease-fire, saying his guerrillas would 
stop fighting if American soldiers did the same, according to a spokesman for the 
group. The offer would renew a two-month-old truce between Mr. Sadr and the 
American military, a truce that had appeared on the verge of crumbling earlier 
Thursday.  
Each side blamed the other for the apparent breakdown of the cease-fire, which comes 
less than two weeks before a national political conference that Mr. Sadr has said he 
will not attend.  
While more confined than the widespread fighting in April and May, Thursday's 
attacks represented the most serious challenge yet to the interim Iraqi government, 
whose head, Ayad Allawi, has struggled to assert his authority since being named 
prime minister in June. Unlike moderate Shiite political leaders like Dr. Allawi, Mr. 
Sadr fiercely opposes the continuing American presence here and has tried twice since 
October to revolt against it.  
Dr. Allawi, who has been traveling outside Iraq for most of the last 10 days, is eager 
to show his independence from the United States and to prove that Iraqi security 
forces can stop the growing violence here. But Thursday's clashes showed again that 
only American troops have the firepower to contain Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army, a well-
armed militia that has fighters across the southern half of Iraq.  
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During the afternoon, American jets swooped over Baghdad and appeared to drop 
several bombs on Sadr City, a giant Shiite slum in Baghdad. A military spokesman 
confirmed that an F-15 fighter had dropped at least one bomb.  
Mr. Sadr, a 31-year-old cleric whose father, Muhammad, was revered by many poor 
Shiites, is a deeply polarizing figure here. Some Iraqis view him as a hothead, while 
others regard him as a courageous leader who has risked his life to defy the United 
States.  
In interviews on Thursday, shopkeepers and residents in the Shiite neighborhood of 
Kadhimiya expressed contempt for what they said was the cleric's quickness to turn to 
weapons and intemperate speeches.  
''He doesn't represent me,'' said Kasim Muhammad, a 25-year-old dress shop owner. 
''There isn't a house in Iraq that doesn't have someone dead because of wars, and he 
talks about carrying weapons.''  
Even in the chaos of kidnappings and car bombs that has roiled the country since the 
American occupation began last year, Mr. Muhammad remains firmly set against Mr. 
Sadr. Four families who live in his neighborhood have lost relatives in car bombings 
this year.  
Last year, an Iraqi judge secretly ordered Mr. Sadr arrested for the murder of a more 
moderate cleric in April 2003, but the authorities hesitated to carry out the warrant for 
fear of provoking his followers. When the United States disclosed the warrant in 
April, nearly two months of clashes followed, ending only when the occupation 
authorities promised not to arrest him.  
Baghdad, which has recently been racked by a spate of kidnappings of both Iraqis and 
Westerners, was very tense on Thursday as word of Mr. Sadr's call for an uprising 
spread. There are no reliable estimates of the exact size of the Mahdi Army, but in the 
past Mr. Sadr has shown he could bring thousands of armed men into the streets.  
In Sadr City, masked Mahdi Army guerrillas controlled intersections and checked 
cars. Iraqi police officers and American soldiers remained outside the area for most of 
the day, and an Iraqi employee of The Times who entered the area twice during the 
afternoon said he had seen no signs of fighting.  
But the Iraqi police reported several firefights in Sadr City during the late afternoon, 
and an American military spokesman told The Associated Press that seven soldiers 
had been wounded in two firefights in the area.  
In Basra, a mostly Shiite city in the southeastern corner of Iraq, a spokesman for Mr. 
Sadr said the Mahdi Army had 1,000 guerrillas ready to fight, according to Reuters.  
The fiercest fighting took place in and around Najaf, where at least seven insurgents 
were killed and at least 22 wounded, according to a military statement. The shrine of 
Imam Ali, a mosque in the center of Najaf that is among the holiest sites to Shiites, 
was slightly damaged in the fighting, The A.P. reported. In general, American troops 
have tried to avoid fighting around the shrine and other Shiite holy sites.  
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The truce between Mr. Sadr and the military has been unraveling for days. It first 
frayed Sunday, when the police arrested a representative of his in Karbala, near Najaf. 
On Monday, marines and Mahdi insurgents battled near a maternity hospital in Najaf, 
and several rebels were killed.  
On Tuesday, American troops approached Mr. Sadr's house in Najaf, according to Dr. 
Salama al-Khafaji, a spokeswoman for a government-appointed council that mediates 
between the cleric and the American authorities. Fighting intensified Wednesday 
night, when troops again approached the house, Dr. Khafaji said.  
''The Americans escalated the whole situation by coming back with their armored 
vehicles and trespassing,'' he said.  
But the American military blamed Mr. Sadr for the breakdown. Marines were sent to 
Najaf's main police station at 3 a.m., after his forces attacked it with machine guns 
and rocket-propelled grenades, according to a military statement. The Iraqi police and 
national guard troops defended the station, and the marines did not fire shots or take 
any casualties, according to the statement.  
''The attack is an overt violation of the cease-fire agreement reached in June between 
coalition forces and Moktada Sadr,'' the statement said. In addition, Mahdi Army 
insurgents recently kidnapped six Iraqi police officers in Najaf, according to the 
statement. Five have been released, but one remains captive, it said.  
In a later military statement, Falah al-Nakib, the Iraqi interior minister, blamed Mr. 
Sadr's forces for the fighting.  
''They attacked Iraqi police and we must respond,'' Mr. Nakib said. ''We have the 
thugs isolated. Our police forces, supported by the multinational force, are doing their 
job.''  
But it was a watch seller in a shop near the Kadhim Shrine -- the most holy in 
Baghdad for Shiites -- who put the situation in the starkest term. Iraqis, said the seller, 
Safa Aswad Abbas, ''are standing in a pit,'' and Mr. Sadr's followers ''think America is 
a big devil.''  
''But if the devil is telling me, 'Give me your hand and I'll get you out,' why shouldn't I 
take it?'' Mr. Abbas asked.  
''Yes, it's the devil,'' he said, ''but I'm dying in this pit.''  
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The New York Times, Oct 24, 2004
Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Are a More Effective Protection.
(Foreign Desk)(THE REACH OF WAR: ALLIES) 
Norimitsu Onishi  
Abstract: Dutch soldiers in Iraq are having a much different experience than 
American soldiers; they are patrolling a relatively peaceful area and are using non-
confrontational methods, such as using soft-topped vehicles, not wearing helmets and 
trying to engage the local people, in order to be seen as friendly guests rather than an 
occupying force. 
 
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 The New York Times Company 
In a neighborhood here without lights, its pockmarked dirt streets and open sewers 
faintly visible under the full moon, the Dutch soldiers began a foot patrol on a recent 
evening. After getting out of their soft-top vehicles, the soldiers entered a street, 
wearing no helmets and pointing their guns down, chatting with Iraqis clustered in 
front of their homes.  
''Hello, Mister!'' some boys cried out, and they followed the soldiers to the bend in the 
road. Driving through the town later, the Dutch called out ''Salaam Aleikum'' to 
pedestrians. Many Iraqis, adults and children, waved at them.  
Part neighborhood police officers, part social workers, the soldiers managed to 
practice in Iraq what the Netherlands has come to call the Dutch approach to 
patrolling. Scarred by national shame over the Dutch peacekeepers who proved 
powerless to stop the Bosnian Serbs from rolling into the United Nations enclave of 
Srebrenica in 1995 and killing thousands of Muslims, the Dutch have nonetheless 
managed to keep a soft touch, honed in Afghanistan and now on display in this small 
town on the Euphrates.  
Instead of armored vehicles, the Dutch drive vehicles that leave them exposed to the 
people around them. To encourage interaction with local residents, they go bare-
headed and are forbidden to wear mirror sunglasses. Making soldiers accessible and 
vulnerable to their surroundings increases their security, they contend. Making them 
inaccessible decreases it.  
''You would lose contact with the people,'' said Lt. Col. Kees Matthijssen, the 
commander of the Dutch force in Iraq. ''In fact, the support and the consent of the 
people is a form of protection. If you have good contact with the people, if it's easy to 
talk to the people, people always give you some information. You know what's in 
their minds, what they're thinking, what's worrying them.''  
Samawa, one of the quietest spots in Iraq outside the Kurdish north, is a world away 
from the lawlessness that has spread across Baghdad and other cities. What the Dutch 
face here cannot be compared with what American soldiers must deal with in the 
capital or in the Sunni triangle, where they are confronted daily with a deadly 
resistance.  
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Yet, perhaps unfairly, the Americans do get compared with the Dutch here, in a way 
that underscores how difficult it will be for Americans to win back some of the 
popular support they enjoyed after the fall of Saddam Hussein. American soldiers are 
not based here, but they regularly make short, though lasting, appearances. American 
convoys traveling the main highway between Baghdad and Kuwait force their way 
through Samawa's crowded main street at full speed and, fearful of becoming targets, 
do not stop even after causing fatal accidents, Dutch and Iraqi officials here say. 
Worried about car-bombers, American soldiers in armored vehicles point guns at 
drivers to keep cars away.  
At this point, Colonel Matthijssen said, he could not say whether the Dutch approach 
would be feasible in a place like Baghdad. ''On the other hand, it might have helped,'' 
he said. ''Everybody is aware of how the Iraqi population is looking at the Americans 
now. They are happy that the Americans liberated them from Saddam Hussein, but I 
wonder if the population is still happy with what the Americans are doing now.''  
The Dutch force, made up of 1,350 troops, is in charge of security in Muthanna 
Province, of which Samawa is the capital. In their 14 months here, two of their 
soldiers have been killed, one in a grenade attack and another in a vehicle ambush. 
The deaths caused the Dutch, at the highest levels of government, to rethink their 
approach.  
But they concluded that the killings were isolated incidents and that the local 
authorities and population remained on their side. Their soft approach, they 
concluded, would keep them safer than hunkering down in armored vehicles.  
''If we have to abandon the Dutch approach, it would be better for us to go home,'' 
said a 23-year-old first lieutenant who insisted on being identified only by his first 
name, Wietse.  
The lieutenant, who commands a platoon of 27 soldiers, oversees a $25,000 budget 
for community projects. After consulting with a superior, he can decide to finance the 
repair of a road, fence or other projects he has found worthy on his patrols.  
During the recent evening patrol, the soldiers walked through a neighborhood for 
about half an hour. They talked to local residents, through an Iraqi interpreter who 
always accompanies them.  
''They are respectful, much better than the Americans,'' said one resident, Hussein 
Kamel, 50.  
A neighbor, Assad Abdul Razak, said he found it ''provocative'' that the Dutch entered 
the neighborhood carrying guns. But most Iraqi comments tended toward the positive.  
The sergeant leading the evening patrol, who spoke on condition that he be identified 
only by his first name, Rene, said: ''We must be respectful. It's their country. We are 
only guests here.''  
Karim Hleibit al-Zayad, the police chief here, made a clear distinction between the 
Dutch and Americans: ''The Dutch have tried seriously to understand our traditions. 
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We do not view them as an occupying force, but a friendly one. The Americans are an 
occupying force. I agree they helped us get rid of the past regime, but they should not 
take away our dignity.''  
In Samawa, Chief Zayad and others here said, the American convoys represent the 
greatest affront to Iraqi dignity. The Dutch and Iraqis say the convoys 
indiscriminately hit private cars and pedestrians, treating Iraqis only as obstacles to be 
removed. A few weeks ago, one such convoy struck a car, killing two Iraqi passengers 
and injuring three, the Dutch said. The convoy never stopped.  
Because of the convoys, ''dislike is growing'' for the Americans, Colonel Matthijssen 
said.  
''Of course, an American is a different type of human than a Dutchman,'' the colonel 
said. ''We have our own culture. But I think the Americans could have a way of 
operating with more respect and more understanding toward the population.''  
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